Quotients of Strongly Proper Forcings and Guessing Models

We prove that a wide class of strongly proper forcing posets have quotients with strong properties. Specifically, we prove that quotients of forcing posets which have simple universal strongly generic conditions on a stationary set of models by certain nice regular suborders satisfy the $\omega_1$-approximation property. We prove that the existence of stationarily many $\omega_1$-guessing models in $P_{\omega_2}(H(\theta))$, for sufficiently large cardinals $\theta$, is consistent with the continuum being arbitrarily large, solving a problem of Viale and Weiss

Set Theory

This stimulating workshop exposed some of the most exciting recent develops in set theory, including major new results about the proper forcing axiom, stationary reflection, gaps in P(ω)/Fin, iterated forcing, the tree property, ideals and colouring numbers, as well as important new applications of set theory to C*-algebras, Ramsey theory, measure theory, representation theory, group theory and Banach spaces

Mengenlehre

[no abstract available

On Indestructible Strongly Guessing Models

In \cite{MV} we defined and proved the consistency of the principle ${\rm GM}^+(\omega_3,\omega_1)$ which implies that many consequences of strong forcing axioms hold simultaneously at $\omega_2$ and $\omega_3$. In this paper we formulate a strengthening of ${\rm GM}^+(\omega_3,\omega_1)$ that we call ${\rm SGM}^+(\omega_3,\omega_1)$. We also prove, modulo the consistency of two supercompact cardinals, that ${\rm SGM}^+(\omega_3,\omega_1)$ is consistent with ZFC. In addition to all the consequences of ${\rm GM}^+(\omega_3,\omega_1)$, the principle ${\rm SGM}^+(\omega_3,\omega_1)$, together with some mild cardinal arithmetic assumptions that hold in our model, implies that any forcing that adds a new subset of $\omega_2$ either adds a real or collapses some cardinal. This gives a partial answer to a question of Abraham \cite{AvrahamPhD} and extends a previous result of Todor\v{c}evi\'{c} \cite{Todorcevic82} in this direction

On what I do not understand (and have something to say): Part I

This is a non-standard paper, containing some problems in set theory I have in various degrees been interested in. Sometimes with a discussion on what I have to say; sometimes, of what makes them interesting to me, sometimes the problems are presented with a discussion of how I have tried to solve them, and sometimes with failed tries, anecdote and opinion. So the discussion is quite personal, in other words, egocentric and somewhat accidental. As we discuss many problems, history and side references are erratic, usually kept at a minimum (``see ... '' means: see the references there and possibly the paper itself). The base were lectures in Rutgers Fall'97 and reflect my knowledge then. The other half, concentrating on model theory, will subsequently appear