Reasoning about Knowledge and Strategies under Hierarchical Information

Two distinct semantics have been considered for knowledge in the context of strategic reasoning, depending on whether players know each other's strategy or not. The problem of distributed synthesis for epistemic temporal specifications is known to be undecidable for the latter semantics, already on systems with hierarchical information. However, for the other, uninformed semantics, the problem is decidable on such systems. In this work we generalise this result by introducing an epistemic extension of Strategy Logic with imperfect information. The semantics of knowledge operators is uninformed, and captures agents that can change observation power when they change strategies. We solve the model-checking problem on a class of "hierarchical instances", which provides a solution to a vast class of strategic problems with epistemic temporal specifications on hierarchical systems, such as distributed synthesis or rational synthesis

Reasoning about Knowledge and Strategies: Epistemic Strategy Logic

In this paper we introduce Epistemic Strategy Logic (ESL), an extension of Strategy Logic with modal operators for individual knowledge. This enhanced framework allows us to represent explicitly and to reason about the knowledge agents have of their own and other agents' strategies. We provide a semantics to ESL in terms of epistemic concurrent game models, and consider the corresponding model checking problem. We show that the complexity of model checking ESL is not worse than (non-epistemic) Strategy LogicComment: In Proceedings SR 2014, arXiv:1404.041

Reasoning About Strategies: On the Model-Checking Problem

In open systems verification, to formally check for reliability, one needs an appropriate formalism to model the interaction between agents and express the correctness of the system no matter how the environment behaves. An important contribution in this context is given by modal logics for strategic ability, in the setting of multi-agent games, such as ATL, ATL\star, and the like. Recently, Chatterjee, Henzinger, and Piterman introduced Strategy Logic, which we denote here by CHP-SL, with the aim of getting a powerful framework for reasoning explicitly about strategies. CHP-SL is obtained by using first-order quantifications over strategies and has been investigated in the very specific setting of two-agents turned-based games, where a non-elementary model-checking algorithm has been provided. While CHP-SL is a very expressive logic, we claim that it does not fully capture the strategic aspects of multi-agent systems. In this paper, we introduce and study a more general strategy logic, denoted SL, for reasoning about strategies in multi-agent concurrent games. We prove that SL includes CHP-SL, while maintaining a decidable model-checking problem. In particular, the algorithm we propose is computationally not harder than the best one known for CHP-SL. Moreover, we prove that such a problem for SL is NonElementarySpace-hard. This negative result has spurred us to investigate here syntactic fragments of SL, strictly subsuming ATL\star, with the hope of obtaining an elementary model-checking problem. Among the others, we study the sublogics SL[NG], SL[BG], and SL[1G]. They encompass formulas in a special prenex normal form having, respectively, nested temporal goals, Boolean combinations of goals and, a single goal at a time. About these logics, we prove that the model-checking problem for SL[1G] is 2ExpTime-complete, thus not harder than the one for ATL\star

Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games

We discuss a number of conceptual issues that arise in attempting to capture, in dynamic games, the notion that there is "common understanding" among the players that they are all rational.Belief revision, common belief, counterfactual, dynamic game, model of a game, rationality

Homo Sapiens Sapiens Meets Homo Strategicus at the Laboratory

Homo Strategicus populates the vast plains of Game Theory. He knows all logical implications of his knowledge (logical omniscience) and chooses optimal strategies given his knowledge and beliefs (rationality). This paper investigates the extent to which the logical capabilities of Homo Sapiens Sapiens resemble those possessed by Homo Strategicus. Controlling for other-regarding preferences and beliefs about the rationality of others, we show, in the laboratory, that the ability of Homo Sapiens Sapiens to perform complex chains of iterative reasoning is much better than previously thought. Subjects were able to perform about two to three iterations of reasoning on average.iterative reasoning; depth of reasoning; logical omniscience; rationality; experiments; other-regarding preferences

Distributed System Contract Monitoring

The use of behavioural contracts, to specify, regulate and verify systems, is particularly relevant to runtime monitoring of distributed systems. System distribution poses major challenges to contract monitoring, from monitoring-induced information leaks to computation load balancing, communication overheads and fault-tolerance. We present mDPi, a location-aware process calculus, for reasoning about monitoring of distributed systems. We define a family of Labelled Transition Systems for this calculus, which allow formal reasoning about different monitoring strategies at different levels of abstractions. We also illustrate the expressivity of the calculus by showing how contracts in a simple contract language can be synthesised into different mDPi monitors.Comment: In Proceedings FLACOS 2011, arXiv:1109.239

Reasoning about strategies under partial observability and fairness constraints

A number of extensions exist for Alternating-time Temporal Logic; some of these mix strategies and partial observability but, to the best of our knowledge, no work provides a unified framework for strategies, partial observability and fairness constraints. In this paper we propose AT LK^F_po, a logic mixing strategies under partial observability and epistemic properties of agents in a system with fairness constraints on states, and we provide a model checking algorithm for i

Strategy Logic with Simple Goals: Tractable Reasoning about Strategies

peer reviewe