Using automata to characterise fixed point temporal logics

This work examines propositional fixed point temporal and modal logics called mu-calculi and their relationship to automata on infinite strings and trees. We use correspondences between formulae and automata to explore definability in mu-calculi and their fragments, to provide normal forms for formulae, and to prove completeness of axiomatisations. The study of such methods for describing infinitary languages is of fundamental importance to the areas of computer science dealing with non-terminating computations, in particular to the specification and verification of concurrent and reactive systems. To emphasise the close relationship between formulae of mu-calculi and alternating automata, we introduce a new first recurrence acceptance condition for automata, checking intuitively whether the first infinitely often occurring state in a run is accepting. Alternating first recurrence automata can be identified with mu-calculus formulae, and ordinary, non-alternating first recurrence automata with formulae in a particular normal form, the strongly aconjunctive form. Automata with more traditional Büchi and Rabin acceptance conditions can be easily unwound to first recurrence automata, i.e. to mu-calculus formulae. In the other direction, we describe a powerset operation for automata that corresponds to fixpoints, allowing us to translate formulae inductively to ordinary Büchi and Rabin-automata. These translations give easy proofs of the facts that Rabin-automata, the full mu-calculus, its strongly aconjunctive fragment and the monadic second-order calculus of n successors SnS are all equiexpressive, that Büchi-automata, the fixpoint alternation class Pi_2 and the strongly aconjunctive fragment of Pi_2 are similarly related, and that the weak SnS and the fixpoint-alternation-free fragment of mu-calculus also coincide. As corollaries we obtain Rabin's complementation lemma and the powerful decidability result of SnS. We then describe a direct tableau decision method for modal and linear-time mu-calculi, based on the notion of definition trees. The tableaux can be interpreted as first recurrence automata, so the construction can also be viewed as a transformation to the strongly aconjunctive normal form. Finally, we present solutions to two open axiomatisation problems, for the linear-time mu-calculus and its extension with path quantifiers. Both completeness proofs are based on transforming formulae to normal forms inspired by automata. In extending the completeness result of the linear-time mu-calculus to the version with path quantifiers, the essential problem is capturing the limit closure property of paths in an axiomatisation. To this purpose, we introduce a new \exists\nu-induction inference rule

Frameworks, models, and case studies

This thesis focuses on models of conceptual change in science and philosophy. In particular, I developed a new bootstrapping methodology for studying conceptual change, centered around the formalization of several popular models of conceptual change and the collective assessment of their improved formal versions via nine evaluative dimensions. Among the models of conceptual change treated in the thesis are Carnap’s explication, Lakatos’ concept-stretching, Toulmin’s conceptual populations, Waismann’s open texture, Mark Wilson’s patches and facades, Sneed’s structuralism, and Paul Thagard’s conceptual revolutions. In order to analyze and compare the conception of conceptual change provided by these different models, I rely on several historical reconstructions of episodes of scientific conceptual change. The historical episodes of scientific change that figure in this work include the emergence of the morphological concept of fish in biological taxonomies, the development of scientific conceptions of temperature, the Church-Turing thesis and related axiomatizations of effective calculability, the history of the concept of polyhedron in 17th and 18th century mathematics, Hamilton’s invention of the quaternions, the history of the pre-abstract group concepts in 18th and 19th century mathematics, the expansion of Newtonian mechanics to viscous fluids forces phenomena, and the chemical revolution. I will also present five different formal and informal improvements of four specific models of conceptual change. I will first present two different improvements of Carnapian explication, a formal and an informal one. My informal improvement of Carnapian explication will consist of a more fine-grained version of the procedure that adds an intermediate, third step to the two steps of Carnapian explication. I will show how this novel three-step version of explication is more suitable than its traditional two-step relative to handle complex cases of explications. My second, formal improvement of Carnapian explication will be a full explication of the concept of explication itself within the theory of conceptual spaces. By virtue of this formal improvement, the whole procedure of explication together with its application procedures and its pragmatic desiderata will be reconceptualized as a precise procedure involving topological and geometrical constraints inside the theory of conceptual spaces. My third improved model of conceptual change will consist of a formal explication of Darwinian models of conceptual change that will make vast use of Godfrey-Smith’s population-based Darwinism for targeting explicitly mathematical conceptual change. My fourth improvement will be dedicated instead to Wilson’s indeterminate model of conceptual change. I will show how Wilson’s very informal framework can be explicated within a modified version of the structuralist model-theoretic reconstructions of scientific theories. Finally, the fifth improved model of conceptual change will be a belief-revision-like logical framework that reconstructs Thagard’s model of conceptual revolution as specific revision and contraction operations that work on conceptual structures. At the end of this work, a general conception of conceptual change in science and philosophy emerges, thanks to the combined action of the three layers of my methodology. This conception takes conceptual change to be a multi-faceted phenomenon centered around the dynamics of groups of concepts. According to this conception, concepts are best reconstructed as plastic and inter-subjective entities equipped with a non-trivial internal structure and subject to a certain degree of localized holism. Furthermore, conceptual dynamics can be judged from a weakly normative perspective, bound to be dependent on shared values and goals. Conceptual change is then best understood, according to this conception, as a ubiquitous phenomenon underlying all of our intellectual activities, from science to ordinary linguistic practices. As such, conceptual change does not pose any particular problem to value-laden notions of scientific progress, objectivity, and realism. At the same time, this conception prompts all our concept-driven intellectual activities, including philosophical and metaphilosophical reflections, to take into serious consideration the phenomenon of conceptual change. An important consequence of this conception, and of the analysis that generated it, is in fact that an adequate understanding of the dynamics of philosophical concepts is a prerequisite for analytic philosophy to develop a realistic and non-idealized depiction of itself and its activities