Modelling the Developing Mind: From Structure to Change

This paper presents a theory of cognitive change. The theory assumes that the fundamental causes of cognitive change reside in the architecture of mind. Thus, the architecture of mind as specified by the theory is described first. It is assumed that the mind is a three-level universe involving (1) a processing system that constrains processing potentials, (2) a set of specialized capacity systems that guide understanding of different reality and knowledge domains, and (3) a hypecognitive system that monitors and controls the functioning of all other systems. The paper then specifies the types of change that may occur in cognitive development (changes within the levels of mind, changes in the relations between structures across levels, changes in the efficiency of a structure) and a series of general (e.g., metarepresentation) and more specific mechanisms (e.g., bridging, interweaving, and fusion) that bring the changes about. It is argued that different types of change require different mechanisms. Finally, a general model of the nature of cognitive development is offered. The relations between the theory proposed in the paper and other theories and research in cognitive development and cognitive neuroscience is discussed throughout the paper

(WP 2014-03) Bounded Rationality and Bounded Individuality

This paper argues that since the utility function conception of the individual is derived from standard rationality theory, the view that rationality is bounded suggests that individuality should also be seen as bounded. The meaning of this idea is developed in terms of two ways in which individuality can be said to be bounded, with one bound associated with Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory and the ‘new’ behavioral economics and a second bound associated with Simon’s evolutionary thinking and the ‘old’ behavioral economics. The paper then shows how different bounded individuality conceptions operate in nudge economics, agent-based modeling, and social identity theory, explaining these conceptions in terms of how they relate to these two behavioral economics views of bounded rationality. How both the ‘new’ and ‘old’ individuality bounds might then be combined in a single account is briefly explored in connection with Kirman’s Marseille fish market analysis

Homogeneous symmetrical threshold model with nonconformity: independence vs. anticonformity

We study two variants of the modified Watts threshold model with a noise (with nonconformity, in the terminology of social psychology) on a complete graph. Within the first version, a noise is introduced via so-called independence, whereas in the second version anticonformity plays the role of a noise, which destroys the order. The modified Watts threshold model, studied here, is homogeneous and posses an up-down symmetry, which makes it similar to other binary opinion models with a single-flip dynamics, such as the majority-vote and the q-voter models. Because within the majority-vote model with independence only continuous phase transitions are observed, whereas within the q-voter model with independence also discontinuous phase transitions are possible, we ask the question about the factor, which could be responsible for discontinuity of the order parameter. We investigate the model via the mean-field approach, which gives the exact result in the case of a complete graph, as well as via Monte Carlo simulations. Additionally, we provide a heuristic reasoning, which explains observed phenomena. We show that indeed, if the threshold r = 0.5, which corresponds to the majority-vote model, an order-disorder transition is continuous. Moreover, results obtained for both versions of the model (one with independence and the second one with anticonformity) give the same results, only rescaled by the factor of 2. However, for r > 0.5 the jump of the order parameter and the hysteresis is observed for the model with independence, and both versions of the model give qualitatively different results.Comment: 12 pages, 4 figures, accepted to Complexit

Concerning Dice and Divinity

Einstein initially objected to the probabilistic aspect of quantum mechanics - the idea that God is playing at dice. Later he changed his ground, and focussed instead on the point that the Copenhagen Interpretation leads to what Einstein saw as the abandonment of physical realism. We argue here that Einstein's initial intuition was perfectly sound, and that it is precisely the fact that quantum mechanics is a fundamentally probabilistic theory which is at the root of all the controversies regarding its interpretation. Probability is an intrinsically logical concept. This means that the quantum state has an essentially logical significance. It is extremely difficult to reconcile that fact with Einstein's belief, that it is the task of physics to give us a vision of the world apprehended sub specie aeternitatis. Quantum mechanics thus presents us with a simple choice: either to follow Einstein in looking for a theory which is not probabilistic at the fundamental level, or else to accept that physics does not in fact put us in the position of God looking down on things from above. There is a widespread fear that the latter alternative must inevitably lead to a greatly impoverished, positivistic view of physical theory. It appears to us, however, that the truth is just the opposite. The Einsteinian vision is much less attractive than it seems at first sight. In particular, it is closely connected with philosophical reductionism.Comment: Contribution to proceedings of Foundations of Probability and Physics, Vaxjo, 200

Geoscience after IT: Part J. Human requirements that shape the evolving geoscience information system

The geoscience record is constrained by the limitations of human thought and of the technology for handling information. IT can lead us away from the tyranny of older technology, but to find the right path, we need to understand our own limitations. Language, images, data and mathematical models, are tools for expressing and recording our ideas. Backed by intuition, they enable us to think in various modes, to build knowledge from information and create models as artificial views of a real world. Markup languages may accommodate more flexible and better connected records, and the object-oriented approach may help to match IT more closely to our thought processes