Randomized strategies for the plurality problem

AbstractWe consider a game played by two players, Paul and Carol. At the beginning of the game, Carol fixes a coloring of n balls. At each turn, Paul chooses a pair of the balls and asks Carol whether the balls have the same color. Carol truthfully answers his question. Paul’s goal is to determine the most frequent (plurality) color in the coloring by asking as few questions as possible. The game is studied in the probabilistic setting when Paul is allowed to choose his next question randomly.We give asymptotically tight bounds both for the case of two colors and many colors. For the balls colored by k colors, we prove a lower bound Ω(kn) on the expected number of questions; this is asymptotically optimal. For the balls colored by two colors, we provide a strategy for Paul to determine the plurality color with the expected number of 2n/3+O(nlogn) questions; this almost matches the lower bound 2n/3−O(n)

Acyclic Games and Iterative Voting

We consider iterative voting models and position them within the general framework of acyclic games and game forms. More specifically, we classify convergence results based on the underlying assumptions on the agent scheduler (the order of players) and the action scheduler (which better-reply is played). Our main technical result is providing a complete picture of conditions for acyclicity in several variations of Plurality voting. In particular, we show that (a) under the traditional lexicographic tie-breaking, the game converges for any order of players under a weak restriction on voters' actions; and (b) Plurality with randomized tie-breaking is not guaranteed to converge under arbitrary agent schedulers, but from any initial state there is \emph{some} path of better-replies to a Nash equilibrium. We thus show a first separation between restricted-acyclicity and weak-acyclicity of game forms, thereby settling an open question from [Kukushkin, IJGT 2011]. In addition, we refute another conjecture regarding strongly-acyclic voting rules.Comment: some of the results appeared in preliminary versions of this paper: Convergence to Equilibrium of Plurality Voting, Meir et al., AAAI 2010; Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting, Meir, COMSOC 201

Computing Majority with Triple Queries

Consider a bin containing $n$ balls colored with two colors. In a $k$-query, $k$ balls are selected by a questioner and the oracle's reply is related (depending on the computation model being considered) to the distribution of colors of the balls in this $k$-tuple; however, the oracle never reveals the colors of the individual balls. Following a number of queries the questioner is said to determine the majority color if it can output a ball of the majority color if it exists, and can prove that there is no majority if it does not exist. We investigate two computation models (depending on the type of replies being allowed). We give algorithms to compute the minimum number of 3-queries which are needed so that the questioner can determine the majority color and provide tight and almost tight upper and lower bounds on the number of queries needed in each case.Comment: 22 pages, 1 figure, conference version to appear in proceedings of the 17th Annual International Computing and Combinatorics Conference (COCOON 2011

Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard

Voting is a general method for preference aggregation in multiagent settings, but seminal results have shown that all (nondictatorial) voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard computationally. A number of recent papers study the complexity of manipulating existing protocols. This paper is the first work to take the next step of designing new protocols that are especially hard to manipulate. Rather than designing these new protocols from scratch, we instead show how to tweak existing protocols to make manipulation hard, while leaving much of the original nature of the protocol intact. The tweak studied consists of adding one elimination preround to the election. Surprisingly, this extremely simple and universal tweak makes typical protocols hard to manipulate! The protocols become NP-hard, #P-hard, or PSPACE-hard to manipulate, depending on whether the schedule of the preround is determined before the votes are collected, after the votes are collected, or the scheduling and the vote collecting are interleaved, respectively. We prove general sufficient conditions on the protocols for this tweak to introduce the hardness, and show that the most common voting protocols satisfy those conditions. These are the first results in voting settings where manipulation is in a higher complexity class than NP (presuming PSPACE $\neq$ NP)

Noisy Rumor Spreading and Plurality Consensus

Error-correcting codes are efficient methods for handling \emph{noisy} communication channels in the context of technological networks. However, such elaborate methods differ a lot from the unsophisticated way biological entities are supposed to communicate. Yet, it has been recently shown by Feinerman, Haeupler, and Korman {[}PODC 2014{]} that complex coordination tasks such as \emph{rumor spreading} and \emph{majority consensus} can plausibly be achieved in biological systems subject to noisy communication channels, where every message transferred through a channel remains intact with small probability $\frac{1}{2}+\epsilon$, without using coding techniques. This result is a considerable step towards a better understanding of the way biological entities may cooperate. It has been nevertheless be established only in the case of 2-valued \emph{opinions}: rumor spreading aims at broadcasting a single-bit opinion to all nodes, and majority consensus aims at leading all nodes to adopt the single-bit opinion that was initially present in the system with (relative) majority. In this paper, we extend this previous work to $k$-valued opinions, for any $k\geq2$. Our extension requires to address a series of important issues, some conceptual, others technical. We had to entirely revisit the notion of noise, for handling channels carrying $k$-\emph{valued} messages. In fact, we precisely characterize the type of noise patterns for which plurality consensus is solvable. Also, a key result employed in the bivalued case by Feinerman et al. is an estimate of the probability of observing the most frequent opinion from observing the mode of a small sample. We generalize this result to the multivalued case by providing a new analytical proof for the bivalued case that is amenable to be extended, by induction, and that is of independent interest.Comment: Minor revisio