ReaCog, a Minimal Cognitive Controller Based on Recruitment of Reactive Systems

Schilling M, Cruse H. ReaCog, a Minimal Cognitive Controller Based on Recruitment of Reactive Systems. Frontiers in Neurorobotics. 2017;11: 3.It has often been stated that for a neuronal system to become a cognitive one, it has to be large enough. In contrast, we argue that a basic property of a cognitive system, namely the ability to plan ahead, can already be fulfilled by small neuronal systems. As a proof of concept, we propose an artificial neural network, termed reaCog, that, first, is able to deal with a specific domain of behavior (six-legged-walking). Second, we show how a minor expansion of this system enables the system to plan ahead and deploy existing behavioral elements in novel contexts in order to solve current problems. To this end, the system invents new solutions that are not possible for the reactive network. Rather these solutions result from new combinations of given memory elements. This faculty does not rely on a dedicated system being more or less independent of the reactive basis, but results from exploitation of the reactive basis by recruiting the lower-level control structures in a way that motor planning becomes possible as an internal simulation relying on internal representation being grounded in embodied experiences

Mental states as emergent properties : from walking to consciousness

In this article we propose a bottom-up approach to higher-level mental states, such as emotions, attention, intention, volition, or consciousness. The idea behind this bottom-up approach is that higher-level properties may arise as emergent properties, i.e., occur without requiring explicit implementation of the phenomenon under examination. Using a neural architecture that shows the abilities of autonomous agents, we want to come up with quantitative hypotheses concerning cognitive mechanisms, i.e., to come up with testable predictions concerning the underlying structure and functioning of an autonomous system that can be tested in a robot-control system. we do not want to build an artificial system that is, for example, conscious in the first place. on the contrary, we want to construct a system able to control behavior. only then will this system be used as a tool to test to what extent descriptions of mental phenomena used in psychology or philosophy of mind may be applied to such an artificial system. originally these phenomena are necessarily defined using verbal formulations that allow for interpreting them differently. a functional definition, in contrast, does not suffer from being ambiguous, because it can be expressed explicitly using mathematical formulations that can be tested, for example, in a quantitative simulation. it is important to note that we are not concerned with the “hard” problem of consciousness, i.e., the subjective aspect of mental phenomena. this approach is possible because, adopting a monist view, we assume that we can circumvent the “hard” problem without losing information concerning the possible function of these phenomena. in other words, we assume that phenomenality is an inherent property of both access consciousness and metacognition (or reflexive consciousness). following these arguments, we claim that our network does not only show emergent properties on the reactive level; it also shows that mental states, such as emotions, attention, intention, volition, or consciousness can be observed, too. concerning consciousness, we argue that properties assumed to partially constitute access consciousness are present in our network, including the property of global availability, which means that elements of the procedural memory can be addressed even if they do not belong to the current context. further expansions are discussed that may allow for the recognition of properties attributed to metacognition or reflexive consciousness

Lose a Leg but not Your Head – A Cognitive Extension of a Biologically-inspired Walking Architecture

Schilling M. Lose a Leg but not Your Head – A Cognitive Extension of a Biologically-inspired Walking Architecture. Procedia Computer Science. 2016;88:102-106

Mental states as emergent properties. From walking to consciousness

Cruse H, Schilling M. Mental states as emergent properties. From walking to consciousness. In: Metzinger T, Windt J, eds. Open Mind. Frankfurt/M.: MIND Group Frankfurt/M.; 2015.In this article we propose a bottom-up approach to higher-level mental states, such as emotions, attention, intention, volition, or consciousness. The idea behind this bottom-up approach is that higher-level properties may arise as emergent properties, i.e., occur without requiring explicit implementation of the phenomenon under examination. Using a neural architecture that shows the abilities of autonomous agents, we want to come up with quantitative hypotheses concerning cognitive mechanisms, i.e., to come up with testable predictions concerning the underlying structure and functioning of an autonomous system that can be tested in a robot-control system. We do not want to build an artificial system that is, for example, conscious in the first place. On the contrary, we want to construct a system able to control behavior. Only then will this system be used as a tool to test to what extent descriptions of mental phenomena used in psychology or philosophy of mind may be applied to such an artificial system. Originally these phenomena are necessarily defined using verbal formulations that allow for interpreting them differently. A functional definition, in contrast, does not suffer from being ambiguous, because it can be expressed explicitly using mathematical formulations that can be tested, for example, in a quantitative simulation. It is important to note that we are not concerned with the “hard” problem of consciousness, i.e., the subjective aspect of mental phenomena. This approach is possible because, adopting a monist view, we assume that we can circumvent the “hard” problem without losing information concerning the possible function of these phenomena. In other words, we assume that phenomenality is an inherent property of both access consciousness and metacognition (or reflexive consciousness). Following these arguments, we claim that our network does not only show emergent properties on the reactive level; it also shows that mental states, such as emotions, attention, intention, volition, or consciousness can be observed, too. Concerning consciousness, we argue that properties assumed to partially constitute access consciousness are present in our network, including the property of global availability, which means that elements of the procedural memory can be addressed even if they do not belong to the current context. Further expansions are discussed that may allow for the recognition of properties attributed to metacognition or reflexive consciousness

Integrative Biomimetics of Autonomous Hexapedal Locomotion

Dürr V, Arena PP, Cruse H, et al. Integrative Biomimetics of Autonomous Hexapedal Locomotion. Frontiers in Neurorobotics. 2019;13: 88.Despite substantial advances in many different fields of neurorobotics in general, and biomimetic robots in particular, a key challenge is the integration of concepts: to collate and combine research on disparate and conceptually disjunct research areas in the neurosciences and engineering sciences. We claim that the development of suitable robotic integration platforms is of particular relevance to make such integration of concepts work in practice. Here, we provide an example for a hexapod robotic integration platform for autonomous locomotion. In a sequence of six focus sections dealing with aspects of intelligent, embodied motor control in insects and multipedal robots—ranging from compliant actuation, distributed proprioception and control of multiple legs, the formation of internal representations to the use of an internal body model—we introduce the walking robot HECTOR as a research platform for integrative biomimetics of hexapedal locomotion. Owing to its 18 highly sensorized, compliant actuators, light-weight exoskeleton, distributed and expandable hardware architecture, and an appropriate dynamic simulation framework, HECTOR offers many opportunities to integrate research effort across biomimetics research on actuation, sensory-motor feedback, inter-leg coordination, and cognitive abilities such as motion planning and learning of its own body size

A complex systems approach to education in Switzerland

The insights gained from the study of complex systems in biological, social, and engineered systems enables us not only to observe and understand, but also to actively design systems which will be capable of successfully coping with complex and dynamically changing situations. The methods and mindset required for this approach have been applied to educational systems with their diverse levels of scale and complexity. Based on the general case made by Yaneer Bar-Yam, this paper applies the complex systems approach to the educational system in Switzerland. It confirms that the complex systems approach is valid. Indeed, many recommendations made for the general case have already been implemented in the Swiss education system. To address existing problems and difficulties, further steps are recommended. This paper contributes to the further establishment complex systems approach by shedding light on an area which concerns us all, which is a frequent topic of discussion and dispute among politicians and the public, where billions of dollars have been spent without achieving the desired results, and where it is difficult to directly derive consequences from actions taken. The analysis of the education system's different levels, their complexity and scale will clarify how such a dynamic system should be approached, and how it can be guided towards the desired performance