The GOOSE Protocol

The majority of the electrical substations built today conform to the international standard IEC 61850 that uniformly defines the communication between the various intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) of the substation automation system. The success of the standard in substation automation has expanded its application to new areas, such as wind power, hydro power, and smart grids. For this thesis, the most intriguing use of the standard is its application to the communication between the control system of internal combustion engines and other equipment in a power plant. The main objective of this thesis is to gain early experience on the use of the Generic Object Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE) protocol, which is often considered the most prominent communication protocol of IEC 61850. In this thesis, the standard IEC 61850 is described, and its most fundamental concepts are illustrated by clear examples. An application based on open source software has been developed in the Linux-environment in conjunction with this thesis. The application enables two IEDs from different manufacturers to exchange GOOSE messages. The emphasis of the thesis is thus on the presentation of the GOOSE protocol and the developed application. The results show that the GOOSE protocol provides compatible interfaces for information exchange between IEDs provided by different manufacturers, and can be seen as a viable option as a future communication protocol. IEC 61850 will likely be put into service in engine power plants, in the near future. The schedule partially depends on the development of the markets and the requirements of the customers.fi=Opinnäytetyö kokotekstinä PDF-muodossa.|en=Thesis fulltext in PDF format.|sv=Lärdomsprov tillgängligt som fulltext i PDF-format

Integrated Centralized Substation Protection

Substation cyber assets are mission critical for protection and control of substations. Managing and ensuring their secure operation is of paramount importance. A known vulnerability is hidden failures which are responsible for about 10% of mis-operations and their detrimental effects on system reliability. The paper presents an integrated centralized substation protection approach that is based on the recently developed setting-less relays which are integrated into a centralized substation protection scheme with the following features: (a) fast, dependable and secure protection of each substation protection zone by a settingless relay, (b) supervision of each settingless relay by validating relay input data by a substation wide state estimator, (c) self-healing against hidden failures by detecting and identifying compromised data and replacing them with estimated values, thus ensuring that the settingless relays will always operate on validated data. The paper provides a summary review of the settingless protective relay and introduces the Integrated Centralized Substation Protection Scheme (ICSP) which uses the data from all settingless relays in the substation to perform a substation wide state estimation. The state estimator uses a hypothesis testing algorithm to determine whether (a) data are valid with no faults or hidden failures, (b) data are valid and a fault exists in the system, or (c) some data are invalid due to hidden failures. In the last case, the state estimator uses the substation state and model to replace the compromised data with estimated values and thus enabling self-immunization against hidden failures. A byproduct of the method is the substation state estimate which is transmitted to the control center where it is used with the state from all substations to synthesize the system wide state estimate and model. Architectural issues are addressed as well as migration issues of existing systems into the proposed ICSP

Security of Process Bus in Digital Substation

Cyber security attacks in substations have been a issue for a very long time [1]. It is necessary to secure the communication between devices in substation automation system. Generally, Substation Automation Systems uses Intelligent Electronic devices (IED) for monitoring, control and protection of substation. In the past, single purpose and mostly hard-wire interconnected devices were safety and control devices. More and more features have been built into multi-function intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) over time. The need for contact between the devices in the scheme has increased by increasing the number of functions per unit. The lack of wide-ranging knowledge of data communication technologies, protocols, remote access and risks to cybersecurity would improve the prospects for cyber-initiated events. Enabling support for authentication and authorization, auditability and logging as well as product and system hardening are critical features for safeguarding electric power grids and power networks. The introduction of a centralized account management system in the substation automation system is a simple solution for adding and removing users who have or are deprived of access. For utilities that have to stick to laws, this is a big advantage. The security logging mechanisms are a must in the case of intrusion prevention, finding unexpected use patterns and for safety forensics. It has to be precise, readily distributed and easily gathered [2]. Adopting new solutions for substations. These systems are following standards and trends, as of which one of them is in particular Ethernet and TCP/IP based communication protocols. The substation automation multicast messages are Generic Object Driven Substation Event (GOOSE) and Sampled Measured Value (SMV), Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS). The two recent standards published to protect the systems are IEC 61850 and IEC 62351. The mainstream development for substation automation is IEC61850. It provides an integrated solution for ensuring communication in substation automation between intelligent electronic devices (IED). On the one side, these standard mandates that GOOSE and SV messages must be used by the RSA cryptosystem to provide source authenticity. This report provides a realistic consideration and review of the implementation in a substation automation system of a stable sampled measured value (SeSV) message. IEC Working Group 15 of Technical Committee 57 released IEC62351 on protection for IEC61850 profiles because of the lack of security features in the standard. However, the use of IEC62351 standards-based SV authentication methods is still not integrated and computational capabilities and performance are not validated and checked with commercial-grade devices. Therefore this report demonstrates the performance of SeSV allowed security feature packets transmitted between security and control devices by appending the extended IEC61850 packets to a message authentication code (MAC). A prototype implementation on a low-cost embedded commodity device has shown that with negligible time delay, the MAC-enabled SV message can completely protect the process bus communication in the digital substation.Master of ScienceComputer and Information Science, College of Engineering and Computer ScienceUniversity of Michigan-Dearbornhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/166307/1/Ramya Karnati Final Thesis.pdfDescription of Ramya Karnati Final Thesis.pdf : Thesi

Toward a substation automation system based on IEC 61850

With the global trend to digitalize substation automation systems, International Electro technical Commission 61850, a communication protocol defined by the International Electrotechnical Commission, has been given much attention to ensure consistent communication and integration of substation high-voltage primary plant assets such as instrument transformers, circuit breakers and power transformers with various intelligent electronic devices into a hierarchical level. Along with this transition, equipment of primary plants in the switchyard, such as non-conventional instrument transformers, and a secondary system including merging units are expected to play critical roles due to their fast-transient response over a wide bandwidth. While a non-conventional instrument transformer has advantages when compared with the conventional one, extensive and detailed performance investigation and feasibility studies are still required for its full implementation at a large scale within utilities, industries, smart grids and digital substations. This paper is taking one step forward with respect to this aim by employing an optimized network engineering tool to evaluate the performance of an Ethernet-based network and to validate the overall process bus design requirement of a high-voltage non-conventional instrument transformer. Furthermore, the impact of communication delay on the substation automation system during peak traffic is investigated through a detailed simulation analysis. © 2021 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland