Reasoning About Distributed Knowledge of Groups with Infinitely Many Agents

Spatial constraint systems (scs) are semantic structures for reasoning about spatial and epistemic information in concurrent systems. We develop the theory of scs to reason about the distributed information of potentially infinite groups. We characterize the notion of distributed information of a group of agents as the infimum of the set of join-preserving functions that represent the spaces of the agents in the group. We provide an alternative characterization of this notion as the greatest family of join-preserving functions that satisfy certain basic properties. We show compositionality results for these characterizations and conditions under which information that can be obtained by an infinite group can also be obtained by a finite group. Finally, we provide algorithms that compute the distributive group information of finite groups

Modeling Human Ad Hoc Coordination

Whether in groups of humans or groups of computer agents, collaboration is most effective between individuals who have the ability to coordinate on a joint strategy for collective action. However, in general a rational actor will only intend to coordinate if that actor believes the other group members have the same intention. This circular dependence makes rational coordination difficult in uncertain environments if communication between actors is unreliable and no prior agreements have been made. An important normative question with regard to coordination in these ad hoc settings is therefore how one can come to believe that other actors will coordinate, and with regard to systems involving humans, an important empirical question is how humans arrive at these expectations. We introduce an exact algorithm for computing the infinitely recursive hierarchy of graded beliefs required for rational coordination in uncertain environments, and we introduce a novel mechanism for multiagent coordination that uses it. Our algorithm is valid in any environment with a finite state space, and extensions to certain countably infinite state spaces are likely possible. We test our mechanism for multiagent coordination as a model for human decisions in a simple coordination game using existing experimental data. We then explore via simulations whether modeling humans in this way may improve human-agent collaboration.Comment: AAAI 201

An Epistemic Perspective on Consistency of Concurrent Computations

Consistency properties of concurrent computations, e.g., sequential consistency, linearizability, or eventual consistency, are essential for devising correct concurrent algorithms. In this paper, we present a logical formalization of such consistency properties that is based on a standard logic of knowledge. Our formalization provides a declarative perspective on what is imposed by consistency requirements and provides some interesting unifying insight on differently looking properties

Logic-Based Specification Languages for Intelligent Software Agents

The research field of Agent-Oriented Software Engineering (AOSE) aims to find abstractions, languages, methodologies and toolkits for modeling, verifying, validating and prototyping complex applications conceptualized as Multiagent Systems (MASs). A very lively research sub-field studies how formal methods can be used for AOSE. This paper presents a detailed survey of six logic-based executable agent specification languages that have been chosen for their potential to be integrated in our ARPEGGIO project, an open framework for specifying and prototyping a MAS. The six languages are ConGoLog, Agent-0, the IMPACT agent programming language, DyLog, Concurrent METATEM and Ehhf. For each executable language, the logic foundations are described and an example of use is shown. A comparison of the six languages and a survey of similar approaches complete the paper, together with considerations of the advantages of using logic-based languages in MAS modeling and prototyping.Comment: 67 pages, 1 table, 1 figure. Accepted for publication by the Journal "Theory and Practice of Logic Programming", volume 4, Maurice Bruynooghe Editor-in-Chie

Cooperation Enforcement and Collusion Resistance in Repeated Public Goods Games

Enforcing cooperation among substantial agents is one of the main objectives for multi-agent systems. However, due to the existence of inherent social dilemmas in many scenarios, the free-rider problem may arise during agents' long-run interactions and things become even severer when self-interested agents work in collusion with each other to get extra benefits. It is commonly accepted that in such social dilemmas, there exists no simple strategy for an agent whereby she can simultaneously manipulate on the utility of each of her opponents and further promote mutual cooperation among all agents. Here, we show that such strategies do exist. Under the conventional repeated public goods game, we novelly identify them and find that, when confronted with such strategies, a single opponent can maximize his utility only via global cooperation and any colluding alliance cannot get the upper hand. Since a full cooperation is individually optimal for any single opponent, a stable cooperation among all players can be achieved. Moreover, we experimentally show that these strategies can still promote cooperation even when the opponents are both self-learning and collusive