Quantifying Information Leakage of Randomized Protocols

International audienceThe quantification of information leakage provides a quantitative evaluation of the security of a system. We propose the usage of Markovian processes to model and analyze the information leakage of deterministic and probabilistic systems. We show that this method generalizes the lattice of information approach and is a natural framework for modeling refined attackers capable to observe the internal behavior of the system. We also use our method to obtain an algorithm for the computation of channel capacity from our Markovian models. Finally, we show how to use the method to analyze timed and non-timed attacks on the Onion Routing protocol

Minimizing information leakage of tree-based RFID authentication protocols using alternate tree-walking

The privacy of efficient tree-based RFID authentication protocols is heavily dependent on the branching factor on the top layer. Indefinitely increasing the branching factor, however, is not a viable option. This paper proposes the alternate-tree walking scheme as well as two protocols to circumvent this problem. The privacy of the resulting protocols is shown to be comparable to that of linear-time protocols, where there is no leakage of information, whilst reducing the computational load of the database by one-third of what is required of tree-based protocols during authentication. We also identify and address a limitation in quantifying privacy in RFID protocols

Quantifying the Leakage of Quantum Protocols for Classical Two-Party Cryptography

We study quantum protocols among two distrustful parties. By adopting a rather strict definition of correctness - guaranteeing that honest players obtain their correct outcomes only - we can show that every strictly correct quantum protocol implementing a non-trivial classical primitive necessarily leaks information to a dishonest player. This extends known impossibility results to all non-trivial primitives. We provide a framework for quantifying this leakage and argue that leakage is a good measure for the privacy provided to the players by a given protocol. Our framework also covers the case where the two players are helped by a trusted third party. We show that despite the help of a trusted third party, the players cannot amplify the cryptographic power of any primitive. All our results hold even against quantum honest-but-curious adversaries who honestly follow the protocol but purify their actions and apply a different measurement at the end of the protocol. As concrete examples, we establish lower bounds on the leakage of standard universal two-party primitives such as oblivious transfer.Comment: 38 pages, completely supersedes arXiv:0902.403

Comparing Experiments to the Fault-Tolerance Threshold

Achieving error rates that meet or exceed the fault-tolerance threshold is a central goal for quantum computing experiments, and measuring these error rates using randomized benchmarking is now routine. However, direct comparison between measured error rates and thresholds is complicated by the fact that benchmarking estimates average error rates while thresholds reflect worst-case behavior when a gate is used as part of a large computation. These two measures of error can differ by orders of magnitude in the regime of interest. Here we facilitate comparison between the experimentally accessible average error rates and the worst-case quantities that arise in current threshold theorems by deriving relations between the two for a variety of physical noise sources. Our results indicate that it is coherent errors that lead to an enormous mismatch between average and worst case, and we quantify how well these errors must be controlled to ensure fair comparison between average error probabilities and fault-tolerance thresholds.Comment: 5 pages, 2 figures, 13 page appendi