13,723 research outputs found
Integrated Safety and Security Risk Assessment Methods: A Survey of Key Characteristics and Applications
Over the last years, we have seen several security incidents that compromised
system safety, of which some caused physical harm to people. Meanwhile, various
risk assessment methods have been developed that integrate safety and security,
and these could help to address the corresponding threats by implementing
suitable risk treatment plans. However, an overarching overview of these
methods, systematizing the characteristics of such methods, is missing. In this
paper, we conduct a systematic literature review, and identify 7 integrated
safety and security risk assessment methods. We analyze these methods based on
5 different criteria, and identify key characteristics and applications. A key
outcome is the distinction between sequential and non-sequential integration of
safety and security, related to the order in which safety and security risks
are assessed. This study provides a basis for developing more effective
integrated safety and security risk assessment methods in the future
An Assurance Framework for Independent Co-assurance of Safety and Security
Integrated safety and security assurance for complex systems is difficult for
many technical and socio-technical reasons such as mismatched processes,
inadequate information, differing use of language and philosophies, etc.. Many
co-assurance techniques rely on disregarding some of these challenges in order
to present a unified methodology. Even with this simplification, no methodology
has been widely adopted primarily because this approach is unrealistic when met
with the complexity of real-world system development.
This paper presents an alternate approach by providing a Safety-Security
Assurance Framework (SSAF) based on a core set of assurance principles. This is
done so that safety and security can be co-assured independently, as opposed to
unified co-assurance which has been shown to have significant drawbacks. This
also allows for separate processes and expertise from practitioners in each
domain. With this structure, the focus is shifted from simplified unification
to integration through exchanging the correct information at the right time
using synchronisation activities
Model-based Safety and Security Co-analysis: a Survey
We survey the state-of-the-art on model-based formalisms for safety and
security analysis, where safety refers to the absence of unintended failures,
and security absence of malicious attacks. We consider ten model-based
formalisms, comparing their modeling principles, the interaction between safety
and security, and analysis methods. In each formalism, we model the classical
Locked Door Example where possible. Our key finding is that the exact nature of
safety-security interaction is still ill-understood. Existing formalisms merge
previous safety and security formalisms, without introducing specific
constructs to model safety-security interactions, or metrics to analyze trade
offs
DAG-Based Attack and Defense Modeling: Don't Miss the Forest for the Attack Trees
This paper presents the current state of the art on attack and defense
modeling approaches that are based on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). DAGs
allow for a hierarchical decomposition of complex scenarios into simple, easily
understandable and quantifiable actions. Methods based on threat trees and
Bayesian networks are two well-known approaches to security modeling. However
there exist more than 30 DAG-based methodologies, each having different
features and goals. The objective of this survey is to present a complete
overview of graphical attack and defense modeling techniques based on DAGs.
This consists of summarizing the existing methodologies, comparing their
features and proposing a taxonomy of the described formalisms. This article
also supports the selection of an adequate modeling technique depending on user
requirements
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