Approximations of Algorithmic and Structural Complexity Validate Cognitive-behavioural Experimental Results

We apply methods for estimating the algorithmic complexity of sequences to behavioural sequences of three landmark studies of animal behavior each of increasing sophistication, including foraging communication by ants, flight patterns of fruit flies, and tactical deception and competition strategies in rodents. In each case, we demonstrate that approximations of Logical Depth and Kolmogorv-Chaitin complexity capture and validate previously reported results, in contrast to other measures such as Shannon Entropy, compression or ad hoc. Our method is practically useful when dealing with short sequences, such as those often encountered in cognitive-behavioural research. Our analysis supports and reveals non-random behavior (LD and K complexity) in flies even in the absence of external stimuli, and confirms the "stochastic" behaviour of transgenic rats when faced that they cannot defeat by counter prediction. The method constitutes a formal approach for testing hypotheses about the mechanisms underlying animal behaviour.Comment: 28 pages, 7 figures and 2 table

Causality, Information and Biological Computation: An algorithmic software approach to life, disease and the immune system

Biology has taken strong steps towards becoming a computer science aiming at reprogramming nature after the realisation that nature herself has reprogrammed organisms by harnessing the power of natural selection and the digital prescriptive nature of replicating DNA. Here we further unpack ideas related to computability, algorithmic information theory and software engineering, in the context of the extent to which biology can be (re)programmed, and with how we may go about doing so in a more systematic way with all the tools and concepts offered by theoretical computer science in a translation exercise from computing to molecular biology and back. These concepts provide a means to a hierarchical organization thereby blurring previously clear-cut lines between concepts like matter and life, or between tumour types that are otherwise taken as different and may not have however a different cause. This does not diminish the properties of life or make its components and functions less interesting. On the contrary, this approach makes for a more encompassing and integrated view of nature, one that subsumes observer and observed within the same system, and can generate new perspectives and tools with which to view complex diseases like cancer, approaching them afresh from a software-engineering viewpoint that casts evolution in the role of programmer, cells as computing machines, DNA and genes as instructions and computer programs, viruses as hacking devices, the immune system as a software debugging tool, and diseases as an information-theoretic battlefield where all these forces deploy. We show how information theory and algorithmic programming may explain fundamental mechanisms of life and death.Comment: 30 pages, 8 figures. Invited chapter contribution to Information and Causality: From Matter to Life. Sara I. Walker, Paul C.W. Davies and George Ellis (eds.), Cambridge University Pres

Coding-theorem Like Behaviour and Emergence of the Universal Distribution from Resource-bounded Algorithmic Probability

Previously referred to as `miraculous' in the scientific literature because of its powerful properties and its wide application as optimal solution to the problem of induction/inference, (approximations to) Algorithmic Probability (AP) and the associated Universal Distribution are (or should be) of the greatest importance in science. Here we investigate the emergence, the rates of emergence and convergence, and the Coding-theorem like behaviour of AP in Turing-subuniversal models of computation. We investigate empirical distributions of computing models in the Chomsky hierarchy. We introduce measures of algorithmic probability and algorithmic complexity based upon resource-bounded computation, in contrast to previously thoroughly investigated distributions produced from the output distribution of Turing machines. This approach allows for numerical approximations to algorithmic (Kolmogorov-Chaitin) complexity-based estimations at each of the levels of a computational hierarchy. We demonstrate that all these estimations are correlated in rank and that they converge both in rank and values as a function of computational power, despite fundamental differences between computational models. In the context of natural processes that operate below the Turing universal level because of finite resources and physical degradation, the investigation of natural biases stemming from algorithmic rules may shed light on the distribution of outcomes. We show that up to 60\% of the simplicity/complexity bias in distributions produced even by the weakest of the computational models can be accounted for by Algorithmic Probability in its approximation to the Universal Distribution.Comment: 27 pages main text, 39 pages including supplement. Online complexity calculator: http://complexitycalculator.com

Understanding Consciousness as Data Compression

In this article we explore the idea that consciousness is a language-complete phenomenon, that is, one which is as difficult to formalise as the foundations of language itself. We posit that the reason consciousness resists scientific description is because the language of science is too weak; its power to render phenomena objective is exhausted by the sophistication of the brain’s architecture. However, this does not mean that there is nothing to say about consciousness. We propose that the phenomenon can be expressed in terms of data compression, a well-defined concept from theoretical computer science which acknowledges and formalises the limits of objective representation. Data compression focuses on the intersection between the uncomputable and the finite. It has a number of fundamental theoretical applications, giving rise, for example, to a universal definition of intelligence (Hutter, 2004), a universal theory of prior probability, as well as a universal theory of inductive inference (Solomonoff, 1964). Here we explore the merits of considering consciousness in such terms, showing how the data compression approach can provide new perspectives on intelligent behaviour, the combination problem, and the hard problem of subjective experience. In particular, we use the tools of algorithmic information theory to prove that integrated experience cannot be achieved by a computable process

Can a machine think (anything new)? Automation beyond simulation

This article will rework the classical question ‘Can a machine think?’ into a more specific problem: ‘Can a machine think anything new?’ It will consider traditional computational tasks such as prediction and decision-making, so as to investigate whether the instrumentality of these operations can be understood in terms of the creation of novel thought. By addressing philosophical and technoscientific attempts to mechanise thought on the one hand (e.g. Leibniz’s mathesis universalis and Turing’s algorithmic method of computation), and the philosophical and cultural critique of these attempts on the other, I will argue that computation’s epistemic productions should be assessed vis-à-vis the logico-mathematical specificity of formal axiomatic systems. Such an assessment requires us to conceive automated modes of thought in such a way as to supersede the hope that machines might replicate human cognitive faculties, and to thereby acknowledge a form of onto-epistemological autonomy in automated ‘thinking’ processes. This involves moving beyond the view that machines might merely simulate humans. Machine thought should be seen as dramatically alien to human thought, and to the dimension of lived experience upon which the latter is predicated. Having stepped outside the simulative paradigm, the question ‘Can a machine think anything new?’ can then be reformulated. One should ask whether novel behaviour in computing might come not from the breaking of mechanical rules, but from following them: from doing what computers do already, and not what we might think they should be doing if we wanted them to imitate us