Field Experiments: A Bridge Between Lab and Naturally-Occurring Data

Laboratory experiments have been used extensively in economics in the past several decades to lend both positive and normative insights into a myriad of important economic issues. This study discusses a related approach that has increasingly grown in prominence of late--field experiments. I argue that field experiments serve as a useful bridge between data generated in the lab and empirical studies using naturally-occurring data. In discussing this relationship, I highlight that field experiments can yield important insights into economic theory and provide useful guidance to policymakers. I also draw attention to an important methodological contribution of field experiments: they provide an empirical account of behavioral principles that are shared across different domains. In this regard, at odds with conventional wisdom, I argue that representativeness of the environment, rather than representative of the sampled population, is the most crucial variable in determining generalizability of results for a large class of experimental laboratory games.

Market Design, Human Behavior, and Management

We review past research and discuss future directions on how the vibrant research areas of market design and behavioral economics have influenced and will continue to impact the science and practice of management in both the private and public sectors. Using examples from various auction markets, reputation and feedback systems in online markets, matching markets in education, and labor markets, we demonstrate that combining market design theory, behavioral insights, and experimental methods can lead to fruitful implementation of superior market designs in practice

Introduction to Economic Analysis

This book presents introductory economics ("principles") material using standard mathematical tools, including calculus. It is designed for a relatively sophisticated undergraduate who has not taken a basic university course in economics. It also contains the standard intermediate microeconomics material and some material that ought to be standard but is not. The book can easily serve as an intermediate microeconomics text. The focus of this book is on the conceptual tools and not on fluff. Most microeconomics texts are mostly fluff and the fluff market is exceedingly over-served by $100+ texts. In contrast, this book reflects the approach actually adopted by the majority of economists for understanding economic activity. There are lots of models and equations and no pictures of economists

Suljettujen online-mainosalustojen strategiat — tapaukset Google ja Facebook

This thesis studies closed ad platforms in the modern online advertising industry. The research in the field is still nascent and the concept of a closed ad platform doesn’t exist. The objective of the research was to discover the main factors determining the revenue of online advertising platforms and to understand why some publishers choose to establish their own closed ad platforms instead of selling their inventory for third-party ad platforms. The concept of a closed ad platform is defined leveraging the existing online advertising literature and the platform governance structure theory. Using the case study method, Google and Facebook were chosen as the cases as they have driven most of the innovation in the field and quickly gained significant market share. In total, 47 people were interviewed for this study, most of them working for advanced online advertisers. Based on the interviews, a microeconomic mathematic formula is created for modeling an ad platform’s net advertising revenue. The formula is used to identify the five main drivers of an ad platform’s revenue an each of them are studied in depth. The results suggest that the most important revenue drivers the ad platforms can affect are access to an active user base, the efficiency of ad serving and the comprehensiveness of measurement. Setting up a closed ad platform requires significant investments from a publisher and should be only done if it can improve the advertisers’ results. After it’s been established, a closed platform can leverage its position to collect user data and structured business data to optimize its performance further. The results provide a structured understanding of the main dynamics in the industry that can be used in decision-making and a basis for future research on closed ad platforms.Tämä diplomityö tutkii suljettuja mainosalustoja nykyaikaisella online-mainonta-alalla. Alan tutkimus on vielä aluillaan ja suljetun mainosalustan konseptia ei ole olemassa. Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli löytää online-mainosalustojen liikevaihdon määrittävät tekijät ja ymmärtää miksi jotkut julkaisijat valitsevat omien suljettujen mainosalustojen perustamisen mainospaikkojen kolmansien osapuolien mainosalustoille myymisen sijaan. Suljetun mainosalustan konsepti määritellään olemassaolevaa online- mainontakirjallisuutta ja alustojen hallintarakenneteoriaa hyödyntäen. Tapaustutkimusmenetelmää käyttäen, Google ja Facebook valittiin tapauksiksi, sillä ne ovat ajaneet eniten innovaatioita alalla ja nopeasti saavuttaneet merkittävän markkinaosuuden. Yhteensä 47 henkilöä haastateltiin tätä tutkimusta varten, useimmat heistä edistyneiden online-mainostajien työntekijöitä. Haastattelujen perusteella luodaan mikrotaloudellinen matemaattinen kaava mainosalustan nettoliikevaihdon mallintamiseksi. Kaavaa käytetään tunnistamaan mainosalustan liikevaihdon viisi pääkomponenttia, ja kuhunkin niistä perehdytään syvällisemmin. Tulokset viittaavat, että tärkeimmät liikevaihdon ajurit, joihin mainosalustat voivat vaikuttaa ovat pääsy aktiiviseen käyttäjäkantaan, mainosten näyttämisen tehokkuus ja mittaamisen kattavuus. Suljetun mainosalustan perustaminen vaatii merkittäviä investointeja julkaisijalta ja tulisi tehdä ainoastaan, jos sillä voidaan parantaa mainostajien tuloksia. Suljetun alustan perustamisen jälkeen sen positiota voidaan hyödyntää käyttäjädatan ja strukturoidun liiketoimintadatan keräämiseksi suorituskyvyn edelleen optimoimiseksi. Tulokset tarjoavat toimialan päädynamiikkojen ymmärryksen, jota voidaan käyttää päätöksenteossa sekä pohjana suljettujen mainosalustojen edelleen tutkimiseksi tulevaisuudessa

Is Behavioral Economics Doomed?

It is fashionable to criticize economic theory for focusing too much on rationality and ignoring the imperfect and emotional way in which real economic decisions are reached. All of us facing the global economic crisis wonder just how rational economic men and women can be. Behavioral economics—an effort to incorporate psychological ideas into economics—has become all the rage. This book by well-known economist David K. Levine questions the idea that behavioral economics is the answer to economic problems. It explores the successes and failures of contemporary economics both inside and outside the laboratory. It then asks whether popular behavioral theories of psychological biases are solutions to the failures. It not only provides an overview of popular behavioral theories and their history, but also gives the reader the tools for scrutinizing them. Levine’s book is essential reading for students and teachers of economic theory and anyone interested in the psychology of economics

Competition between demand-side intermediaries in ad exchanges

Online advertising constitutes one of the main sources of revenue for the majority of businesses on the web. Online advertising inventory was traditionally traded via bilateral contracts between publishers and advertisers, vastly through a number of intermediaries. However, what caused an explosion in the volume and, consequently, the revenue of online ads was the incorporation of auctions as the major mechanism for trading sponsored search ads in all major search engines. This reduced transaction costs and allowed for the advertisement of small websites which constitute the majority of Internet traffic. Auction-based markets were harder to establish in the display advertising industry due to the higher volume of inventory and the pre-existence of traditional intermediaries, often leading to inefficiencies and lack of transparency. Nevertheless, this has recently changed with the introduction of the ad exchanges, centralized marketplaces for the allocation of display advertising inventory that support auctions and real-time bidding. The appearance of ad exchanges has also altered the market structure of both demand-side and supply side intermediaries which increasingly adopt auctions to perform their business operations. Hence, each time a user enters a publisher's website, the contracted ad exchange runs an auction among a number of demand-side intermediaries, each of which represents their interested advertisers and typically submits a bid by running a local auction among these advertisers.Against this background, within this thesis, we look both at the auction design problem of the ad exchange and the demand-side intermediaries as well as at the strategies to be adopted by advertisers. Specifically, we study the revenue and efficiency effects of the introduction and competition of the demand-side intermediaries in a single-item auction setting with independent private valuations. The introduction of these intermediaries constitutes a major issue for ad exchanges since they hide some of the demand from the ad exchange and hence can make a profit by pocketing the difference between what they receive from their advertisers and what they pay at the exchange. Ad exchanges were created to offer transparency to both sides of the market, so it is important to study the share of the revenue that intermediaries receive to justify their services offered given the competition they face by other such intermediaries. The existence of mediators is a well-known problem in other settings. For this reason, our formulation is general enough to encompass other areas where two levels of auctions arise, such as procurement auctions with subcontracting and auctions with colluding bidders.In more detail, we study the effects of the demand-side intermediaries' choice of auction for three widely used mechanisms, two variations of the second-price sealed-bid (known as Vickrey) auction, termed PRE and POST, and first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) auctions. We first look at a scenario with a finite number of intermediaries, each implementing the same mechanism, where we compare the profits attained for all stakeholders. We find that there cannot be a complete profit ranking of the three auctions: FPSB auctions yield higher expected profit for a small number of competing intermediaries, otherwise PRE auctions are better for the intermediaries. We also find that the ad exchange benefits from intermediaries implementing POST auctions. We then let demand-side intermediaries set reserve (or floor) prices, that are known to increase an auctioneer's expected revenue. For issues of analytical tractability, we only consider scenarios with two intermediaries but we also compare the two Vickrey variations in heterogeneous settings where one intermediary implements the first whereas the other implements the second variation. We find that intermediaries, in general, follow mixed reserve-price-setting strategies whose distributions are difficult to derive analytically. For this reason, we use the fictitious play algorithm to calculate approximate equilibria and numerically compare the revenue and efficiency of the three mechanisms for specific instances. We find that PRE seems to perform best in terms of attained profit but is less efficient than POST. Hence, the latter might be a better option for intermediaries in the long term.Finally, we extend the previous setting by letting advertisers strategically select one of the two intermediaries when the latter implement each of the two Vickrey variations. We analytically derive the advertisers' intermediary selection strategies in equilibrium. Given that, in some cases, these strategies are rather complex, we use again the fictitious play algorithm to numerically calculate the intermediaries' and the ad exchange's best responses for the same instances as before. We find that, when both intermediaries implement POST auctions, advertisers always select the low-reserve intermediary, otherwise they generally follow randomized strategies. Last, we find that the ad exchange benefits from intermediaries implementing the pre-award Vickrey variation compared to a setting with two heterogeneous Vickrey intermediary auctioneers, whereas the opposite is true for the intermediaries.<br/