15,382 research outputs found
Reasoning about actions meets strategic logics (LORI 2013)
International audienceWe introduce ATLEA, a novel extension of Alternating-time Temporal Logic with explicit actions in the object language. ATLEA allows to reason about abilities of agents under commitments to play certain actions. Pre- and postconditions as well as availability and unavailability of actions can be expressed. We show that the multiagent extension of Reiter’s solution to the frame problem can be encoded into ATLEA. We also consider an epistemic extension of ATLEA. We demonstrate that the resulting logic is sufficiently expressive to reason about uniform choices of actions. Complexity results for the satisfiability problem of ATLEA and its epistemic extension are given in the paper
Refining and Delegating Strategic Ability in ATL
We propose extending Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) by an operator <i
refines-to G> F to express that agent i can distribute its powers to a set of
sub-agents G in a way which satisfies ATL condition f on the strategic ability
of the coalitions they may form, possibly together with others agents. We prove
the decidability of model-checking of formulas whose subformulas with this
operator as the main connective have the form ...<i_m
refines-to G_m> f, with no further occurrences of this operator in f.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2014, arXiv:1404.041
A Backward-traversal-based Approach for Symbolic Model Checking of Uniform Strategies for Constrained Reachability
Since the introduction of Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL), many logics
have been proposed to reason about different strategic capabilities of the
agents of a system. In particular, some logics have been designed to reason
about the uniform memoryless strategies of such agents. These strategies are
the ones the agents can effectively play by only looking at what they observe
from the current state. ATL_ir can be seen as the core logic to reason about
such uniform strategies. Nevertheless, its model-checking problem is difficult
(it requires a polynomial number of calls to an NP oracle), and practical
algorithms to solve it appeared only recently.
This paper proposes a technique for model checking uniform memoryless
strategies. Existing techniques build the strategies from the states of
interest, such as the initial states, through a forward traversal of the
system. On the other hand, the proposed approach builds the winning strategies
from the target states through a backward traversal, making sure that only
uniform strategies are explored. Nevertheless, building the strategies from the
ground up limits its applicability to constrained reachability objectives only.
This paper describes the approach in details and compares it experimentally
with existing approaches implemented into a BDD-based framework. These
experiments show that the technique is competitive on the cases it can handle.Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2017, arXiv:1709.0176
The Logic of Joint Ability in Two-Player Tacit Games
Logics of joint strategic ability have recently received attention, with arguably the most influential being those in a family that includes Coalition Logic (CL) and Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). Notably, both CL and ATL bypass the epistemic issues that underpin Schelling-type coordination problems, by apparently relying on the meta-level assumption of (perfectly reliable) communication between cooperating rational agents. Yet such epistemic issues arise naturally in settings relevant to ATL and CL: these logics are standardly interpreted on structures where agents move simultaneously, opening the possibility that an agent cannot foresee the concurrent choices of other agents. In this paper we introduce a variant of CL we call Two-Player Strategic Coordination Logic (SCL2). The key novelty of this framework is an operator for capturing coalitional ability when the cooperating agents cannot share strategic information. We identify significant differences in the expressive power and validities of SCL2 and CL2, and present a sound and complete axiomatization for SCL2. We briefly address conceptual challenges when shifting attention to games with more than two players and stronger notions of rationality
GDL Meets ATL: A Logic for Game Description and Strategic Reasoning
National audienceThis paper presents a logical framework that extends the Game Description Language with coalition operators from Alternating-time Temporal Logic and prioritised strategy connectives. Our semantics is built upon the standard state transition model. The new framework allows us to formalise van Benthem’s game-oriented principles in multi-player games, and formally derive Weak Determinacy and Zermelo’s Theorem for two-player games. We demonstrate with a real-world game how to use our language to specify a game and design a strategy, and how to use our framework to verify a winning/no-losing strategy. Finally, we show that the model-checking problem of our logic is in 2EXPTIME with respect to the size of game structure and the length of formula, which is no worse than the model-checking problem in ATL
Computer Science and Game Theory: A Brief Survey
There has been a remarkable increase in work at the interface of computer
science and game theory in the past decade. In this article I survey some of
the main themes of work in the area, with a focus on the work in computer
science. Given the length constraints, I make no attempt at being
comprehensive, especially since other surveys are also available, and a
comprehensive survey book will appear shortly.Comment: To appear; Palgrave Dictionary of Economic
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