Compassion - Toward an Ethics of Mindfulness

This work is guided by two hypotheses with one overall objective of establishing an ethics of mindfulness . The first hypothesis is the concept of moral motivator or in- tentional moral. Both Western philosophy and mindfulness operate with an intention influenced by their moral beliefs. The second hypothesis is the relationship between moral reasoning and wisdom. That is, our reasoning is affected by our moral belief . To combine those two theses, I introduce the concept compassion from mindfulness and the ethics based on the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. Hereby, I suggest that by practicing mindfulness, one can develop his or her capacity for compassion, but also – this practice – is a «way of life» that can help protect the planet: an ethical practice

Quaker Virtue Ethics: Religious Life without Creeds

Beliefs are conventionally understood to guide people’s actions. Put another way, the actions which people take are understood to be products of what they believe. However, these claims are challenged by the fact that many Quakers hold that they do not have a creed. This feature of Quakerism creates a tension with the theory that actions must follow from beliefs. That tension prompts a question: How can Quakers make ethical decisions in a clear and decisive manner when they lack a creed? The answer to such a question is significant for two reasons. First, it provides insights into the specific case of Quakerism. Second, it brings about an important examination of the role which creeds play in the ethics of religions in general. Many variations of Quaker ethics resemble virtue ethics. This is not to say that Quakerism and the tradition of virtue ethics share a common origin, as they do not. Rather, the tendencies and values of many Quakers cause them to approach moral dilemmas in a manner which closely resembles that of virtue ethics. Accordingly, virtue ethics can be used as a tool with which one can understand, explain, and defend the ethical reasoning of many Quakers

Wittgenstein and Aesthetic Reasoning with Stories in the Bioethics Classroom

Wittgenstein once remarked that the same kind of reasoning that occurs in ordinary conversations about works of art can be found “in Ethics, but also in Philosophy.” That observation has been almost entirely overlooked by his commentators. What is aesthetic reasoning? What does it look like in conversations about art? And where might we find examples of such reasoning “in Ethics”? To set the stage for my answers, I begin with an overview of the early Wittgenstein’s view of ethics and aesthetics, emphasizing two ideas that were retained in his later view of aesthetic reasoning: the moral importance of non-moral descriptions, and the power of a “picture” to regulate action and thought. I illustrate those ideas by considering the moral influence of Tolstoy’s parable of the Good Samaritan on Wittgenstein. Next, I examine the passage in which Wittgenstein introduced aesthetic reasoning, and I articulate some general features of that concept. I also contend that we learn more about aesthetic reasoning by understanding Wittgenstein’s invention of the language-game concept as his reasoning aesthetically “in Philosophy.” Furthermore, I argue that the later Wittgenstein’s notions of aspect perception and grammatical pictures further inform aesthetic reasoning, revealing that it involves the introduction of grammar that can draw a person’s attention to unnoticed aspects of an object and equip him with further descriptions of that object. To illustrate that characterization of aesthetic reasoning, and to offer an example of such reasoning “in Ethics,” I return to Tolstoy’s parable and show that my interacting with it in a particular way involves aesthetic reasoning. Finally, I argue that aesthetic reasoning continues to occur in ethics in that it is woven into discussions of stories in bioethics classes. A student can have her grammatical picture of the case that a story presents reshaped as she sees and accepts aspects of that story that she had not noticed, and this, in turn, might influence her ways of seeing and responding morally to other cases. I close by considering whether aesthetic reasoning occurs in ethics in other ways, and I articulate some implications of my work for further Wittgenstein studies

From Image to Icon? Ethics and Taste in Photographic Portrayals of the Death of Pym Fortuyn

Moral reasoning based on deontology frames much of the debate in the scholarly literature and the journalism texts about ethics in journalism. Yet when the ethics of journalists and editors are called into question, a variety of forms of moral reasoning seem to appear. This article is a case study of the various forms of moral reasoning that were applied in the public debate which followed publication on May 8, 2002, in The Australian newspaper, of a full colour, front page photograph of assassinated Dutch politician Pym Fortuyn lying dead and uncovered at the crime scene with the accompanying headline: Death of a gay, anti-Muslim maverick. Specifically, this article canvasses the relationship between taste and ethics, the limits of deontological arguments and codes, and the use of casuistry by the newspaper's editor in defending publication of the photograph

From Image to Icon? Ethics and Taste in Photographic Portrayals of the Death of Pym Fortuyn

Moral reasoning based on deontology frames much of the debate in the scholarly literature and the journalism texts about ethics in journalism. Yet when the ethics of journalists and editors are called into question, a variety of forms of moral reasoning seem to appear. This article is a case study of the various forms of moral reasoning that were applied in the public debate which followed publication on May 8, 2002, in The Australian newspaper, of a full colour, front page photograph of assassinated Dutch politician Pym Fortuyn lying dead and uncovered at the crime scene with the accompanying headline: Death of a gay, anti-Muslim maverick. Specifically, this article canvasses the relationship between taste and ethics, the limits of deontological arguments and codes, and the use of casuistry by the newspaper's editor in defending publication of the photograph

Is empathy the missing link in teaching business ethics? A course-based educational intervention with undergraduate business students

Past approaches to teaching ethics have been rooted primarily within the cognitive developmental tradition, with the focus on developing moral reasoning. Recent studies in cognitive neuroscience and social psychology have challenged this emphasis, highlighting the primacy of the emotion in driving moral decision-making. This study proposed that empathy may be an appropriate construct for integrating both processes, and that an moral education intervention that focused on empathetic perspective-taking based on Martin Hoffman\u27s work may prove effective in both advancing moral reasoning and empathy. This approach was applied using a quasi-experimental design with undergraduate business students (N = 181) within a semester-long business ethics course. It was predicted that the class section receiving the empathetic perspective-taking intervention would show more growth on both perspective-taking (Interpersonal Reactivity Index, PT subscale) and moral reasoning (Defining Issues Test-2) measures than the comparison groups receiving the principled moral reasoning approach. Results from repeated measures ANOVAs by group indicated statistically significant differences for the comparison group increases on moral reasoning (DIT-2 N2 score); no difference was seen in the intervention group on either moral reasoning or perspective-taking. The results, however, did indicated a significant difference by gender for the intervention group on one of the subscales, Empathetic Concern, with women increasing and men decreasing in empathetic concern. A discussion of the results offers specific suggestions for integrating empathy into business ethics courses, balancing moral reasoning with emotional engagement and addressing issues related to gender. Also, this study suggests the need for skill-based, context specific measures of empathy

The Development of Ethical Reasoning: A Comparison of Online versus Hybrid Delivery Modes of Ethics Instruction

There is a concerted effort to improve online learning opportunities in higher education, including in the domain of engineering ethics. The benefits of online learning include ease in sharing course content, flexibility in the timing of participation, and increased variation in delivery modes for course material. However, the effect of online and hybrid participation on developing ethical reasoning in students is largely unknown, and interactive cases and dialogic learning are central to the pedagogy in ethics courses. An opportunity to fill this knowledge gap occurred while testing a new pedagogy for enhancing ethical reasoning among engineering graduate students, implemented in a graduate-level course over three offerings in Spring 2014, Summer 2014, and Spring 2015. Of the 29 students enrolled, 11 participated on-campus in a weekly class discussion-based lecture, and 18 completed the majority of course activities online. This multi-phase study presents results from a comparative analysis of the differences in ethical reasoning development and perception of course activities across these groups. Both groups of students showed substantial gains in their ethical reasoning development. Furthermore, changes in ethical reasoning were not significantly different when students participated in the on-line only versus an on-line/in-class or “hybrid” format. Nonetheless, analysis from post-course surveys indicated that the hybrid group perceived course activities more favorably than did their on-line only peers. In sum, these results indicate that on-line ethics interventions can be designed to be as impactful in developing ethical reasoning as formats that include an in-class component, although students may be more satisfied with ethics education when they have the opportunity for face-to-face, in-class interaction with peers and instructors

Comparing Moral Reasoning across Graduate Occupational and Physical Therapy Students and Practitioners

Practicing clinicians must use moral reasoning to solve ethical problems and combat moral distress. Development of moral reasoning in occupational therapy (OT) and physical therapy (PT) students has been significantly under researched. The purpose of this study was to analyze the differences in moral reasoning between first year and second year OT and PT students and between students and OT and PT practitioners. Investigators utilized a cross-sectional study design with a convenience sample of University of Indianapolis OT and PT students and a combination of convenience and snowball sampling to recruit licensed OT and PT practitioners. One hundred and fifty-four participants completed the Defining Issues Test - 2 (DIT-2; Rest et al., 1999) survey. Comparisons of N2 scores using t-tests found no differences between groups in moral reasoning schema (one’s preferred way of approaching moral issues, divided into stratified developmental levels). However, Pearson’s Chi-Square analysis for a comparison of all students to all practitioners for moral reasoning patterns (one’s ability to discriminate between types of moral reasoning schemas when presented with a complex moral dilemma) was significant between students (transitional) and practitioners (consolidated), with the greatest difference between second-year students and practitioners. Continual expansion of ethics content, including interjecting clinical experiences into the classroom, within OT and PT graduate programs may promote moral reasoning pattern development with carryover into practice. Clinical experiences provide real-world opportunities necessary to progress students from transitional to consolidated thinking patterns. To improve ethics education, authors recommend active learning strategies and ethics mentorship throughout clinical experiences

Situating Moral Justification: Rethinking the Mission of Moral Epistemology

This is the first of two companion articles drawn from a larger project, provisionally entitled Undisciplining Moral Epistemology. The overall goal is to understand how moral claims may be rationally justified in a world characterized by cultural diversity and social inequality. To show why a new approach to moral justification is needed, it is argued that several currently influential philosophical accounts of moral justification lend themselves to rationalizing the moral claims of those with more social power. The present article explains how discourse ethics is flawed just in this way. The article begins by identifying several conditions of adequacy for assessing reasoning practices designed to achieve moral justification and shows that, when used in contexts of cultural diversity and social inequality, discourse ethics fails these conditions. It goes on to argue that the failure of discourse ethics is rooted in its reliance on a broader conception of moral epistemology that is invidiously idealized. It concludes by pointing to the need to rethink both the mission and the method of moral epistemology