Public Information and Electoral Bias

We present a theory of strategic voting that predicts elections are more likely to be close and voter turnout is more likely to be high when citizens possess better public information about the composition of the electorate. These findings are disturbing because they suggest that providing more information to potential voters about aggregate political preferences (e.g., through polls, political stock markets, or expert forecasts) may actually undermine the democratic process. We show that if the distribution of preferences is common knowledge, then strategic voting leads to a stark neutrality result in which the probability that either alternative wins the election is 12. This occurs because membersof the minority compensate exactly for their smaller group size by voting with higher frequency. By contrast, when citizens are symmetrically ignorant about the distribution of types, the majority is more likely to win the election and expected voter turnout is lower. Indeed, when the population is large and voting costs are small, the majority wins with probability arbitrarily close to one in equilibrium. Welfare is, therefore, unambiguously higher when citizens possess less information about the distribution of political preferences.

Politics, Information and the Urban Bias

Governments in many developing countries skew public resources towards urban sectors, despite a majority of citizens residing in rural areas. This paper develops a novel political argument for this urban bias phenomenon in a framework where all voters, rural and urban, have equal voice, but di?er in their access to information. We argue that this di?erence is su?cient to give governments an incentive to ine?ciently overallocate resources towards urban areas. The bias is shown to worsen during adverse economic times, leading to increased migration. We also examine how voter informativeness a?ects e?ciency of the electoral process in weeding out incompetent governments.Urban Bias, Information, Heterogeneous Electorate, Migration.

The Performance of Elected Officials: Evidence from State Supreme Courts

This paper provides evidence on the effect of electoral institutions on the performance of public officials. Using panel data on state supreme courts between 1947 and 1994, we measure the effects of changes in judicial electoral processes on judge work quality – as measured by citations by later judges. Judges selected by non-partisan elections write higher-quality opinions than judges selected by partisan elections. Judges selected by technocratic merit commissions write higher-quality opinions than either partisan-elected judges or non-partisan-elected judges. Election-year politics reduces judicial performance in both partisan and non-partisan election systems. Giving stronger tenure to non-partisan-selected judges improves performance, while giving stronger tenure to partisan-selected judges has no effect. These results are consistent with the view that technocratic merit commissions have better information about the quality of candidates than voters, and that political bias can reduce the quality of elected officials

"Voto por voto, casilla por casilla?" : Democratic consolidation, political intermediation, and the Mexican election of 2006

After he had only tightly lost the election in July 2006, Andrés Manuel López Obrador and his Coalición claimed fraud and asserted that unfair conditions during the campaign had diminished his chances to win the presidency. The paper investigates this latter allegation centering on a perceived campaign of hate, unequal access to campaign resources and malicious treatment by the mass media. It further analyzes the mass media’s performance during the conflictual post electoral period until the final decision of the Federal Electoral Tribunal on September 5th, 2006. While the media’s performance during the campaign tells us about their compliance with fair media coverage mechanisms that have been implemented by electoral reforms in the 1990s, the mass media is uncontained by such measures after the election. Thus, their mode of coverage of the postelectoral conflicts allows us to “test” the mass media’s transformation to a more unbiased, social responsible “fourth estate”. Finally the paper scrutinizes whether the claims of fraud and the protests by the leftist movement resulted in lower levels of institutional trust and democratic support. The analysis of the media performance is based on data provided by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). Its Media Monitor encompassed more than 150 TV stations, 240 radio stations and 200 press publications. However, there is no comparable data available for the postelectoral period. Interviews with Mexican media experts, which the author has conducted during the postelectoral period, serve as empirical basis for the second part. Data on the public opinions and attitudes of Mexican citizens are taken from the 2007 Latinobarometro, the 2006 Encuesta Nacional and several polls conducted by Grupo Reforma. The results do not support López Obradors notions. Even though a strong party bias is characteristic of the Mexican media system, all findings hint at a continuity of balanced campaign coverage and fair access to mass media publicity. Coverage during the postelectoral period was more polarized, yet both sides remained at least partially open for oppositional views. The claims of fraud, mass protest mobilization and anti-institutional discourse by Lopez Obrador’s leftist movement seem not to have caused significant loss in institutional trust, support of and satisfaction with democracy, even though these levels remain quite low

At a time of insurgent parties, can societies believe in election polls?. The Spanish experience

The main purpose of this paper is to use the Spanish case, through an econometric analysis of 226 electoral polls, to explain why polls are making more mistakes in times of great socioeconomic slumps, political instability and the emergence of new political parties. In this context, it is the very instrument with which society tries to reduce the reigning uncertainty that, paradoxically, can ultimately drive uncertainty up. Our results show that the prediction error for the new emerging parties is significantly higher than for the traditional parties and this error is not sensitive to solutions for increasing the reliability of surveys, such as increasing sample size, transparency constantly conducting periodical surveys, the closeness of the approaching election or the survey mode that is used. It can be observed that pollsters do not want to make predictions that vary greatly from the average of the other polls. Finally, editorial bias appears to play a significant role, especially in the case of traditional parties.El principal objetivo de este artículo es explicar por qué las encuestas electorales cometen más errores en épocas de crisis económica, inestabilidad política y con partidos emergentes como Podemos y Ciudadanos. Para ello utilizamos una base de datos de 226 encuestas previas a las elecciones generales españolas de 2016. En este contexto, paradójicamente vemos como el instrumento que la sociedad utiliza para reducir su incertidumbre puede acabar aumentándola. Nuestros resultados muestran como el error de predicción de los nuevos partidos es significativamente mayor que los tradicionales e insensible a las soluciones clásicas para aumentar la precisión de las encuestas, como el tamaño de la muestra, el método de muestreo, la experiencia del encuestador, o la proximidad de la cita electoral. Además, se observa que las empresas que desarrollan las encuestas realizan de forma sistemática predicciones muy próximas a las que han realizado las encuestas recientes de sus competidores. Finalmente, el sesgo editorial parece ser una variable relevante, especialmente en lo relativo a las predicciones de los partidos tradicionale

Do Campaign Contribution Limits Curb the Influence of Money in Politics?

Over 40% of countries around the world have adopted limits on campaign contributions to curb the influence of money in politics. Yet, we have limited knowledge on whether and how these limits achieve this goal. With a regression discontinuity design that uses institutional rules on contribution limits in Colombian municipalities, we show that looser limits increase the number and value of public contracts assigned to the winning candidate’s donors. The evidence suggests that this is explained by looser limits concentrating influence over the elected candidate among top donors and not by a reduction in electoral competition or changes in who runs for office. We further show that looser limits worsen the performance of donor-managed contracts: they are more likely to run over costs and require time extensions. Overall, this paper demonstrates a direct link between campaign contribution limits, donor kickbacks, and worse government contract performance

Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures: a dynamic panel regression analysis

This paper investigates the presence of political budget cycles (PBCs) in the European Union using a data set encompassing all 27 current member states over the period 1997-2008, and analyzes what may explain their variability across countries and over time. Conditioning on partisan considerations and several socio-economic variables, we find evidence in favor of a systematic electoral cycle in fiscal policy (i.e. spending and budget deficits are raised in election years). Furthermore, we find that PBCs are much larger in the Eurozone countries than in the countries that have not yet adopted the euro. Finally, we discuss an interesting area for future research, namely, fiscal policy manipulations are influenced by the information available to the market before elections. Specifically, we show that the size of PBCs is inversely proportional to the relative weight voters assign to non-economic issues prior to an election and positively correlated with the uncertainty over the electoral outcome. Once we account for these two features, the aforementioned differences between the Eurozone and the non-Eurozone countries seem to disappear

A meta-analysis of state-of-the-art electoral prediction from Twitter data

Electoral prediction from Twitter data is an appealing research topic. It seems relatively straightforward and the prevailing view is overly optimistic. This is problematic because while simple approaches are assumed to be good enough, core problems are not addressed. Thus, this paper aims to (1) provide a balanced and critical review of the state of the art; (2) cast light on the presume predictive power of Twitter data; and (3) depict a roadmap to push forward the field. Hence, a scheme to characterize Twitter prediction methods is proposed. It covers every aspect from data collection to performance evaluation, through data processing and vote inference. Using that scheme, prior research is analyzed and organized to explain the main approaches taken up to date but also their weaknesses. This is the first meta-analysis of the whole body of research regarding electoral prediction from Twitter data. It reveals that its presumed predictive power regarding electoral prediction has been rather exaggerated: although social media may provide a glimpse on electoral outcomes current research does not provide strong evidence to support it can replace traditional polls. Finally, future lines of research along with a set of requirements they must fulfill are provided.Comment: 19 pages, 3 table

BallotMaps: Detecting name bias in alphabetically ordered ballot papers

The relationship between candidates’ position on a ballot paper and vote rank is explored in the case of 5000 candidates for the UK 2010 local government elections in the Greater London area. This design study uses hierarchical spatially arranged graphics to represent two locations that affect candidates at very different scales: the geographical areas for which they seek election and the spatial location of their names on the ballot paper. This approach allows the effect of position bias to be assessed; that is, the degree to which the position of a candidate’s name on the ballot paper influences the number of votes received by the candidate, and whether this varies geographically. Results show that position bias was significant enough to influence rank order of candidates, and in the case of many marginal electoral wards, to influence who was elected to government. Position bias was observed most strongly for Liberal Democrat candidates but present for all major political parties. Visual analysis of classification of candidate names by ethnicity suggests that this too had an effect on votes received by candidates, in some cases overcoming alphabetic name bias. The results found contradict some earlier research suggesting that alphabetic name bias was not sufficiently significant to affect electoral outcome and add new evidence for the geographic and ethnicity influences on voting behaviour. The visual approach proposed here can be applied to a wider range of electoral data and the patterns identified and hypotheses derived from them could have significant implications for the design of ballot papers and the conduct of fair elections