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Interference Effects in Quantum Belief Networks
Probabilistic graphical models such as Bayesian Networks are one of the most
powerful structures known by the Computer Science community for deriving
probabilistic inferences. However, modern cognitive psychology has revealed
that human decisions could not follow the rules of classical probability
theory, because humans cannot process large amounts of data in order to make
judgements. Consequently, the inferences performed are based on limited data
coupled with several heuristics, leading to violations of the law of total
probability. This means that probabilistic graphical models based on classical
probability theory are too limited to fully simulate and explain various
aspects of human decision making.
Quantum probability theory was developed in order to accommodate the
paradoxical findings that the classical theory could not explain. Recent
findings in cognitive psychology revealed that quantum probability can fully
describe human decisions in an elegant framework. Their findings suggest that,
before taking a decision, human thoughts are seen as superposed waves that can
interfere with each other, influencing the final decision.
In this work, we propose a new Bayesian Network based on the psychological
findings of cognitive scientists. We made experiments with two very well known
Bayesian Networks from the literature. The results obtained revealed that the
quantum like Bayesian Network can affect drastically the probabilistic
inferences, specially when the levels of uncertainty of the network are very
high (no pieces of evidence observed). When the levels of uncertainty are very
low, then the proposed quantum like network collapses to its classical
counterpart
QuLBIT: Quantum-Like Bayesian Inference Technologies for Cognition and Decision
This paper provides the foundations of a unified cognitive decision-making
framework (QulBIT) which is derived from quantum theory. The main advantage of
this framework is that it can cater for paradoxical and irrational human
decision making. Although quantum approaches for cognition have demonstrated
advantages over classical probabilistic approaches and bounded rationality
models, they still lack explanatory power. To address this, we introduce a
novel explanatory analysis of the decision-maker's belief space. This is
achieved by exploiting quantum interference effects as a way of both
quantifying and explaining the decision-maker's uncertainty. We detail the main
modules of the unified framework, the explanatory analysis method, and
illustrate their application in situations violating the Sure Thing Principle
Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics
A substantial school in the philosophy of science identifies Bayesian
inference with inductive inference and even rationality as such, and seems to
be strengthened by the rise and practical success of Bayesian statistics. We
argue that the most successful forms of Bayesian statistics do not actually
support that particular philosophy but rather accord much better with
sophisticated forms of hypothetico-deductivism. We examine the actual role
played by prior distributions in Bayesian models, and the crucial aspects of
model checking and model revision, which fall outside the scope of Bayesian
confirmation theory. We draw on the literature on the consistency of Bayesian
updating and also on our experience of applied work in social science.
Clarity about these matters should benefit not just philosophy of science,
but also statistical practice. At best, the inductivist view has encouraged
researchers to fit and compare models without checking them; at worst,
theorists have actively discouraged practitioners from performing model
checking because it does not fit into their framework.Comment: 36 pages, 5 figures. v2: Fixed typo in caption of figure 1. v3:
Further typo fixes. v4: Revised in response to referee
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