Reputation-Aware Relay Selection With Opportunistic Spectrum Access : A Blockchain Approach

The highly dynamic nature of cognitive radio (CR) systems and their stringent latency requirements pose a significant challenge in the realization of efficient intelligent transport systems (ITS). In this paper, we investigate relay selection and opportunistic spectrum access in conjunction with blockchain technology in a secure manner. Specifically, we propose a cross-layer method for secure relay selection, where secondary relays (SRs) are granted access to available spectrum bands based on the balance of their respective virtual wallets. These virtual wallets, which are built based on the SRs' secrecy capacity and their behavior in the network, are the predominant factors that allow SRs to participate in an auction model. To quantify the trustworthiness of the SRs, we formulate a mathematical framework to evaluate the trust value of each SR, which is then leveraged for rewarding or penalizing the SR. Also, we develop an offline blockchain framework to store the information of participating relays and make it available for future operations, to detect reputable and non-reputable relays in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. The stored reputations of the participating relays are used to develop a self-learning algorithm to exclude the non-reputable relays from the selection group. Finally, we present thorough numerical results to demonstrate the superiority of the proposed system in terms of security, credibility, and integrity.Peer reviewe

Integration of Blockchain and Auction Models: A Survey, Some Applications, and Challenges

In recent years, blockchain has gained widespread attention as an emerging technology for decentralization, transparency, and immutability in advancing online activities over public networks. As an essential market process, auctions have been well studied and applied in many business fields due to their efficiency and contributions to fair trade. Complementary features between blockchain and auction models trigger a great potential for research and innovation. On the one hand, the decentralized nature of blockchain can provide a trustworthy, secure, and cost-effective mechanism to manage the auction process; on the other hand, auction models can be utilized to design incentive and consensus protocols in blockchain architectures. These opportunities have attracted enormous research and innovation activities in both academia and industry; however, there is a lack of an in-depth review of existing solutions and achievements. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive state-of-the-art survey of these two research topics. We review the existing solutions for integrating blockchain and auction models, with some application-oriented taxonomies generated. Additionally, we highlight some open research challenges and future directions towards integrated blockchain-auction models

A Blockchain Enhanced Coexistence of Heterogeneous Networks on Unlicensed Spectrum

Due to the forecasted fast increasing cellular traffic and the already highly congested licensed spectrum, it is critical to exploit and utilize the unlicensed spectrum resources for the fifth-generation (5G) and beyond networks. A challenging problem is the coexistence of 5G and other networks with fair, reliable, and efficient sharing of the unlicensed spectrum. In this paper, we propose a blockchain-enhanced distributed spectrum sharing scheme for coexisting multiple operators and multiple WiFi APs. We design a novel lightweight and efficient consensus mechanism, named Proof of Strategy (PoG). In this consensus mechanism, the problem of spectrum sharing is used as a consensus puzzle, and the part of the unlicensed spectrum is used as the ‘fee’ of miners. With such a design, the computing overhead of the consensus process is expected to be reduced significantly. We develop a non-cooperative game to analyze the behavior of the miners and obtain a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium under the uniform distribution of mining cost estimation. It can be found mathematically and experimentally that the strategy of the winner tends to maximize the system revenue by sharing the unlicensed spectrum resource. Furthermore, to reduce the impact of heavy interactions on system throughput, the operation of WiFi APs in the proposed scheme can be adaptively switched between ‘contention mode’ and ‘blockchain mode’ according to the network traffic load. The dynamic behavior is constructed as an evolutionary game, and the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium points are proved by theoretical analysis. Simulations demonstrated the fairness and effectiveness of the proposed blockchain-based scheme and the mode switching method for distributed spectrum sharing by heterogeneous wireless networks

Optimal Computational Power Allocation in Multi-Access Mobile Edge Computing for Blockchain

Blockchain has emerged as a decentralized and trustable ledger for recording and storing digital transactions. The mining process of Blockchain, however, incurs a heavy computational workload for miners to solve the proof-of-work puzzle (i.e., a series of the hashing computation), which is prohibitive from the perspective of the mobile terminals (MTs). The advanced multi-access mobile edge computing (MEC), which enables the MTs to offload part of the computational workloads (for solving the proof-of-work) to the nearby edge-servers (ESs), provides a promising approach to address this issue. By offloading the computational workloads via multi-access MEC, the MTs can effectively increase their successful probabilities when participating in the mining game and gain the consequent reward (i.e., winning the bitcoin). However, as a compensation to the ESs which provide the computational resources to the MTs, the MTs need to pay the ESs for the corresponding resource-acquisition costs. Thus, to investigate the trade-off between obtaining the computational resources from the ESs (for solving the proof-of-work) and paying for the consequent cost, we formulate an optimization problem in which the MTs determine their acquired computational resources from different ESs, with the objective of maximizing the MTs’ social net-reward in the mining process while keeping the fairness among the MTs. In spite of the non-convexity of the formulated problem, we exploit its layered structure and propose efficient distributed algorithms for the MTs to individually determine their optimal computational resources acquired from different ESs. Numerical results are provided to validate the effectiveness of our proposed algorithms and the performance of our proposed multi-access MEC for Blockchain

Optimal Computational Power Allocation in Multi-Access Mobile Edge Computing for Blockchain

Blockchain has emerged as a decentralized and trustable ledger for recording and storing digital transactions. The mining process of Blockchain, however, incurs a heavy computational workload for miners to solve the proof-of-work puzzle (i.e., a series of the hashing computation), which is prohibitive from the perspective of the mobile terminals (MTs). The advanced multi-access mobile edge computing (MEC), which enables the MTs to offload part of the computational workloads (for solving the proof-of-work) to the nearby edge-servers (ESs), provides a promising approach to address this issue. By offloading the computational workloads via multi-access MEC, the MTs can effectively increase their successful probabilities when participating in the mining game and gain the consequent reward (i.e., winning the bitcoin). However, as a compensation to the ESs which provide the computational resources to the MTs, the MTs need to pay the ESs for the corresponding resource-acquisition costs. Thus, to investigate the trade-off between obtaining the computational resources from the ESs (for solving the proof-of-work) and paying for the consequent cost, we formulate an optimization problem in which the MTs determine their acquired computational resources from different ESs, with the objective of maximizing the MTs’ social net-reward in the mining process while keeping the fairness among the MTs. In spite of the non-convexity of the formulated problem, we exploit its layered structure and propose efficient distributed algorithms for the MTs to individually determine their optimal computational resources acquired from different ESs. Numerical results are provided to validate the effectiveness of our proposed algorithms and the performance of our proposed multi-access MEC for Blockchain

A Survey on Consensus Mechanisms and Mining Strategy Management in Blockchain Networks

© 2013 IEEE. The past decade has witnessed the rapid evolution in blockchain technologies, which has attracted tremendous interests from both the research communities and industries. The blockchain network was originated from the Internet financial sector as a decentralized, immutable ledger system for transactional data ordering. Nowadays, it is envisioned as a powerful backbone/framework for decentralized data processing and data-driven self-organization in flat, open-access networks. In particular, the plausible characteristics of decentralization, immutability, and self-organization are primarily owing to the unique decentralized consensus mechanisms introduced by blockchain networks. This survey is motivated by the lack of a comprehensive literature review on the development of decentralized consensus mechanisms in blockchain networks. In this paper, we provide a systematic vision of the organization of blockchain networks. By emphasizing the unique characteristics of decentralized consensus in blockchain networks, our in-depth review of the state-of-the-art consensus protocols is focused on both the perspective of distributed consensus system design and the perspective of incentive mechanism design. From a game-theoretic point of view, we also provide a thorough review of the strategy adopted for self-organization by the individual nodes in the blockchain backbone networks. Consequently, we provide a comprehensive survey of the emerging applications of blockchain networks in a broad area of telecommunication. We highlight our special interest in how the consensus mechanisms impact these applications. Finally, we discuss several open issues in the protocol design for blockchain consensus and the related potential research directions