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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment
Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is reducible to the other. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that practical stakes can affect the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases. First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and outline a particular argument for dualism. Finally, I show how dualism can explain the intuitions that underlie pragmatic encroachment. My basic proposal is that in high-stakes cases, it is not that one cannot rationally believe that p; instead, one ought not to rely on one's belief that p. One should rather rely on one's credence in p. I conclude that we need not commit ourselves to pragmatic encroachment in order to explain the intuitiveness of the cases that motivate it
Empirical interpretation of imprecise probabilities
This paper investigates the possibility of a frequentist interpretation of imprecise probabilities, by generalizing the approach of Bernoulliâs Ars Conjectandi. That is, by studying, in the case of games of chance, under which assumptions imprecise probabilities can be satisfactorily estimated from data. In fact, estimability on the basis of finite amounts of data is a necessary condition for imprecise probabilities in order to have a clear empirical meaning. Unfortunately, imprecise probabilities can be estimated arbitrarily well from data only in very limited settings
Modelling and managing reliability growth during the engineering design process
[This is a keynote speech presented at the 2nd International Conference on Design Engineering and Science, discussing modelling and managing reliability growth during the engineering process.] Reliability is vital for safe and efficient operation of systems. Decisions about the configuration and selection of parts within a system, and the development activities to prove the chosen design, will influence the inherent reliability. Modelling provides a mechanism for explicating the relationship between the engineering activities and the statistical measures of reliability so that useful estimates of reliability can be obtained. Reliability modelling should be aligned to support the decisions taken during design and development. We examine why and how a reliability growth model can be structured, the type of data required and available to populate them, the selection of relevant summary measures, the process for updating estimates and feeding back into design to support planning decisions. The modelling process described is informed by our theoretical background in management science and our practical experience of working with UK industry
Pascalâs wager and the origins of decision theory: decision-making by real decision-makers
Pascalâs Wager does not exist in a Platonic world of possible gods, abstract probabilities and arbitrary payoffs. Real decision-makers, such as Pascalâs âman of the worldâ of 1660, face a range of religious options they take to be serious, with fixed probabilities grounded in their evidence, and with utilities that are fixed quantities in actual minds. The many ingenious objections to the Wager dreamed up by philosophers do not apply in such a real decision matrix. In the situation Pascal addresses, the Wager is a good bet. In the situation of a modern Western intellectual, the reasoning of the Wager is still powerful, though the range of options and the actions indicated are not the same as in Pascalâs day
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A child-centred exploration of the relevance of family and friends to theory of mind development
This is the author's accepted manuscript. The final published article is available from the link below. Copyright @ 2011 The Authors.Theory of Mind (ToM) is said to develop at around 4 years old. But some studies suggest it develops considerably earlier than this, with others suggesting it develops much later. Although several recent studies have found that social factors (like gender, family size, number of siblings, and number of friends) can impact on ToM, other studies contradict those findings. We wondered whether addressing several procedural issues and ensuring the task concerns real protagonists in real time, would bear on the above issues. Here, 114 children of 3â6 years completed four ToM tasks incorporating controls from experimental psychology, including randomly varying the order of ToM and non-ToM questions across participants. Now, children passed ToM tasks from around 5 years old, rather than 4 years or earlier. Girls did not develop ToM any earlier than boys. There was clear correlational evidence for the older-sibling effect and effects of friends but no reliable effects of nuclear or extended family. However, when these factors were set in the context of one another, the sibling effect was driven by a negative influence from younger siblings (as opposed to older siblings) and the friends effect was driven by friends at school (as opposed to friends at home). Finally, âfriendsâ was a stronger predictor than siblings but memory (a cognitive factor) and age (a maturational factor) were the strongest predictors of all
An Analytic View of Delusion
The present article proposes a logical account of delusions, which are regarded as conclusions resulting from fallacious arguments. This leads to distinguish between primary, secondary, ..., n-ary types of delusional arguments. Examples of delusional arguments leading to delusion of reference, delusion of influence, thought-broadcasting delusion and delusion of grandeur are described and then analyzed. This suggests finally a way susceptible of improving the efficiency of cognitive therapy for delusions
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