A Survey on Retrieval of Mathematical Knowledge

We present a short survey of the literature on indexing and retrieval of mathematical knowledge, with pointers to 72 papers and tentative taxonomies of both retrieval problems and recurring techniques.Comment: CICM 2015, 20 page

Ranking Semantics Based on Subgraphs Analysis

An abstract argumentation framework [15] consists of a direct graph where nodes represent arguments and arrows represent an attack relation among arguments. A semantics is used to evaluate arguments’ acceptability. In the labelling approach [7], this evaluation is done by assigning to each argument a label in, out or undec, meaning that the argument is considered consistently acceptable, non-acceptable or undecided (i.e. no decision can be taken on arguments’ acceptability)

Adapting the DF-QuAD algorithm to bipolar argumentation

We define a quantitative semantics for evaluating the strength of arguments in Bipolar Argumentation frameworks (BAFs) by adapting the Discontinuity-Free QuAD (DF-QuAD) algorithm previously used for evaluating the strength of arguments in Quantitative Argumentation Debates (QuAD) frameworks. We study the relationship between the new semantics and some existing semantics for other argumentation frameworks, as well as some properties of the semantics

Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The Case of Executive Power

There are consequences to theories in a world questioning the power of the President. For decades, some originalists, including Justice Scalia, maintained that the President enjoys “all” executive power. Of course, this is not the Constitution’s actual text (which refers to “the” executive power, not “all” executive power)—but a highly contestable, and potentially dangerous, addition of meaning to the text. As I demonstrate in this Article, adding to the actual text of the Constitution is common in the originalist literature on executive power, whether the precise question is the President’s removal power, the President’s power to refuse to enforce the law, or the President’s obligations under the Emoluments Clause. Using elementary principles from the philosophy of language—principles that apply to all communication—I explain how originalist interpreters in this area “pragmatically enrich” the text, without articulating or justifying those additions and without seeking to test those meanings against the full text of the Constitution. Before one gets to history, the originalist has assumed a unit of textual analysis—a word, a clause, a paragraph—that may effectively enrich the meaning to reflect the interpreter’s preferred policy position. If this is correct, originalists must theorize the “interpretation zone,” a putatively neutral place from which historical inquiries are launched, and explain why interpreters may add meaning by pragmatic enrichment in this zone—particularly if those meanings are falsified by the rest of the Constitution. Perhaps more importantly, originalism’s opponents need to start talking about how to reclaim the actual text of the Constitution

Weighted‐selective aggregated majority‐OWA operator and its application in linguistic group decision making

This paper focuses on the aggregation operations in the group decision-making model based on the concept of majority opinion. The weighted-selective aggregated majority-OWA (WSAM-OWA) operator is proposed as an extension of the SAM-OWA operator, where the reliability of information sources is considered in the formulation. The WSAM-OWA operator is generalized to the quanti- fied WSAM-OWA operator by including the concept of linguistic quantifier, mainly for the group fusion strategy. The QWSAM-IOWA operator, with an ordering step, is introduced to the individual fusion strategy. The proposed aggregation operators are then implemented for the case of alternative scheme of heterogeneous group decision analysis. The heterogeneous group includes the consensus of experts with respect to each specific criterion. The exhaustive multicriteria group decision-making model under the linguistic domain, which consists of two-stage aggregation processes, is developed in order to fuse the experts' judgments and to aggregate the criteria. The model provides greater flexibility when analyzing the decision alternatives with a tolerance that considers the majority of experts and the attitudinal character of experts. A selection of investment problem is given to demonstrate the applicability of the developed model

Public Legal Reason

This essay develops an ideal of public legal reason--a normative theory of legal reasons that is appropriate for a society characterized by religious and moral pluralism. One of the implications of this theory is that normative theorizing about public and private law should eschew reliance on the deep premises of deontology or consequentialism and should instead rely on what the author calls public values--values that can be affirmed without relying on the deep and controversial premises of particular comprehensive moral doctrines. The ideal of public legal reason is then applied to a particular question--whether welfarism (a particular form of normative law and economics) provides the sort of reasons that appropriate for legal practice. The answer to that question is no--to the extent that welfarism contends that the normative assessment of legal policies should rely exclusively on information about individual preferences, welfarism relies on deep and controversial premises of consequentialist moral theory that fail the test of public reason. The essay also investigates the thesis--advanced by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell--that any fairness principle (a nonwelfarist method of policy assessment) can violate weak Pareto (making everyone worse off). Whatever the implications of Kaplow and Shavell\u27s argument, it does not show that welfarism can provide public legal reasons. The essay concludes that law\u27s justifications should rely on normative principles that are accessible to reasonable citizens, whether they are theists or atheists, deontologists or consequentialists, moral philosophers or economists. Law\u27s deliberations should be shallow and not deep. Law\u27s reason should be public