5 research outputs found
Blockchains and the commons
Blockchain phenomena is similar to the last century gold rush. Blockchain technologies are publicized as being the technical solution for fully decentralizing activities that were for centuries centralized such as administration and banking. Therefore, prominent socio-economical actors all over the world are attracted and ready to invest in these technologies. Despite their large publicity, blockchains are far from being a technology ready to be used in critical economical applications and scientists multiply their effort in warning about the risks of using this technology before understanding and fully mastering it. That is, a blockchain technology evolves in a complex environment where rational and irrational behaviors are melted with faults and attacks. This position paper advocates that the theoretical foundations of blockchains should be a cross research between classical distributed systems, distributed cryptography, self-organized micro-economies, game theory and formal methods. We discuss in the following a set of open research directions interesting in this context
"Zero Cost'' Majority Attacks on Permissionless Blockchains
The core premise of permissionless blockchains is their reliable and secure
operation without the need to trust any individual agent. At the heart of
blockchain consensus mechanisms is an explicit cost (whether work or stake) for
participation in the network and the opportunity to add blocks to the
blockchain. A key rationale for that cost is to make attacks on the network,
which could be theoretically carried out if a majority of nodes were controlled
by a single entity, too expensive to be worthwhile. We demonstrate that a
majority attacker can successfully attack with a {\em negative cost}, which
shows that the protocol mechanisms are insufficient to create a secure network,
and emphasizes the importance of socially driven mechanisms external to the
protocol. At the same time, negative cost enables a new type of majority attack
that is more likely to elude external scrutiny
The Blockchain Of Oz : Specifying Blockchain Failures for Scalable Protocols Offering Unprecedented Safety and Decentralization
Blockchains have starred an outstanding increase in interest from both business and research since Nakamoto’s 2008 Bitcoin. Unfortunately, many questions in terms of results that establish upper-bounds, and of proposals that approach these bounds. Furthermore, the sudden hype surrounding the blockchain world has led to several proposals that are either only partially public, informal, or not proven correct.
The main contribution of this dissertation is to build upon works that steer clear of blockchain puffery, following research methodology. The works of this dissertation converge towards a blockchain that for the first time formally proves and empirically shows deterministic guarantees in the presence of classical Byzantine adversaries, while at the same time pragmatically resolves unlucky cases in which the adversary corrupts an unprecedented percentage of the system. This blockchain is decentralized and scalable, and needs no strong assumptions like synchrony.
For this purpose, we build upon previous work and propose a novel attack of synchronous offchain protocols. We then introduce Platypus, an offchain protocol without synchrony. Secondly, we present Trap, a Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocol for blockchains that also tolerates up to less than half of the processes deviating. Thirdly, we present Basilic, a class of protocols that solves consensus both against a resilient-optimal Byzantine adversary and against an adversary controlling up to less than 2/3 of combined liveness and safety faults. Then, we use Basilic to present Zero-loss Blockchain (ZLB), a blockchain that tolerates less than 2/3 of safety faults of which less than 1/3 can be Byzantine. Finally, we present two random beacon protocols for committee sortition: Kleroterion and Kleroterion+ , that improve previous works in terms of communication complexity and in the number of faults tolerated, respectively
Rationals vs Byzantines in Consensus-based Blockchains
In this paper we analyze from the game theory point of view Byzantine Fault Tolerantblockchains when processes exhibit rational or Byzantine behavior. Our work is the first tomodel the Byzantine-consensus based blockchains as a committeecoordination game. Ourfirstcontribution is to offer a game-theoretical methodology to analyseequilibrium interactions be-tween Byzantine and rational committee members in Byzantine FaultTolerant blockchains.Byzantine processes seek to inflict maximum damage to the system,while rational processesbest-respond to maximise their expected net gains. Oursecondcontribution is to derive condi-tions under which consensus properties are satisfied or not in equilibrium. When the majoritythreshold is lower than the proportion of Byzantine processes, invalid blocks are accepted inequilibrium. When the majority threshold is large, equilibrium can involvecoordination fail-ures, in which no block is ever accepted. However, when the cost ofaccepting invalid blocks islarge, there exists an equilibrium in which blocks are accepted iff they are valid