Causal Confusion in Imitation Learning

Behavioral cloning reduces policy learning to supervised learning by training a discriminative model to predict expert actions given observations. Such discriminative models are non-causal: the training procedure is unaware of the causal structure of the interaction between the expert and the environment. We point out that ignoring causality is particularly damaging because of the distributional shift in imitation learning. In particular, it leads to a counter-intuitive "causal misidentification" phenomenon: access to more information can yield worse performance. We investigate how this problem arises, and propose a solution to combat it through targeted interventions---either environment interaction or expert queries---to determine the correct causal model. We show that causal misidentification occurs in several benchmark control domains as well as realistic driving settings, and validate our solution against DAgger and other baselines and ablations.Comment: Published at NeurIPS 2019 9 pages, plus references and appendice

Seeding with Costly Network Information

We study the task of selecting $k$ nodes in a social network of size $n$, to seed a diffusion with maximum expected spread size, under the independent cascade model with cascade probability $p$. Most of the previous work on this problem (known as influence maximization) focuses on efficient algorithms to approximate the optimal seed set with provable guarantees, given the knowledge of the entire network. However, in practice, obtaining full knowledge of the network is very costly. To address this gap, we first study the achievable guarantees using $o(n)$ influence samples. We provide an approximation algorithm with a tight (1-1/e){\mbox{OPT}}-\epsilon n guarantee, using $O_{\epsilon}(k^2\log n)$ influence samples and show that this dependence on $k$ is asymptotically optimal. We then propose a probing algorithm that queries ${O}_{\epsilon}(p n^2\log^4 n + \sqrt{k p} n^{1.5}\log^{5.5} n + k n\log^{3.5}{n})$ edges from the graph and use them to find a seed set with the same almost tight approximation guarantee. We also provide a matching (up to logarithmic factors) lower-bound on the required number of edges. To address the dependence of our probing algorithm on the independent cascade probability $p$, we show that it is impossible to maintain the same approximation guarantees by controlling the discrepancy between the probing and seeding cascade probabilities. Instead, we propose to down-sample the probed edges to match the seeding cascade probability, provided that it does not exceed that of probing. Finally, we test our algorithms on real world data to quantify the trade-off between the cost of obtaining more refined network information and the benefit of the added information for guiding improved seeding strategies

Practical Attacks Against Graph-based Clustering

Graph modeling allows numerous security problems to be tackled in a general way, however, little work has been done to understand their ability to withstand adversarial attacks. We design and evaluate two novel graph attacks against a state-of-the-art network-level, graph-based detection system. Our work highlights areas in adversarial machine learning that have not yet been addressed, specifically: graph-based clustering techniques, and a global feature space where realistic attackers without perfect knowledge must be accounted for (by the defenders) in order to be practical. Even though less informed attackers can evade graph clustering with low cost, we show that some practical defenses are possible.Comment: ACM CCS 201