Mental States Are Like Diseases

While Quine’s linguistic behaviorism is well-known, his Kant Lectures contain one of his most detailed discussions of behaviorism in psychology and the philosophy of mind. Quine clarifies the nature of his psychological commitments by arguing for a modest view that is against ‘excessively restrictive’ variants of behaviorism while maintaining ‘a good measure of behaviorist discipline…to keep [our mental] terms under control’. In this paper, I use Quine’s Kant Lectures to reconstruct his position. I distinguish three types of behaviorism in psychology and the philosophy of mind: ontological behaviorism, logical behaviorism, and epistemological behaviorism. I then consider Quine’s perspective on each of these views and argue that he does not fully accept any of them. By combining these perspectives we arrive at Quine’s surprisingly subtle view about behaviorism in psychology

Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy

Quine and Davidson employ proxy functions to demonstrate that the use of language (behaviouristically conceived) is compatible with indefinitely many radically different reference relations. They also believe that the use of language (behaviouristically conceived) is all that determines reference. From this they infer that reference is indeterminate, i.e. that there are no facts of the matter as to what singular terms designate and what predicates apply to. Yet referential indeterminacy yields rather dire consequences. One thus does wonder whether one can hold on to a Quine-Davidson stance in semantics-cum-metaphysics and still avoid embracing referential indeterminacy. I argue that one can. Anyone adhering to the behaviouristic account pivotal to the Quine-Davidson stance is bound to acknowledge certain facts about verbal behaviour – that some utterances are tied to situations, that some utterances are tied to segments in situations, that some predicates have non-contextualised conditions of application, and that use involves causal dependencies. The restrictions from these facts ensure that only reference relations generated by means of rather exceptional proxy functions are compatible with verbal behaviour. I conclude that this allows one to rebuff the Quine-Davidson argument for the indeterminacy of reference, as it were, from within. I moreover tentatively conclude that the line of thought laid out provides good reason for just about anyone to hold that there are facts about reference after all

Meaningfulness, the unsaid and translatability. Instead of an introduction

The present paper opens this topical issue on translation techniques by drawing a theoretical basis for the discussion of translational issues in a linguistic perspective. In order to forward an audience- oriented definition of translation, I will describe different forms of linguistic variability, highlighting how they present different difficulties to translators, with an emphasis on the semantic and communicative complexity that a source text can exhibit. The problem is then further discussed through a comparison between Quine's radically holistic position and the translatability principle supported by such semanticists as Katz. General translatability — at the expense of additional complexity — is eventually proposed as a possible synthesis of this debate. In describing the meaningfulness levels of source texts through Hjelmslevian semiotics, and his semiotic hierarchy in particular, the paper attempts to go beyond denotative semiotic, and reframe some translational issues in a connotative semiotic and metasemiotic perspective

Threats and challenges to the scientific representation of semantics: Carnap, Quine, and the Lessons of Semantic Skepticism

We will approach the problem of semantic skepticism by comparing Quine's view with Carnap's strategy for finding intensional equivalences that guarantee a solution to the paradox of analysis; and then we will consider how the Intensionalists use these possible solutions to save the scientificity of semantics. Quine disagrees with Carnap that plausible solutions to the question of intensional equivalence provide us with explanations for the difficult problems. These are ones where, in contrast to mere extensional indistinguishability of expressions, we need a stronger determination to choose the right interpretation. And then he has a skeptical answer to which the semanticist-linguist cannot remain insensitive. The problem is that a semanticist can only say that he has an "object" of inquiry if a normative property can be reconstructed, but that is not guaranteed by the mathematical theory used to infer intensional values. Finally, we would like to point out the relevance of skeptical doctrines about semantics that go beyond the mere haunting of relativism or quietism about meaning. Without a skeptical approach, we argue, we lose sight of the unique nature of language and its peculiar property of being an object shaped by pressures on its own ability to be theorized. &nbsp

The Epistemology of “Epistemology Naturalized”

Quine's “Epistemology Naturalized” has become part of the canon in epistemology and excited a widespread revival of interest in naturalism. Yet the status accorded the essay is ironic, since both friends and foes of philosophical naturalism deny that Quine makes a plausible case that the methods of naturalism can accommodate the problems of epistemology

Deflationism about Truth and Meaning

The aim of my thesis is to defend a deflationary view of truth and meaning. I characterize the view as a doctrine holding that truth is a purely logical notion, and truth-theoretic notions don\u27t play a serious explanatory role in an account of meaning and content. We use truth-terms (e.g. `true\u27) everywhere, from the discourse of ordinary conversation to those of the hard science and morality. The ubiquity of truth-terms gives rise to the impression that truth is a profound notion playing substantive explanatory roles. This impression, say deflationists, is unduly inflated--the ubiquity of truth-terms is not a sign of the richness but thinness of the concept of truth. In my thesis, I aim to defend this view by responding to some of its well-known objections. To defend a view often involves a modification, which is especially relevant to the case of deflationism due to the plethora of its variants. I have chosen two variants--Horwich\u27s and Field\u27s--in order to find out what features are to be had by a well-rounded variant of deflationism. My special interest is on the merits of a deflationary theory of truth as it is applied to an account of meaning and content. The specifics of each chapter are summarized in the following. In chapter 1, I discuss the background of a deflationary theory of truth by examining the problems with a correspondence theory of truth. I divide a correspondence theory into two kinds: a fact-based theory and an object-based theory. As examples of a fact-based correspondence theory, Russell\u27s and early Wittgenstein\u27s theories are given a critical examination. I then turn to Tarski\u27s semantic definition of truth. I argue that Tarski\u27s definition has offered a way to develop a correspondence theory without invoking a fact or fact-like entity. I argue, however, that even a correspondence theory of a Tarski-style is vulnerable to a certain problem--the problem raised by Field. I then turn to reductive/physicalistic theories of reference--Kripke-Putnam\u27s causal theory of reference, the information theory, and the teleological theory of representation. By arguing against each of these theories, I conclude that the prospect of a correspondence theory of truth is dim. I end this chapter by discussing how the dismal prospect of a correspondence theory of truth has motivated a deflationary theory of truth. In chapter 2, I embark upon the core project of my thesis--developing and defending a deflationary theory of truth and meaning. I devote chapter 2 mainly to the discussion of Field\u27s pure disquotational theory of truth. According to this view of truth, the concept of truth is at bottom purely disquotational. In this chapter, I try to elaborate and clarify the central ideas underlying this radical version of a deflationary theory of truth. To do so, I focus on some objections leveled against this view: that it cannot accommodate the modal properties of truth and logical derivations involving an attribution of truth to sentences that one does not understand. After criticizing Field\u27s solutions to these problems, I propose my own solutions. The topic of chapter 3 is the success argument against a deflationary theory of truth, according to which a deflationist cannot make sense of the explanatory role of truth in an account of the success of behavior or theories. In the first half of this chapter, I examine Nic Damnjanovic\u27s supervenience/compatibilist objection to deflationism. I argue that a supervenience approach to truth is incompatible with a deflationary theory of truth. In the second half, I discuss Kitcher\u27s realist objection to deflationism. Drawing upon the role of truth in an account of the success of scientific theories, Kitcher contends that realism requires a non-deflationary--correspondence--concept of truth. I criticize Kitcher\u27s argument on the grounds that it conflates the objectivity requirement with the systematicity requirement. I argue that only the first is needed to accommodate the role of truth in an account of the success of a scientific theory. In chapter 4, I aim to defend a deflationary theory of meaning and content. To this end, I carry out three projects--first, defending Horwich\u27s use theory of meaning against Kripke\u27s skeptical challenge; second, bringing out the commonalities between Horwich\u27s and Field\u27s views of meaning and content; and third, arguing for Field\u27s deflationary analysis of the role of truth-conditions in psychological explanations. More precisely, I try to bring out the core ideas running through some deflationists\u27 views of meaning and content such as late Wittgenstein, Horwich, and Field. By doing so, I aim to explain what it involves to state that truth-theoretic notions don\u27t play a central role in an account of meaning and content, which is the main thesis of Horwich\u27s and Field\u27s deflationary views. I end this chapter by defending Field\u27s view of truth-conditions--not only truth but also truth-conditions are expressive, not explanatory, devices aiding generalization