787 research outputs found
A lightweight McEliece cryptosystem co-processor design
Due to the rapid advances in the development of quantum computers and their susceptibility to errors, there is a renewed interest in error correction algorithms. In particular, error correcting code-based cryptosystems have reemerged as a highly desirable coding technique. This is due to the fact that most classical asymmetric cryptosystems will fail in the quantum computing era. Quantum computers can solve many of the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems efficiently. However, code-based cryptosystems are still secure against quantum computers, since the decoding of linear codes remains as NP-hard even on these computing systems. One such cryptosystem is the McEliece code-based cryptosystem. The original McEliece code-based cryptosystem uses binary Goppa code, which is known for its good code rate and error correction capability. However, its key generation and decoding procedures have a high computation complexity. In this work we propose a design and hardware implementation of an public-key encryption and decryption co-processor based on a new variant of McEliece system. This co-processor takes the advantage of the non-binary Orthogonal Latin Square Codes to achieve much smaller computation complexity, hardware cost, and the key size.Published versio
A CCA2 Secure Variant of the McEliece Cryptosystem
The McEliece public-key encryption scheme has become an interesting
alternative to cryptosystems based on number-theoretical problems. Differently
from RSA and ElGa- mal, McEliece PKC is not known to be broken by a quantum
computer. Moreover, even tough McEliece PKC has a relatively big key size,
encryption and decryption operations are rather efficient. In spite of all the
recent results in coding theory based cryptosystems, to the date, there are no
constructions secure against chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model -
the de facto security notion for public-key cryptosystems. In this work, we
show the first construction of a McEliece based public-key cryptosystem secure
against chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model. Our construction is
inspired by a recently proposed technique by Rosen and Segev
A Lightweight McEliece Cryptosystem Co-processor Design
Due to the rapid advances in the development of quantum computers and their
susceptibility to errors, there is a renewed interest in error correction
algorithms. In particular, error correcting code-based cryptosystems have
reemerged as a highly desirable coding technique. This is due to the fact that
most classical asymmetric cryptosystems will fail in the quantum computing era.
Quantum computers can solve many of the integer factorization and discrete
logarithm problems efficiently. However, code-based cryptosystems are still
secure against quantum computers, since the decoding of linear codes remains as
NP-hard even on these computing systems. One such cryptosystem is the McEliece
code-based cryptosystem. The original McEliece code-based cryptosystem uses
binary Goppa code, which is known for its good code rate and error correction
capability. However, its key generation and decoding procedures have a high
computation complexity. In this work we propose a design and hardware
implementation of an public-key encryption and decryption co-processor based on
a new variant of McEliece system. This co-processor takes the advantage of the
non-binary Orthogonal Latin Square Codes to achieve much smaller computation
complexity, hardware cost, and the key size.Comment: 2019 Boston Area Architecture Workshop (BARC'19
A tiny public key scheme based on Niederreiter Cryptosystem
Due to the weakness of public key cryptosystems encounter of quantum
computers, the need to provide a solution was emerged. The McEliece
cryptosystem and its security equivalent, the Niederreiter cryptosystem, which
are based on Goppa codes, are one of the solutions, but they are not practical
due to their long key length. Several prior attempts to decrease the length of
the public key in code-based cryptosystems involved substituting the Goppa code
family with other code families. However, these efforts ultimately proved to be
insecure. In 2016, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
called for proposals from around the world to standardize post-quantum
cryptography (PQC) schemes to solve this issue. After receiving of various
proposals in this field, the Classic McEliece cryptosystem, as well as the
Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC) and Bit Flipping Key Encapsulation (BIKE), chosen as
code-based encryption category cryptosystems that successfully progressed to
the final stage. This article proposes a method for developing a code-based
public key cryptography scheme that is both simple and implementable. The
proposed scheme has a much shorter public key length compared to the NIST
finalist cryptosystems. The key length for the primary parameters of the
McEliece cryptosystem (n=1024, k=524, t=50) ranges from 18 to 500 bits. The
security of this system is at least as strong as the security of the
Niederreiter cryptosystem. The proposed structure is based on the Niederreiter
cryptosystem which exhibits a set of highly advantageous properties that make
it a suitable candidate for implementation in all extant systems
Cryptanalysis of the McEliece Cryptosystem on GPGPUs
The linear code based McEliece cryptosystem is potentially promising as a so-called post-quantum public key cryptosystem because thus far it has resisted quantum cryptanalysis, but to be considered secure, the cryptosystem must resist other attacks as well. In 2011, Bernstein et al. introduced the Ball Collision Decoding (BCD) attack on McEliece which is a significant improvement in asymptotic complexity over the previous best known attack. We implement this attack on GPUs, which offer a parallel architecture that is well-suited to the matrix operations used in the attack and decrease the asymptotic run-time. Our implementation executes the attack more than twice as fast as the reference implementation and could be used for a practical attack on the original McEliece parameters
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