Stochastic decomposition in discrete-time queues with generalized vacations and applications

For several specific queueing models with a vacation policy, the stationary system occupancy at the beginning of a rantdom slot is distributed as the sum of two independent random variables. One of these variables is the stationary number of customers in an equivalent queueing system with no vacations. For models in continuous time with Poissonian arrivals, this result is well-known, and referred to as stochastic decomposition, with proof provided by Fuhrmann and Cooper. For models in discrete time, this result received less attention, with no proof available to date. In this paper, we first establish a proof of the decomposition result in discrete time. When compared to the proof in continuous time, conditions for the proof in discrete time are somewhat more general. Second, we explore four different examples: non-preemptive proirity systems, slot-bound priority systems, polling systems, and fiber delay line (FDL) buffer systems. The first two examples are known results from literature that are given here as an illustration. The third is a new example, and the last one (FDL buffer systems) shows new results. It is shown that in some cases the queueing analysis can be considerably simplified using this property

Optimal Pricing Effect on Equilibrium Behaviors of Delay-Sensitive Users in Cognitive Radio Networks

This paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio networks, which characterizes network operators' service provisions to delay-sensitive secondary users (SUs) via pricing strategies. Based on the two paradigms of shared-use and exclusive-use dynamic spectrum access (DSA), we examine three network scenarios corresponding to three types of secondary markets. In the first monopoly market with one operator using opportunistic shared-use DSA, we study the operator's pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of self-optimizing SUs in a queueing system. %This queue represents the congestion of the multiple SUs sharing the operator's single \ON-\OFF channel that models the primary users (PUs) traffic. We provide a queueing delay analysis with the general distributions of the SU service time and PU traffic using the renewal theory. In terms of SUs, we show that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game where SUs are players employing individual optimal strategies. We also provide a sufficient condition and iterative algorithms for equilibrium convergence. In terms of operators, two pricing mechanisms are proposed with different goals: revenue maximization and social welfare maximization. In the second monopoly market, an operator exploiting exclusive-use DSA has many channels that will be allocated separately to each entering SU. We also analyze the pricing effect on the equilibrium behaviors of the SUs and the revenue-optimal and socially-optimal pricing strategies of the operator in this market. In the third duopoly market, we study a price competition between two operators employing shared-use and exclusive-use DSA, respectively, as a two-stage Stackelberg game. Using a backward induction method, we show that there exists a unique equilibrium for this game and investigate the equilibrium convergence.Comment: 30 pages, one column, double spac

The preemptive repeat hybrid server interruption model

We analyze a discrete-time queueing system with server interruptions and a hybrid preemptive repeat interruption discipline. Such a discipline encapsulates both the preemptive repeat identical and the preemptive repeat different disciplines. By the introduction and analysis of so-called service completion times, we significantly reduce the complexity of the analysis. Our results include a.o. the probability generating functions and moments of queue content and delay. Finally, by means of some numerical examples, we assess how performance measures are affected by the specifics of the interruption discipline