771 research outputs found
The "No Justice in the Universe" phenomenon: why honesty of effort may not be rewarded in tournaments
In 2000 Allen Schwenk, using a well-known mathematical model of matchplay
tournaments in which the probability of one player beating another in a single
match is fixed for each pair of players, showed that the classical
single-elimination, seeded format can be "unfair" in the sense that situations
can arise where an indisputibly better (and thus higher seeded) player may have
a smaller probability of winning the tournament than a worse one. This in turn
implies that, if the players are able to influence their seeding in some
preliminary competition, situations can arise where it is in a player's
interest to behave "dishonestly", by deliberately trying to lose a match. This
motivated us to ask whether it is possible for a tournament to be both honest,
meaning that it is impossible for a situation to arise where a rational player
throws a match, and "symmetric" - meaning basically that the rules treat
everyone the same - yet unfair, in the sense that an objectively better player
has a smaller probability of winning than a worse one. After rigorously
defining our terms, our main result is that such tournaments exist and we
construct explicit examples for any number n >= 3 of players. For n=3, we show
(Theorem 3.6) that the collection of win-probability vectors for such
tournaments form a 5-vertex convex polygon in R^3, minus some boundary points.
We conjecture a similar result for any n >= 4 and prove some partial results
towards it.Comment: 26 pages, 2 figure
Who Can Win a Single-Elimination Tournament?
A single-elimination (SE) tournament is a popular way to select a winner in
both sports competitions and in elections. A natural and well-studied question
is the tournament fixing problem (TFP): given the set of all pairwise match
outcomes, can a tournament organizer rig an SE tournament by adjusting the
initial seeding so that their favorite player wins? We prove new sufficient
conditions on the pairwise match outcome information and the favorite player,
under which there is guaranteed to be a seeding where the player wins the
tournament. Our results greatly generalize previous results. We also
investigate the relationship between the set of players that can win an SE
tournament under some seeding (so called SE winners) and other traditional
tournament solutions. In addition, we generalize and strengthen prior work on
probabilistic models for generating tournaments. For instance, we show that
\emph{every} player in an player tournament generated by the Condorcet
Random Model will be an SE winner even when the noise is as small as possible,
; prior work only had such results for . We also establish new results for significantly more
general generative models.Comment: A preliminary version appeared in Proceedings of the 30th AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 201
Bookmaker Consensus and Agreement for the UEFA Champions League 2008/09
Bookmakers odds are an easily available source of ``prospective" information that is thus often employed for forecasting the outcome of sports events. To investigate the statistical properties of bookmakers odds from a variety of bookmakers for a number of different potential outcomes of a sports event, a class of mixed-effects models is explored, providing information about both consensus and (dis)agreement across bookmakers. In an empirical study for the UEFA Champions League, the most prestigious football club competition in Europe, model selection yields a simple and intuitive model with team-specific means for capturing consensus and team-specific standard deviations reflecting agreement across bookmakers. The resulting consensus forecast performs well in practice, exhibiting high correlation with the actual tournament outcome. Furthermore, the teams' agreement can be shown to be strongly correlated with the predicted consensus and can thus be incorporated in a more parsimonious model for agreement while preserving the same consensus fit.Series: Research Report Series / Department of Statistics and Mathematic
Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments
We study an elimination tournament with heterogenous contestants whose ability is common-knowledge. Each pair-wise match is modeled as an all-pay auction where the winner gets the right to compete at the next round. Equilibrium efforts are in mixed strategies, yielding rather complex play dynamics: the endogenous win probabilities in each match depend on the outcome of other matches through the identity of the expected opponent in the next round. The designer can seed the competitors according to their ranks. For tournaments with four players we find optimal seedings with respect to three different criteria: 1) maximization of total effort in the tournament; 2) maximization of the probability of a final among the two top ranked teams; 3) maximization of the win probability for the top player. In addition, we find the seedings ensuring that higher ranked players have a higher probability to win the tournament. Finally, we compare the theoretical predictions with data from NCAA basketball tournaments
Single-Elimination Brackets Fail to Approximate Copeland Winner
Single-elimination (SE) brackets appear commonly in both sports tournaments and the voting theory literature. In certain tournament models, they have been shown to select the unambiguously-strongest competitor with optimum probability. By contrast, we reevaluate SE brackets through the lens of approximation, where the goal is to select a winner who would beat the most other competitors in a round robin (i.e., maximize the Copeland score), and find them lacking. Our primary result establishes the approximation ratio of a randomly-seeded SE bracket is 2^{- Theta(sqrt{log n})}; this is underwhelming considering a 1/2 ratio is achieved by choosing a winner uniformly at random. We also establish that a generalized version of the SE bracket performs nearly as poorly, with an approximation ratio of 2^{- Omega(sqrt[4]{log n})}, addressing a decade-old open question in the voting tree literature
Football Championships and Jersey Sponsors' Stock Prices: An Empirical Investigation
Corporate sports sponsorship is an important part of many companies? corporate communication strategy. We take the example of major football tournaments to show that sponsorship indeed affects the sponsor?s (stock) market value. We find a statistically significant impact of football results (at an individual game level) of the seven most important football nations at European and World Championships on the stock prices of jersey sponsors. In general, the more important a match and the less expected its result, the higher its impact. In addition, we find a form of ?mere exposure?-effect which contradicts the efficient markets hypothesis.Sports sponsorship, Advertising, Stock market efficiency
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