Quantitative games with interval objectives

Traditionally quantitative games such as mean-payoff games and discount sum games have two players -- one trying to maximize the payoff, the other trying to minimize it. The associated decision problem, "Can Eve (the maximizer) achieve, for example, a positive payoff?" can be thought of as one player trying to attain a payoff in the interval $(0,\infty)$. In this paper we consider the more general problem of determining if a player can attain a payoff in a finite union of arbitrary intervals for various payoff functions (liminf, mean-payoff, discount sum, total sum). In particular this includes the interesting exact-value problem, "Can Eve achieve a payoff of exactly (e.g.) 0?"Comment: Full version of CONCUR submissio

Magnifying Lens Abstraction for Stochastic Games with Discounted and Long-run Average Objectives

Turn-based stochastic games and its important subclass Markov decision processes (MDPs) provide models for systems with both probabilistic and nondeterministic behaviors. We consider turn-based stochastic games with two classical quantitative objectives: discounted-sum and long-run average objectives. The game models and the quantitative objectives are widely used in probabilistic verification, planning, optimal inventory control, network protocol and performance analysis. Games and MDPs that model realistic systems often have very large state spaces, and probabilistic abstraction techniques are necessary to handle the state-space explosion. The commonly used full-abstraction techniques do not yield space-savings for systems that have many states with similar value, but does not necessarily have similar transition structure. A semi-abstraction technique, namely Magnifying-lens abstractions (MLA), that clusters states based on value only, disregarding differences in their transition relation was proposed for qualitative objectives (reachability and safety objectives). In this paper we extend the MLA technique to solve stochastic games with discounted-sum and long-run average objectives. We present the MLA technique based abstraction-refinement algorithm for stochastic games and MDPs with discounted-sum objectives. For long-run average objectives, our solution works for all MDPs and a sub-class of stochastic games where every state has the same value

Incentive Stackelberg Mean-payoff Games

We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player can improve his payoff by changing his strategy unilaterally. In the setting of incentive and leader equilibria, there is a distinguished player called the leader who can assign strategies to all other players, referred to as her followers. A strategy profile is a leader strategy profile if no player, except for the leader, can improve his payoff by changing his strategy unilaterally, and a leader equilibrium is a leader strategy profile with a maximal return for the leader. In the proposed case of incentive equilibria, the leader can additionally influence the behaviour of her followers by transferring parts of her payoff to her followers. The ability to incentivise her followers provides the leader with more freedom in selecting strategy profiles, and we show that this can indeed improve the payoff for the leader in such games. The key fundamental result of the paper is the existence of incentive equilibria in mean-payoff games. We further show that the decision problem related to constructing incentive equilibria is NP-complete. On a positive note, we show that, when the number of players is fixed, the complexity of the problem falls in the same class as two-player mean-payoff games. We also present an implementation of the proposed algorithms, and discuss experimental results that demonstrate the feasibility of the analysis of medium sized games.Comment: 15 pages, references, appendix, 5 figure

Decision Problems for Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Games

We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with $\omega$-regular objectives. While the existence of an equilibrium whose payoff falls into a certain interval may be undecidable, we single out several decidable restrictions of the problem. First, restricting the search space to stationary, or pure stationary, equilibria results in problems that are typically contained in PSPACE and NP, respectively. Second, we show that the existence of an equilibrium with a binary payoff (i.e. an equilibrium where each player either wins or loses with probability 1) is decidable. We also establish that the existence of a Nash equilibrium with a certain binary payoff entails the existence of an equilibrium with the same payoff in pure, finite-state strategies.Comment: 22 pages, revised versio

Qualitative Analysis of Concurrent Mean-payoff Games

We consider concurrent games played by two-players on a finite-state graph, where in every round the players simultaneously choose a move, and the current state along with the joint moves determine the successor state. We study a fundamental objective, namely, mean-payoff objective, where a reward is associated to each transition, and the goal of player 1 is to maximize the long-run average of the rewards, and the objective of player 2 is strictly the opposite. The path constraint for player 1 could be qualitative, i.e., the mean-payoff is the maximal reward, or arbitrarily close to it; or quantitative, i.e., a given threshold between the minimal and maximal reward. We consider the computation of the almost-sure (resp. positive) winning sets, where player 1 can ensure that the path constraint is satisfied with probability 1 (resp. positive probability). Our main results for qualitative path constraints are as follows: (1) we establish qualitative determinacy results that show that for every state either player 1 has a strategy to ensure almost-sure (resp. positive) winning against all player-2 strategies, or player 2 has a spoiling strategy to falsify almost-sure (resp. positive) winning against all player-1 strategies; (2) we present optimal strategy complexity results that precisely characterize the classes of strategies required for almost-sure and positive winning for both players; and (3) we present quadratic time algorithms to compute the almost-sure and the positive winning sets, matching the best known bound of algorithms for much simpler problems (such as reachability objectives). For quantitative constraints we show that a polynomial time solution for the almost-sure or the positive winning set would imply a solution to a long-standing open problem (the value problem for turn-based deterministic mean-payoff games) that is not known to be solvable in polynomial time

Computer aided synthesis: a game theoretic approach

In this invited contribution, we propose a comprehensive introduction to game theory applied in computer aided synthesis. In this context, we give some classical results on two-player zero-sum games and then on multi-player non zero-sum games. The simple case of one-player games is strongly related to automata theory on infinite words. All along the article, we focus on general approaches to solve the studied problems, and we provide several illustrative examples as well as intuitions on the proofs.Comment: Invitation contribution for conference "Developments in Language Theory" (DLT 2017

Multi-objective Robust Strategy Synthesis for Interval Markov Decision Processes

Interval Markov decision processes (IMDPs) generalise classical MDPs by having interval-valued transition probabilities. They provide a powerful modelling tool for probabilistic systems with an additional variation or uncertainty that prevents the knowledge of the exact transition probabilities. In this paper, we consider the problem of multi-objective robust strategy synthesis for interval MDPs, where the aim is to find a robust strategy that guarantees the satisfaction of multiple properties at the same time in face of the transition probability uncertainty. We first show that this problem is PSPACE-hard. Then, we provide a value iteration-based decision algorithm to approximate the Pareto set of achievable points. We finally demonstrate the practical effectiveness of our proposed approaches by applying them on several case studies using a prototypical tool.Comment: This article is a full version of a paper accepted to the Conference on Quantitative Evaluation of SysTems (QEST) 201

Model Checking the Quantitative mu-Calculus on Linear Hybrid Systems

We study the model-checking problem for a quantitative extension of the modal mu-calculus on a class of hybrid systems. Qualitative model checking has been proved decidable and implemented for several classes of systems, but this is not the case for quantitative questions that arise naturally in this context. Recently, quantitative formalisms that subsume classical temporal logics and allow the measurement of interesting quantitative phenomena were introduced. We show how a powerful quantitative logic, the quantitative mu-calculus, can be model checked with arbitrary precision on initialised linear hybrid systems. To this end, we develop new techniques for the discretisation of continuous state spaces based on a special class of strategies in model-checking games and present a reduction to a class of counter parity games.Comment: LMCS submissio