On the role of explanatory and systematic power in scientific reasoning

The paper investigates measures of explanatory power and how to define the inference schema “Inference to the Best Explanation”. It argues that these measures can also be used to quantify the systematic power of a hypothesis and the inference schema “Inference to the Best Systematization” is defined. It demonstrates that systematic power is a fruitful criterion for theory choice and IBS is truth-conducive. It also shows that even radical Bayesians must admit that systemic power is an integral component of Bayesian reasoning. Finally, the paper puts the achieved results in perspective with van Fraassen’s famous criticism of IB

Effects of corrective feedback on EFL speaking task complexity in China’s university classroom

Corrective feedback (CF) and task complexity are two important pedagogical topics in second language acquisition research in recent years, but there is few research investigating effects of CF on speaking task complexity in China’s university classroom settings. This research, through conducting different versions of speaking task experiments among 24 university students in China, explores the effect of teachers’ CF on English as a Foreign Language (EFL) speaking task complexity. According to the analysis of first-hand data, this research finds CF has different effects on EFL oral production with different task complexity. In simple speaking task, the effects of five kinds of CF (from largest to smallest) are listed as follows: clarification quest, metalinguistic feedback, recast, repetition and confirmation check. Regarding complex speaking task, the effects of five categorized CF are ranked from largest to smallest as follows: metalinguistic feedback, confirmation check, recast, clarification request and repetition. Improving to provide CF in pedagogical practice is an important contribution to promote EFL speaking task, so, on the basis of above research results, appropriate ways and forms of providing CF are expected to promote efficiency of CF in EFL classroom under the context of Chinese university classroom

Channels’ Confirmation and Predictions’ Confirmation: From the Medical Test to the Raven Paradox

After long arguments between positivism and falsificationism, the verification of universal hypotheses was replaced with the confirmation of uncertain major premises. Unfortunately, Hemple proposed the Raven Paradox. Then, Carnap used the increment of logical probability as the confirmation measure. So far, many confirmation measures have been proposed. Measure F proposed by Kemeny and Oppenheim among them possesses symmetries and asymmetries proposed by Elles and Fitelson, monotonicity proposed by Greco et al., and normalizing property suggested by many researchers. Based on the semantic information theory, a measure b* similar to F is derived from the medical test. Like the likelihood ratio, measures b* and F can only indicate the quality of channels or the testing means instead of the quality of probability predictions. Furthermore, it is still not easy to use b*, F, or another measure to clarify the Raven Paradox. For this reason, measure c* similar to the correct rate is derived. Measure c* supports the Nicod Criterion and undermines the Equivalence Condition, and hence, can be used to eliminate the Raven Paradox. An example indicates that measures F and b* are helpful for diagnosing the infection of Novel Coronavirus, whereas most popular confirmation measures are not. Another example reveals that all popular confirmation measures cannot be used to explain that a black raven can confirm “Ravens are black” more strongly than a piece of chalk. Measures F, b*, and c* indicate that the existence of fewer counterexamples is more important than more positive examples’ existence, and hence, are compatible with Popper’s falsification thought

Justifying Inference to the Best Explanation as a Practical Meta-Syllogism on Dialectical Structures

This article discusses how inference to the best explanation (IBE) can be justified as a practical meta-argument. It is, firstly, justified as a *practical* argument insofar as accepting the best explanation as true can be shown to further a specific aim. And because this aim is a discursive one which proponents can rationally pursue in--and relative to--a complex controversy, namely maximising the robustness of one's position, IBE can be conceived, secondly, as a *meta*-argument. My analysis thus bears a certain analogy to Sellars' well-known justification of inductive reasoning (Sellars 1969); it is based on recently developed theories of complex argumentation (Betz 2010, 2011)

Ways in which coherence is confirmation conducive

Recent works in epistemology show that the claim that coherence is truth conducive – in the sense that, given suitable ceteris paribus conditions, more coherent sets of statements are always more probable – is dubious and possibly false. From this, it does not follows that coherence is a useless notion in epistemology and philosophy of science. Dietrich and Moretti 2005 have proposed a formal of account of how coherence is confirmation conducive – that is, of how the coherence of a set of statements facilitates the confirmation of such statements. This account is grounded in two confirmation transmission properties that are satisfied by some of the measures of coherence recently proposed in the literature. These properties explicate everyday and scientific uses of coherence. In his paper, I review the main findings of Dietrich and Moretti 2005 and define two evidence gathering properties that are satisfied by the same measures of coherence and constitute further ways in which coherence is confirmation conducive. At least one of these properties vindicates important applications of the notion of coherence in everyday life and in science

Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science

In the philosophy of science, it is a common proposal that values are illegitimate in science and should be counteracted whenever they drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions. Drawing on recent cognitive scientific research on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Advocates of it have overlooked that values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reliability of scientific inquiry at the group level even when they negatively affect an individual’s cognition. This casts doubt on the proposal that such values should always be illegitimate in science. It also suggests that advocates of that proposal assume a narrow, individualistic account of science that threatens to undermine their own project of ensuring reliable belief formation in science