113,584 research outputs found

    Cognition in Aristotle's Poetics

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    This paper examines Aristotle’s understanding of the contributions of perceptual and rational cognition to the composition and reception of poetry. An initial outline of Aristotle’s cognitive psychology shows that Aristotelian perception is sufficiently powerful to sustain very rich, complex patterns of behaviour in human as well as non-human animals, and examines the interaction between perception (cognition of the particular and the ‘that’) and the distinctive capacity for reason (which makes possible cognition of the universal and the ‘why’) in human behaviour. The rest of the paper applies this framework to a number of problems in the Poetics: (i) If Aristotelian tekhnĂȘ is defined as a productive disposition involving reason, how can poetic tekhnĂȘ be manifested in the work of poets who work by non-rational habit or talent? (ii) Why does Aristotle believe that the pleasure taken in imitation qua imitation involves rational inference? (iii) What does Aristotle mean when he contrasts history (concerned with the particular) and poetry (concerned with the universal)? (iv) How is Aristotle’s insistence on universality and rationality in the construction of poetic plots to be reconciled with his willingness to tolerate irrationalities and implausibilities

    Through the looking glass: a dynamic lens model approach to multiple cue probability learning

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    Pushing the bounds of rationality: Argumentation and extended cognition

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    One of the central tasks of a theory of argumentation is to supply a theory of appraisal: a set of standards and norms according to which argumentation, and the reasoning involved in it, is properly evaluated. In their most general form, these can be understood as rational norms, where the core idea of rationality is that we rightly respond to reasons by according the credence we attach to our doxastic and conversational commitments with the probative strength of the reasons we have for them. Certain kinds of rational failings are so because they are manifestly illogical – for example, maintaining overtly contradictory commitments, violating deductive closure by refusing to accept the logical consequences of one’s present commitments, or failing to track basing relations by not updating one’s commitments in view of new, defeating information. Yet, according to the internal and empirical critiques, logic and probability theory fail to supply a fit set of norms for human reasoning and argument. Particularly, theories of bounded rationality have put pressure on argumentation theory to lower the normative standards of rationality for reasoners and arguers on the grounds that we are bounded, finite, and fallible agents incapable of meeting idealized standards. This paper explores the idea that argumentation, as a set of practices, together with the procedures and technologies of argumentation theory, is able to extend cognition such that we are better able to meet these idealized logical standards, thereby extending our responsibilities to adhere to idealized rational norms

    Can resources save rationality? ‘Anti-Bayesian’ updating in cognition and perception

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    Resource rationality may explain suboptimal patterns of reasoning; but what of “anti-Bayesian” effects where the mind updates in a direction opposite the one it should? We present two phenomena — belief polarization and the size-weight illusion — that are not obviously explained by performance- or resource-based constraints, nor by the authors’ brief discussion of reference repulsion. Can resource rationality accommodate them

    The Rationality of Perception : Replies to Lord, Railton, and Pautz

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    My replies to Errol Lord, Adam Pautz, and Peter Railton's commentaries on The Rationality of Perception (2017)

    Re-visions of rationality?

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    Empirical evidence suggests proponents of the ‘adaptive toolbox’ framework of human judgment need to rethink their vision of rationality

    Ideal Reasoners don’t Believe in Zombies

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    The negative zombie argument concludes that physicalism is false from the premises that p ∧q is ideally negatively conceivable and that what is ideally negatively conceivable is possible, where p is the conjunction of the fundamental physical truths and laws and q is a phenomenal truth (Chalmers 2002; 2010). A sentence φ is ideally negatively conceivable iff φ is not ruled out a priori on ideal rational reflection. In this paper, I argue that the negative zombie argument is neither a priori nor conclusive. First, I argue that the premises of the argument are true only if there exists an adequate finite ideal reasoner R that believes ◊(p ∧ ÂŹq) on the basis of not believing p→q on a priori basis. Roughly, a finite reasoner is a reasoner with cognitive limitations (e.g. finite memory). I argue that R is finite only if R reasons nonmonotonically and only approach ideal reflection at the limit of a reasoning sequence. This would render the argument nonconclusive. Finally, I argue that, for some q, R does not believe ◊(p ∧ ÂŹq) on the basis of not believing p→q on a priori basis (e.g. for q =‘something is conscious’). This would render the choice of an adequate q dependent on empirical information (and the argument a posteriori). I conclude that the negative zombie argument (and, maybe, all zombie arguments) is neither a priori nor conclusive

    Guidelines to Study Differences in Expressiveness between Ontology Specification Languages: A Case Of Study

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    We focus on our experiences on translating ontologies between two ontology languages, FLogic and Ontolingua, in the framework of Methontology and ODE. Rather than building "ad hoc" translators between languages or using KIF, our option consists of translating through ODE intermediate representations. So, we have built direct translators from ODE intermediate representations to Ontolingua and FLogic, and we have also built reverse translators from these two languages to ODE intermediate representations. Expressiveness of the target languages is the main feature to analyse when automatically generating ontologies from ODE intermediate representations. Therefore, we analyse the expressiveness of Ontolingua and FLogic for creating classes, instances, relations, functions and axioms, which are the essential components in ontologies. The motivation for this analysis can be found in the (KA)ÂČ initiative and can be easily extended to any other domains and languages

    Balancing generalization and lexical conservatism : an artificial language study with child learners

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    Successful language acquisition involves generalization, but learners must balance this against the acquisition of lexical constraints. Such learning has been considered problematic for theories of acquisition: if learners generalize abstract patterns to new words, how do they learn lexically-based exceptions? One approach claims that learners use distributional statistics to make inferences about when generalization is appropriate, a hypothesis which has recently received support from Artificial Language Learning experiments with adult learners (Wonnacott, Newport, & Tanenhaus, 2008). Since adult and child language learning may be different (Hudson Kam & Newport, 2005), it is essential to extend these results to child learners. In the current work, four groups of children (6 years) were each exposed to one of four semi-artificial languages. The results demonstrate that children are sensitive to linguistic distributions at and above the level of particular lexical items, and that these statistics influence the balance between generalization and lexical conservatism. The data are in line with an approach which models generalization as rational inference and in particular with the predictions of the domain general hierarchical Bayesian model developed in Kemp, Perfors & Tenenbaum, 2006. This suggests that such models have relevance for theories of language acquisition
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