1,013 research outputs found
Pure Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Deterministic Games
We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent
deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel
construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player
concurrent game into a two-player turn-based game which turns Nash equilibria
into winning strategies (for some objective that depends on the preference
relations of the players in the original game). We use that transformation to
design algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in finite games, which in most
cases have optimal worst-case complexity, for large classes of preference
relations. This includes the purely qualitative framework, where each player
has a single omega-regular objective that she wants to satisfy, but also the
larger class of semi-quantitative objectives, where each player has several
omega-regular objectives equipped with a preorder (for instance, a player may
want to satisfy all her objectives, or to maximise the number of objectives
that she achieves.)Comment: 72 page
The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Limit-Average Games
We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games
with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a
Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence
of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is decidable, even if we put a
constraint on the payoff of the equilibrium. Our undecidability result holds
even for a restricted class of concurrent games, where nonzero rewards occur
only on terminal states. Moreover, we show that the constrained existence
problem is undecidable not only for concurrent games but for turn-based games
with the same restriction on rewards. Finally, we prove that the constrained
existence problem for Nash equilibria in (pure or randomised) stationary
strategies is decidable and analyse its complexity.Comment: 34 page
Efficient Energy Distribution in a Smart Grid using Multi-Player Games
Algorithms and models based on game theory have nowadays become prominent
techniques for the design of digital controllers for critical systems. Indeed,
such techniques enable automatic synthesis: given a model of the environment
and a property that the controller must enforce, those techniques automatically
produce a correct controller, when it exists. In the present paper, we consider
a class of concurrent, weighted, multi-player games that are well-suited to
model and study the interactions of several agents who are competing for some
measurable resources like energy. We prove that a subclass of those games
always admit a Nash equilibrium, i.e. a situation in which all players play in
such a way that they have no incentive to deviate. Moreover, the strategies
yielding those Nash equilibria have a special structure: when one of the agents
deviate from the equilibrium, all the others form a coalition that will enforce
a retaliation mechanism that punishes the deviant agent. We apply those results
to a real-life case study in which several smart houses that produce their own
energy with solar panels, and can share this energy among them in micro-grid,
must distribute the use of this energy along the day in order to avoid
consuming electricity that must be bought from the global grid. We demonstrate
that our theory allows one to synthesise an efficient controller for these
houses: using penalties to be paid in the utility bill as an incentive, we
force the houses to follow a pre-computed schedule that maximises the
proportion of the locally produced energy that is consumed.Comment: In Proceedings Cassting'16/SynCoP'16, arXiv:1608.0017
A survey of stochastic ω regular games
We summarize classical and recent results about two-player games played on graphs with ω-regular objectives. These games have applications in the verification and synthesis of reactive systems. Important distinctions are whether a graph game is turn-based or concurrent; deterministic or stochastic; zero-sum or not. We cluster known results and open problems according to these classifications
Mixed Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Terminal-Reward Games
We study mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in multiplayer deterministic concurrent games played on graphs, with terminal-reward payoffs (that is, absorbing states with a value for each player). We show undecidability of the existence of a constrained Nash equilibrium (the constraint requiring that one player should have maximal payoff), with only three players and 0/1-rewards (i.e., reachability objectives). This has to be compared with the undecidability result by Ummels and Wojtczak for turn-based games which requires 14 players and general rewards. Our proof has various interesting consequences: (i) the undecidability of the existence of a Nash equilibrium with a constraint on the social welfare; (ii) the undecidability of the existence of an (unconstrained) Nash equilibrium in concurrent games with terminal-reward payoffs
- …