Rational Proofs with Multiple Provers

Interactive proofs (IP) model a world where a verifier delegates computation to an untrustworthy prover, verifying the prover's claims before accepting them. IP protocols have applications in areas such as verifiable computation outsourcing, computation delegation, cloud computing. In these applications, the verifier may pay the prover based on the quality of his work. Rational interactive proofs (RIP), introduced by Azar and Micali (2012), are an interactive-proof system with payments, in which the prover is rational rather than untrustworthy---he may lie, but only to increase his payment. Rational proofs leverage the provers' rationality to obtain simple and efficient protocols. Azar and Micali show that RIP=IP(=PSAPCE). They leave the question of whether multiple provers are more powerful than a single prover for rational and classical proofs as an open problem. In this paper, we introduce multi-prover rational interactive proofs (MRIP). Here, a verifier cross-checks the provers' answers with each other and pays them according to the messages exchanged. The provers are cooperative and maximize their total expected payment if and only if the verifier learns the correct answer to the problem. We further refine the model of MRIP to incorporate utility gap, which is the loss in payment suffered by provers who mislead the verifier to the wrong answer. We define the class of MRIP protocols with constant, noticeable and negligible utility gaps. We give tight characterization for all three MRIP classes. We show that under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions, MRIP is more powerful than both RIP and MIP ; and this is true even the utility gap is required to be constant. Furthermore the full power of each MRIP class can be achieved using only two provers and three rounds. (A preliminary version of this paper appeared at ITCS 2016. This is the full version that contains new results.)Comment: Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science. ACM, 201

Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proofs

Interactive-proof games model the scenario where an honest party interacts with powerful but strategic provers, to elicit from them the correct answer to a computational question. Interactive proofs are increasingly used as a framework to design protocols for computation outsourcing. Existing interactive-proof games largely fall into two categories: either as games of cooperation such as multi-prover interactive proofs and cooperative rational proofs, where the provers work together as a team; or as games of conflict such as refereed games, where the provers directly compete with each other in a zero-sum game. Neither of these extremes truly capture the strategic nature of service providers in outsourcing applications. How to design and analyze non-cooperative interactive proofs is an important open problem. In this paper, we introduce a mechanism-design approach to define a multi-prover interactive-proof model in which the provers are rational and non-cooperative - they act to maximize their expected utility given others\u27 strategies. We define a strong notion of backwards induction as our solution concept to analyze the resulting extensive-form game with imperfect information. We fully characterize the complexity of our proof system under different utility gap guarantees. (At a high level, a utility gap of u means that the protocol is robust against provers that may not care about a utility loss of 1/u.) We show, for example, that the power of non-cooperative rational interactive proofs with a polynomial utility gap is exactly equal to the complexity class P^{NEXP}

Rational proofs

We study a new type of proof system, where an unbounded prover and a polynomial time verifier interact, on inputs a string x and a function f, so that the Verifier may learn f(x). The novelty of our setting is that there no longer are "good" or "malicious" provers, but only rational ones. In essence, the Verifier has a budget c and gives the Prover a reward r ∈ [0,c] determined by the transcript of their interaction; the prover wishes to maximize his expected reward; and his reward is maximized only if he the verifier correctly learns f(x). Rational proof systems are as powerful as their classical counterparts for polynomially many rounds of interaction, but are much more powerful when we only allow a constant number of rounds. Indeed, we prove that if f ∈ #P, then f is computable by a one-round rational Merlin-Arthur game, where, on input x, Merlin's single message actually consists of sending just the value f(x). Further, we prove that CH, the counting hierarchy, coincides with the class of languages computable by a constant-round rational Merlin-Arthur game. Our results rely on a basic and crucial connection between rational proof systems and proper scoring rules, a tool developed to elicit truthful information from experts.United States. Office of Naval Research (Award number N00014-09-1-0597

Recurrent proofs of the irrationality of certain trigonometric values

We use recurrences of integrals to give new and elementary proofs of the irrationality of pi, tan(r) for all nonzero rational r, and cos(r) for all nonzero rational r^2. Immediate consequences to other values of the elementary transcendental functions are also discussed