3,426 research outputs found
Lightweight Mutual Authentication Protocol for Low Cost RFID Tags
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology one of the most promising
technologies in the field of ubiquitous computing. Indeed, RFID technology may
well replace barcode technology. Although it offers many advantages over other
identification systems, there are also associated security risks that are not
easy to be addressed. When designing a real lightweight authentication protocol
for low cost RFID tags, a number of challenges arise due to the extremely
limited computational, storage and communication abilities of Low-cost RFID
tags. This paper proposes a real mutual authentication protocol for low cost
RFID tags. The proposed protocol prevents passive attacks as active attacks are
discounted when designing a protocol to meet the requirements of low cost RFID
tags. However the implementation of the protocol meets the limited abilities of
low cost RFID tags.Comment: 11 Pages, IJNS
Efficient and Low-Cost RFID Authentication Schemes
Security in passive resource-constrained Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) tags is of much interest nowadays. Resistance against illegal tracking,
cloning, timing, and replay attacks are necessary for a secure RFID
authentication scheme. Reader authentication is also necessary to thwart any
illegal attempt to read the tags. With an objective to design a secure and
low-cost RFID authentication protocol, Gene Tsudik proposed a timestamp-based
protocol using symmetric keys, named YA-TRAP*. Although YA-TRAP* achieves its
target security properties, it is susceptible to timing attacks, where the
timestamp to be sent by the reader to the tag can be freely selected by an
adversary. Moreover, in YA-TRAP*, reader authentication is not provided, and a
tag can become inoperative after exceeding its pre-stored threshold timestamp
value. In this paper, we propose two mutual RFID authentication protocols that
aim to improve YA-TRAP* by preventing timing attack, and by providing reader
authentication. Also, a tag is allowed to refresh its pre-stored threshold
value in our protocols, so that it does not become inoperative after exceeding
the threshold. Our protocols also achieve other security properties like
forward security, resistance against cloning, replay, and tracking attacks.
Moreover, the computation and communication costs are kept as low as possible
for the tags. It is important to keep the communication cost as low as possible
when many tags are authenticated in batch-mode. By introducing aggregate
function for the reader-to-server communication, the communication cost is
reduced. We also discuss different possible applications of our protocols. Our
protocols thus capture more security properties and more efficiency than
YA-TRAP*. Finally, we show that our protocols can be implemented using the
current standard low-cost RFID infrastructures.Comment: 21 pages, Journal of Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous Computing,
and Dependable Applications (JoWUA), Vol 2, No 3, pp. 4-25, 201
MUMAP: Modified Ultralightweight Mutual Authentication protocol for RFID enabled IoT networks
Flawed authentication protocols led to the need for a secured protocol for radio frequency identification (RFID) techniques. In this paper, an authentication protocol named Modified ultralightweight mutual authentication protocol (MUMAP) has been proposed and cryptanalysed by Juel-Weis challenge. The proposed protocol aimed to reduce memory requirements in the authentication process for low-cost RFID tags with limited resources. Lightweight operations like XOR and Left Rotation, are used to circumvent the flaws made in the other protocols. The proposed protocol has three-phase of authentication. Security analysis of the proposed protocol proves its resistivity against attacks like desynchronization, disclosure, tracking, and replay attack. On the other hand, performance analysis indicates that it is an effective protocol to use in low-cost RFID tags. Juel-Weis challenge verifies the proposed protocol where it shows insusceptibility against modular operations
A New Ultra-lightweight RFID Authentication Protocol using Merge and Separation Operations
Abstract Since Low-cost RFID tags have very limited hardware resources, it is difficult to implement an authentication protocol which uses heavy operations such as modern ciphers or hash functions. It has been presented some ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocols for low-cost RFID tags by using very light operations. Recently, Jeon and Yoon proposed a new ultra-lightweight RFID authentication protocol. They defined and used the merge and separation operations. The merge operation can merge the bits from two bit strings and the separation operation is an inverse operation of the merge operation. However, we found that the protocol cannot serve correctly when the collision of tag pseudonyms is occurred. In this paper, we propose an improved authentication protocol that solves the problem. We show that the proposed protocol can resist various security attacks and is efficient enough to implement low-cost RFID tags
A two-step mutual authentication protocol based on randomized hash-lock for small RFID networks
RFID has been widely used in today's commercial and supply chain industry, due to the significant advantages it offers and the relatively low production cost. However, this ubiquitous technology has inherent problems in security and privacy. This calls for the development of simple, efficient and cost effective mechanisms against a variety of security threats. This paper proposes a two-step authentication protocol based on the randomized hash-lock scheme proposed by S. Weis in 2003. By introducing additional measures during the authentication process, this new protocol proves to enhance the security of RFID significantly, and protects the passive tags from almost all major attacks, including tag cloning, replay, full-disclosure, tracking, and eavesdropping. Furthermore, no significant changes to the tags is required to implement this protocol, and the low complexity level of the randomized hash-lock algorithm is retained
CriptografĂa ligera en dispositivos de identificaciĂłn por radiofrecuencia- RFID
Esta tesis se centra en el estudio de la tecnologĂa de identificaciĂłn por radiofrecuencia (RFID), la cual puede ser considerada como una de las tecnologĂas mĂĄs prometedoras dentro del ĂĄrea de la computaciĂłn ubicua. La tecnologĂa RFID podrĂa ser el sustituto de los cĂłdigos de barras. Aunque la tecnologĂa RFID ofrece numerosas ventajas frente a otros sistemas de identificaciĂłn, su uso lleva asociados riesgos de seguridad, los cuales no son fĂĄciles de resolver. Los sistemas RFID pueden ser clasificados, atendiendo al coste de las etiquetas, distinguiendo principalmente entre etiquetas de alto coste y de bajo coste. Nuestra investigaciĂłn se centra fundamentalmente en estas Ășltimas. El estudio y anĂĄlisis del estado del arte nos ha permitido identificar la necesidad de desarrollar soluciones criptogrĂĄficas ligeras adecuadas para estos dispositivos limitados. El uso de soluciones criptogrĂĄficas estĂĄndar supone una aproximaciĂłn correcta desde un punto de vista puramente teĂłrico. Sin embargo, primitivas criptogrĂĄficas estĂĄndar (funciones resumen, cĂłdigo de autenticaciĂłn de mensajes, cifradores de bloque/flujo, etc.) exceden las capacidades de las etiquetas de bajo coste. Por tanto, es necesario el uso de criptografĂa ligera._______________________________________This thesis examines the security issues of Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID) technology, one of the most promising technologies in the field of
ubiquitous computing. Indeed, RFID technology may well replace barcode
technology. Although it offers many advantages over other identification
systems, there are also associated security risks that are not easy to address.
RFID systems can be classified according to tag price, with distinction
between high-cost and low-cost tags. Our research work focuses mainly
on low-cost RFID tags. An initial study and analysis of the state of the
art identifies the need for lightweight cryptographic solutions suitable for
these very constrained devices. From a purely theoretical point of view,
standard cryptographic solutions may be a correct approach. However,
standard cryptographic primitives (hash functions, message authentication
codes, block/stream ciphers, etc.) are quite demanding in terms of circuit
size, power consumption and memory size, so they make costly solutions
for low-cost RFID tags. Lightweight cryptography is therefore a pressing
need.
First, we analyze the security of the EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard,
which is considered the universal standard for low-cost RFID tags.
Secondly, we cryptanalyze two new proposals, showing their unsuccessful
attempt to increase the security level of the specification without much further
hardware demands. Thirdly, we propose a new protocol resistant to
passive attacks and conforming to low-cost RFID tag requirements. In this
protocol, costly computations are only performed by the reader, and security
related computations in the tag are restricted to very simple operations.
The protocol is inspired in the family of Ultralightweight Mutual Authentication
Protocols (UMAP: M2AP, EMAP, LMAP) and the recently proposed
SASI protocol. The thesis also includes the first published cryptanalysis of
xi
SASI under the weakest attacker model, that is, a passive attacker. Fourthly,
we propose a new protocol resistant to both passive and active attacks and
suitable for moderate-cost RFID tags. We adapt Shieh et.âs protocol for
smart cards, taking into account the unique features of RFID systems. Finally,
because this protocol is based on the use of cryptographic primitives
and standard cryptographic primitives are not supported, we address the
design of lightweight cryptographic primitives. Specifically, we propose
a lightweight hash function (Tav-128) and a lightweight Pseudo-Random
Number Generator (LAMED and LAMED-EPC).We analyze their security
level and performance, as well as their hardware requirements and show that both could be realistically implemented, even in low-cost RFID tags
Mutual Authentication Protocols for RFID Systems
Radio-Frequency Identification Devices (RFID) is emerging as a pervasive computing technology with numerous applications. Current low-cost RFID tags are highly resource-constrained and cannot support complex security mechanisms. Hence they have potential risks and may violate the privacy of their bearers. The challenge in providing security for low-cost RFID tags lies in that they are computationally weak devices, unable to perform even basic symmetric-key cryptographic operations as proposed in currently available protocols. In this thesis we have analyzed the security issues and requirements for a RFID system. We have proposed a suite of lightweight mutual authentication protocols for low-cost RFID tags which offer an adequate level of security at much reduced cost. We also compare our proposed protocols with those proposed by others. Furthermore we apply our proposed protocol to secure a supply chain management system.Computer Science Departmen
SLEC: A Novel Serverless RFID Authentication Protocol Based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography
Internet of Things (IoT) is a new paradigm that has been evolving into the wireless sensor networks to expand the scope of networked devices (or things). This evolution drives communication engineers to design secure and reliable communication at a low cost for many network applications such as radio frequency identification (RFID). In the RFID system, servers, readers, and tags communicate wirelessly. Therefore, mutual authentication is necessary to ensure secure communication. Normally, a central server supports the authentication of readers and tags by distributing and managing the credentials. Recent lightweight RFID authentication protocols have been proposed to satisfy the security features of RFID networks. Using a serverless RFID system is an alternative solution to using a central server. In this model, both the reader and the tag perform mutual authentication without the need for the central server. However, many security challenges arise from implementing lightweight authentication protocols in serverless RFID systems. We propose a new secure serverless RFID authentication protocol based on the famous elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). The protocol also maintains the confidentiality and privacy of the messages, tag information, and location. Although most of the current serverless protocols assume secure channels in the setup phase, we assume an insecure environment during the setup phase between the servers, readers, and tags. We ensure that the credentials can be renewed by any checkpoint server in the mobile RFID network. Thus, we implement ECC in the setup phase (renewal phase), to transmit and store the communication credentials of the server to multiple readers so that the tags can perform the mutual authentication successfully while far from the server. The proposed protocol is compared with other serverless frameworks proposed in the literature in terms of computation cost and attacks resistance.http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/electronics810116
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