12 research outputs found
Public-Key Encryption Resistant to Parameter Subversion and its Realization from Efficiently-Embeddable Groups
We initiate the study of public-key encryption (PKE) schemes and key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) that retain security even when public parameters (primes, curves) they use may be untrusted and subverted. We define a strong security goal that we call ciphertext pseudo-randomness under parameter subversion attack (CPR-PSA). We also define indistinguishability (of ciphertexts for PKE, and of encapsulated keys from random ones for KEMs) and public-key hiding (also called anonymity) under parameter subversion attack, and show they are implied by CPR-PSA, for both PKE and KEMs. We show that hybrid encryption continues to work in the parameter subversion setting to reduce the design of CPR-PSA PKE to CPR-PSA KEMs and an appropriate form of symmetric encryption. To obtain efficient, elliptic-curve-based KEMs achieving CPR-PSA, we introduce efficiently-embeddable group families and give several constructions from elliptic-curves
Cryptographic reverse firewalls for interactive proof systems
We study interactive proof systems (IPSes) in a strong adversarial setting where the machines of *honest parties* might be corrupted and under control of the adversary. Our aim is to answer the following, seemingly paradoxical, questions:
- Can Peggy convince Vic of the veracity of an NP statement, without leaking any information about the witness even in case Vic is malicious and Peggy does not trust her computer? - Can we avoid that Peggy fools Vic into accepting false statements, even if Peggy is malicious and Vic does not trust her computer?
At EUROCRYPT 2015, Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz introduced cryptographic reverse firewalls (RFs) as an attractive approach to tackling such questions. Intuitively, a RF for Peggy/Vic is an external party that sits between Peggy/Vic and the outside world and whose scope is to sanitize Peggy's/Vic's incoming and outgoing messages in the face of subversion of her/his computer, e.g. in order to destroy subliminal channels.
In this paper, we put forward several natural security properties for RFs in the concrete setting of IPSes. As our main contribution, we construct efficient RFs for different IPSes derived from a large class of Sigma protocols that we call malleable.
A nice feature of our design is that it is completely transparent, in the sense that our RFs can be directly applied to already deployed IPSes, without the need to re-implement them
Immunization against complete subversion without random oracles
We seek constructions of general-purpose immunizers that take arbitrary cryptographic primitives, and transform them into ones that withstand a powerful âmalicious but proudâ adversary, who attempts to break security by possibly subverting the implementation of all algorithms (including the immunizer itself!), while trying not to be detected. This question is motivated by the recent evidence of cryptographic schemes being intentionally weakened, or designed together with hidden backdoors, e.g., with the scope of mass surveillance.
Our main result is a subversion-secure immunizer in the plain model, that works for a fairly large class of deterministic primitives, i.e. cryptoschemes where a secret (but tamperable) random source is used to generate the keys and the public parameters, whereas all other algorithms are deterministic. The immunizer relies on an additional independent source of public randomness, which is used to sample a public seed.
Assuming the public source is untamperable, and that the subversion of the algorithms is chosen independently of the seed, we can instantiate our immunizer from any one-way function. In case the subversion is allowed to depend on the seed, and the public source is still untamperable, we obtain an instantiation from collision-resistant hash functions. In the more challenging scenario where the public source is also tamperable, we additionally need to assume that the initial cryptographic primitive has sub-exponential security.
Previous work in the area only obtained subversion-secure immunization for very restricted classes of primitives, often in weaker models of subversion and using random oracles
Usalduse vÀhendamine ja turvalisuse parandamine zk-SNARK-ides ja kinnitusskeemides
VĂ€itekirja elektrooniline versioon ei sisalda publikatsioonezk-SNARK-id on tĂ”husad ja praktilised mitteinteraktiivsed tĂ”estussĂŒsteemid, mis on konstrueeritud viitestringi mudelis ning tĂ€nu kompaktsetele tĂ”estustele ja vĂ€ga tĂ”husale verifitseeritavusele on need laialdaselt kasutusele vĂ”etud suuremahulistes praktilistes rakendustes.
Selles töös uurime zk-SNARK-e kahest vaatenurgast: nende usalduse vĂ€hendamine ja turvalisuse tugevdamine. Esimeses suunas uurime kui palju saab vĂ€hendada usaldust paaristuspĂ”histe zk-SNARK-ide puhul ilma nende tĂ”husust ohverdamata niiviisi, et kasutajad saavad teatud turvataseme ka siis kui seadistusfaas tehti pahatahtlikult vĂ”i kui avalikustati seadistusfaasi salajane teave. Me pakume vĂ€lja mĂ”ned tĂ”husad konstruktsioonid, mis suudavad takistada zk-SNARK-i seadistusfaasi rĂŒndeid ja mis saavutavad senisest tugevama turvataseme. NĂ€itame ka seda, et sarnased tehnikad vĂ”imaldavad leevendada usaldust tagauksega kinnitusskeemides, mis on krĂŒptograafiliste primitiivide veel ĂŒks silmapaistev perekond ja mis samuti nĂ”ub usaldatud seadistusfaasi. Teises suunas esitame mĂ”ned tĂ”husad konstruktsioonid, mis tagavad parema turvalisuse minimaalsete lisakuludega. MĂ”ned esitatud konstruktsioonidest vĂ”imaldavad lihtsustada praegusi TK-turvalisi protokolle, nimelt privaatsust sĂ€ilitavate nutilepingusĂŒsteemide Hawk ja Gyges konstruktsiooni, ja parandada nende tĂ”husust. Uusi konstruktsioone saab aga otse kasutada uutes protokollides, mis soovivad kasutada zk-SNARK-e.
Osa vÀljapakutud zk-SNARK-e on implementeeritud teegis Libsnark ja empiirilised tulemused kinnitavad, et usalduse vÀhendamiseks vÔi suurema turvalisuse saavutamiseks on arvutuslikud lisakulud vÀikesed.Zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge (zk-SNARKs) are an efficient family of NIZK proof systems that are constructed in the Common Reference String (CRS) model and due to their succinct proofs and very efficient verification, they are widely adopted in large-scale practical applications.
In this thesis, we study zk-SNARKs from two perspectives, namely reducing trust and improving security in them. In the first direction, we investigate how much one can mitigate trust in pairing-based zk-SNARKs without sacrificing their efficiency. In such constructions, the parties of protocol will obtain a certain level of security even if the setup phase was done maliciously or the secret information of the setup phase was revealed. As a result of this direction, we present some efficient constructions that can resist against subverting of the setup phase of zk-SNARKs and achieve a certain level of security which is stronger than before. We also show that similar techniques will allow us to mitigate the trust in the trapdoor commitment schemes that are another prominent family of cryptographic primitives that require a trusted setup phase. In the second direction, we present some efficient constructions that achieve more security with minimal overhead. Some of the presented constructions allow to simplify the construction of current UC-secure protocols and improve their efficiency. New constructions can be directly deployed in any novel protocols that aim to use zk-SNARKs.
Some of the proposed zk-SNARKs are implemented in Libsnark, the state-of-the-art library for zk-SNARKs, and empirical experiences confirm that the computational cost to mitigate the trust or to achieve more security is practical.https://www.ester.ee/record=b535927
Tiramisu: Black-Box Simulation Extractable NIZKs in the Updatable CRS Model
Zk-SNARKs, as the most efficient NIZK arguments in terms of proof size and verification, are ubiquitously deployed in practice. In applications like Hawk [S&P\u2716], Gyges [CCS\u2716], Ouroboros Crypsinous [S&P\u2719], the underlying zk-SNARK is lifted to achieve Black-Box Simulation Extractability (BB-SE) under a trusted setup phase. To mitigate the trust in such systems, we propose , as a construction to build NIZK arguments that can achieve , which we define as a new variant of BB-SE. This new variant allows the public parameters, therefore eliminating the need for a trusted third party, while unavoidably relies on a extraction algorithm in the setup phase. In the cost of one-time individual CRS update by the parties, this gets around a known impossibility result by Bellare et al. from ASIACRYPT\u2716, which shows that BB extractability cannot be achieved with subversion ZK (ZK without trusting a third party). uses an efficient public-key encryption with updatable keys which may be of independent interest.
We instantiate , implement the overhead, and present efficient BB-SE zk-SNARKs with updatable parameters that can be used in various applications while allowing the end-users to update the parameters and eliminate the needed trust
Subversion-Resilient Signatures: Definitions, Constructions and Applications
We provide a formal treatment of security of digital signatures against subversion attacks (SAs).
Our model of subversion generalizes previous work in several directions, and is inspired by the proliferation of software attacks (e.g., malware and buffer overflow attacks), and by the recent revelations of Edward Snowden about intelligence agencies trying to surreptitiously sabotage cryptographic algorithms.
The main security requirement we put forward demands that a signature scheme should remain unforgeable even in the presence of an attacker applying SAs (within a certain class of allowed attacks) in a fully-adaptive and continuous fashion. Previous notions---e.g., the notion of security against algorithm-substitution attacks introduced by Bellare et al. (CRYPTO \u2714) for symmetric encryption---were non-adaptive and non-continuous.
In this vein, we show both positive and negative results for the goal of constructing subversion-resilient signature schemes.
Negative results. As our main negative result, we show that a broad class of randomized signature schemes is unavoidably insecure against SAs, even if using just a single bit of randomness. This improves upon earlier work that was only able to attack schemes with larger randomness space. When designing our new attack we consider undetectability as an explicit
adversarial goal, meaning that the end-users (even the ones knowing the signing key) should not be able to detect that the signature scheme was subverted.
Positive results. We complement the above negative results by showing that signature schemes with unique signatures are subversion-resilient against all attacks that meet a basic undetectability requirement. A similar result was shown by Bellare et al. for symmetric encryption, who proved the necessity to rely on stateful schemes; in contrast unique signatures are stateless, and in fact they are among the fastest and most established digital signatures available.
As our second positive result, we show how to construct subversion-resilient identification schemes from subversion-resilient signature schemes.
We finally show that it is possible to devise signature schemes secure against arbitrary tampering with the computation, by making use of an un-tamperable cryptographic reverse firewall (Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz, EUROCRYPT \u2715), i.e., an algorithm that sanitizes any signature given as input (using only public information).
The firewall we design allows to successfully protect so-called re-randomizable signature schemes (which include unique signatures as special case). As an additional contribution, we extend our model to consider multiple users and show implications and separations among the various notions we introduced.
While our study is mainly theoretical, due to its strong practical motivation, we believe that our results have important implications in practice and might influence the way digital signature schemes are selected or adopted in standards and protocols
Reverse Firewalls for Adaptively Secure MPC without Setup
We study Multi-party computation (MPC) in the setting of subversion, where the adversary tampers with the machines of honest parties. Our goal is to construct actively secure MPC protocols where parties are corrupted adaptively by an adversary (as in the standard adaptive security setting), and in addition, honest parties\u27 machines are compromised.
The idea of reverse firewalls (RF) was introduced at EUROCRYPT\u2715 by Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz as an approach to protecting protocols against corruption of honest parties\u27 devices. Intuitively, an RF for a party is an external entity that sits between and the outside world and whose scope is to sanitize âs incoming and outgoing messages in the face of subversion of their computer.
Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz constructed a protocol for passively-secure two-party computation. At CRYPTO\u2720, Chakraborty, Dziembowski and Nielsen constructed a protocol for secure computation with firewalls that improved on this result, both by extending it to multi-party computation protocol, and considering active security in the presence of static corruptions.
In this paper, we initiate the study of RF for MPC in the adaptive setting. We put forward a definition for adaptively secure MPC in the reverse firewall setting, explore relationships among the security notions, and then construct reverse firewalls for MPC in this stronger setting of adaptive security. We also resolve the open question of Chakraborty, Dziembowski and Nielsen by removing the need for a trusted setup in constructing RF for MPC.
Towards this end, we construct reverse firewalls for adaptively secure augmented coin tossing and adaptively secure zero-knowledge protocols and obtain a constant round adaptively secure MPC protocol in the reverse firewall setting without setup. Along the way, we propose a new multi-party adaptively secure coin tossing protocol in the plain model, that is of independent interest
Reverse Firewalls for Oblivious Transfer Extension and Applications to Zero-Knowledge
In the setting of subversion, an adversary tampers with the machines of the honest parties thus leaking the honest parties\u27 secrets through the protocol transcript. The work of Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz (EUROCRYPTâ15) introduced the idea of reverse firewalls (RF) to protect against tampering of honest parties\u27 machines. All known constructions in the RF framework rely on the malleability of the underlying operations in order for the RF to rerandomize/sanitize the transcript. RFs are thus limited to protocols that offer some structure, and hence based on public-key operations. In this work, we initiate the study of Multiparty Computation (MPC) protocols in the presence of tampering. In this regard,
- We construct the Oblivious Transfer (OT) extension protocol in the RF setting. We obtain maliciously-secure OTs using public key operations and inexpensive symmetric key operations, where is the security parameter.
- We construct the Zero-knowledge protocol in the RF setting where each multiplication gate can be proven using symmetric key operations. We achieve this using our OT extension protocol and by extending the ZK protocol of Quicksilver (Yang, Sarkar, Weng and Wang, CCS\u2721) to the RF setting.
- Along the way, we introduce new ideas for malleable interactive proofs that could be of independent interest. We define a notion of for Sigma protocols that unlike prior notions allow modifying the instance as well, in addition to the transcript. We construct new protocols that satisfy this notion, construct RFs for such protocols and use them in constructing our OT extension.
The key idea of our work is to demonstrate that correlated randomness may be obtained in an RF-friendly way having to rerandomize the entire transcript. This enables us to avoid expensive public-key operations that grow with the circuit-size
Steganography-Free Zero-Knowledge
We revisit the well-studied problem of preventing steganographic communication in multi-party communications. While this is known to be a provably impossible task, we propose a new model that allows circumventing this impossibility. In our model, the parties first publish a single message during an honest non-interactive pre-processing phase and then later interact in an execution phase. We show that in this model, it is indeed possible to prevent any steganographic communication in zero-knowledge protocols. Our solutions rely on standard cryptographic assumptions
Functional encryption: definitional foundations and multiparty transformations
Classical cryptographic primitives do not allow for any fine-grained access control over encrypted
data. From an encryption of some data x, a decryptor, who is in possession of a decryption key,
can either obtain the whole data x or nothing. The notion of functional encryption overcomes
this drawback and enables access control over encrypted data. In this setting, a setup generator is
responsible for generating the public parameters and, so-called, functional keys. These functional
keys are decryption keys that are associated with a function f such that, when used in the
decryption procedure, the decryptor obtains f(x), which is the result of the function f applied
to the encrypted data x.
The standard security definition of functional encryption prevents a malicious decryptor from
learning more about the encrypted data than what can be obtained from the functional keys it
owns. In this thesis, we introduce the notion of consistency, a security definition that protects an
honest decryptor against a malicious encryptor and/or setup generator. We formally introduce
this notion using different security games and show that our notions are completely separated
from existing confidentiality notions. Additionally, we analyze existing schemes and show how
they can be modified to achieve consistency. Furthermore, we construct black-box compilers that
turn any functional encryption scheme into a consistent one. Finally, we also analyze consistency
in the universal composability (UC) framework and show that the consistency games imply UC
security.
A more general notion of functional encryption is the notion of multi-client functional
encryption, which allows a decryptor to evaluate multi-input functions on multiple ciphertexts
generated by several different clients. This notion also requires a setup generator that generates
the encryption keys for the different clients as well as the functional keys for the decryptor. A
corrupted setup generator is able to compromise the privacy of all the clients in the system
by generating arbitrary functional keys. To remove this single point of failure, the notion of
decentralized multi-client functional encryption has been introduced. In a decentralized multi-client functional encryption scheme the participating clients in the system are responsible for the
generation of the encryption and functional keys.
In this thesis, we present a compiler that decentralizes any multi-client functional encryption
scheme for inner-products, that fulfills certain properties. Furthermore, we show that we can
construct a (decentralized) multi-client functional encryption scheme for separable functions,
n-input functions that can be written as the sum of n single-input functions, from any general-purpose single-input functional encryption scheme.
An interactive version of multi-client functional encryption is the notion of multiparty
computation. In multiparty computation several parties can jointly compute a function involving
their private inputs by interacting in multiple rounds of communication.
We show how we can use functional encryption to amplify existing multiparty computation
protocols in terms of their communication complexity. In more detail, we show how to turn a
multiparty computation protocol with arbitrary communication complexity into a multiparty
computation protocol with a communication complexity only depending on the depth of the circuit
that is being computed, while preserving the number of rounds of interaction of the protocol.
Furthermore, we present an improved compiler that relies on fully homomorphic encryption, a
cryptographic notion that allows for the oblivious evaluation of functions on encrypted data,
where the communication complexity of the amplified protocol is completely independent of the
circuit that is being computed