Quantitative Cyber Risk Reduction Estimation Methodology for a Small Scada Control System

We propose a new methodology for obtaining a quick quantitative measurement of the risk reduction achieved when a control system is modified with the intent to improve cyber security defense against external attackers. The proposed methodology employs a directed graph called a compromise graph, where the nodes represent stages of a potential attack and the edges represent the expected time-to-compromise for differing attacker skill levels. Time-to-compromise is modeled as a function of known vulnerabilities and attacker skill level. The methodology was used to calculate risk reduction estimates for a specific SCADA system and for a specific set of control system security remedial actions. Despite an 86% reduction in the total number of vulnerabilities, the estimated time-to-compromise was increased only by about 3 to 30% depending on target and attacker skill level

A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems

This paper reviews the state of the art in cyber security risk assessment of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. We select and in-detail examine twenty-four risk assessment methods developed for or applied in the context of a SCADA system. We describe the essence of the methods and then analyse them in terms of aim; application domain; the stages of risk management addressed; key risk management concepts covered; impact measurement; sources of probabilistic data; evaluation and tool support. Based on the analysis, we suggest an intuitive scheme for the categorisation of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems. We also outline five research challenges facing the domain and point out the approaches that might be taken

False Data Injection Attacks on Phasor Measurements That Bypass Low-rank Decomposition

This paper studies the vulnerability of phasor measurement units (PMUs) to false data injection (FDI) attacks. Prior work demonstrated that unobservable FDI attacks that can bypass traditional bad data detectors based on measurement residuals can be identified by detector based on low-rank decomposition (LD). In this work, a class of more sophisticated FDI attacks that captures the temporal correlation of PMU data is introduced. Such attacks are designed with a convex optimization problem and can always bypass the LD detector. The vulnerability of this attack model is illustrated on both the IEEE 24-bus RTS and the IEEE 118-bus systems.Comment: 6 pages, 4 figures, submitted to 2017 IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm

ICT aspects of power systems and their security

This report provides a deep description of four complex Attack Scenarios that have as final goal to produce damage to the Electric Power Transmission System. The details about protocols used, vulnerabilities, devices etc. have been for obvious reasons hidden, and the ones presented have to be understood as mere (even if realistic) simplified versions of possible power systems.JRC.DG.G.6-Security technology assessmen

Understanding Malicious Attacks Against Infrastructures - Overview on the Assessment and Management of Threats and Attacks to Industrial Control Systems

This report describes approaches to the assessment and management of malicious threats and attacks relating to critical infrastructures in general, and electric power infrastructures in particular. Securing infrastructures implies taking into account both the natural and man-made (intentional) events. While protecting against the natural disruptive events is a feasible (yet not trivial) task, benefiting by well-established practices, dealing with intentional attacks comes up across many difficulties, especially due to the unpredictability of such events. The report outlines the state-of-the-art in dealing with threats and malicious attacks, considering both physical and cyber actions. Several approaches taken at national and international levels towards securing the critical infrastructures are also provided.JRC.G.6-Sensors, radar technologies and cybersecurit

Scenarios for the development of smart grids in the UK: literature review

Smart grids are expected to play a central role in any transition to a low-carbon energy future, and much research is currently underway on practically every area of smart grids. However, it is evident that even basic aspects such as theoretical and operational definitions, are yet to be agreed upon and be clearly defined. Some aspects (efficient management of supply, including intermittent supply, two-way communication between the producer and user of electricity, use of IT technology to respond to and manage demand, and ensuring safe and secure electricity distribution) are more commonly accepted than others (such as smart meters) in defining what comprises a smart grid. It is clear that smart grid developments enjoy political and financial support both at UK and EU levels, and from the majority of related industries. The reasons for this vary and include the hope that smart grids will facilitate the achievement of carbon reduction targets, create new employment opportunities, and reduce costs relevant to energy generation (fewer power stations) and distribution (fewer losses and better stability). However, smart grid development depends on additional factors, beyond the energy industry. These relate to issues of public acceptability of relevant technologies and associated risks (e.g. data safety, privacy, cyber security), pricing, competition, and regulation; implying the involvement of a wide range of players such as the industry, regulators and consumers. The above constitute a complex set of variables and actors, and interactions between them. In order to best explore ways of possible deployment of smart grids, the use of scenarios is most adequate, as they can incorporate several parameters and variables into a coherent storyline. Scenarios have been previously used in the context of smart grids, but have traditionally focused on factors such as economic growth or policy evolution. Important additional socio-technical aspects of smart grids emerge from the literature review in this report and therefore need to be incorporated in our scenarios. These can be grouped into four (interlinked) main categories: supply side aspects, demand side aspects, policy and regulation, and technical aspects.

Preliminaries of orthogonal layered defence using functional and assurance controls in industrial control systems

Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are responsible for the automation of different processes and the overall control of systems that include highly sensitive potential targets such as nuclear facilities, energy-distribution, water-supply, and mass-transit systems. Given the increased complexity and rapid evolvement of their threat landscape, and the fact that these systems form part of the Critical National infrastructure (CNI), makes them an emerging domain of conflict, terrorist attacks, and a playground for cyberexploitation. Existing layered-defence approaches are increasingly criticised for their inability to adequately protect against resourceful and persistent adversaries. It is therefore essential that emerging techniques, such as orthogonality, be combined with existing security strategies to leverage defence advantages against adaptive and often asymmetrical attack vectors. The concept of orthogonality is relatively new and unexplored in an ICS environment and consists of having assurance control as well as functional control at each layer. Our work seeks to partially articulate a framework where multiple functional and assurance controls are introduced at each layer of ICS architectural design to further enhance security while maintaining critical real-time transfer of command and control traffic

Statistical Methods for Detection and Mitigation of the Effect of Different Types of Cyber-Attacks and Inconsistencies in Electrical Design Parameters in a Real World Distribution System

In the present grid real time control systems are the energy management systems and distribution management systems that utilize measurements from real-time units (RTUs) and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA). The SCADA systems are designed to operate on isolated, private networks without even basic security features which are now being migrated to modern IP-based communications providing near real time information from measuring and controlling units. To function brain (SCADA) properly heart (RTUs) should provide necessary response thereby creating a coupling which makes SCADA systems as targets for cyber-attacks to cripple either part of the electric transmission grid or fully shut down (create blackout) the grid. Cyber-security research for a distribution grid is a topic yet to be addressed. To date firewalls and classic signature-based intrusion detection systems have provided access control and awareness of suspicious network traffic but typically have not offered any real-time detection and defense solutions for electric distribution grids.;This thesis work not only addresses the cyber security modeling, detection and prevention but also addresses model inconsistencies for effectively utilizing and controlling distribution management systems. Inconsistencies in the electrical design parameters of the distribution network or cyber-attack conditions may result in failing of the automated operations or distribution state estimation process which might lead the system to a catastrophic condition or give erroneous solutions for the probable problems. This research work also develops a robust and reliable voltage controller based on Multiple Linear Regression (MLR) to maintain the voltage profile in a smart distribution system under cyber-attacks and model inconsistencies. The developed cyber-attack detection and mitigation algorithms have been tested on IEEE 13 node and 600+ node real American electric distribution systems modeled in Electric Power Research Institute\u27s (EPRI) OpenDSS software