Optimal Reachability in Divergent Weighted Timed Games

Weighted timed games are played by two players on a timed automaton equipped with weights: one player wants to minimise the accumulated weight while reaching a target, while the other has an opposite objective. Used in a reactive synthesis perspective, this quantitative extension of timed games allows one to measure the quality of controllers. Weighted timed games are notoriously difficult and quickly undecidable, even when restricted to non-negative weights. Decidability results exist for subclasses of one-clock games, and for a subclass with non-negative weights defined by a semantical restriction on the weights of cycles. In this work, we introduce the class of divergent weighted timed games as a generalisation of this semantical restriction to arbitrary weights. We show how to compute their optimal value, yielding the first decidable class of weighted timed games with negative weights and an arbitrary number of clocks. In addition, we prove that divergence can be decided in polynomial space. Last, we prove that for untimed games, this restriction yields a class of games for which the value can be computed in polynomial time

Equilibria, Fixed Points, and Complexity Classes

Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games (stochastic and other games); stable configurations of neural networks; analysing basic stochastic models for evolution like branching processes and for language like stochastic context-free grammars; and models that incorporate the basic primitives of probability and recursion like recursive Markov chains. It is not known whether these problems can be solved in polynomial time. There are certain common computational principles underlying different types of equilibria, which are captured by the complexity classes PLS, PPAD, and FIXP. Representative complete problems for these classes are respectively, pure Nash equilibria in games where they are guaranteed to exist, (mixed) Nash equilibria in 2-player normal form games, and (mixed) Nash equilibria in normal form games with 3 (or more) players. This paper reviews the underlying computational principles and the corresponding classes

On Relevant Equilibria in Reachability Games

We study multiplayer reachability games played on a finite directed graph equipped with target sets, one for each player. In those reachability games, it is known that there always exists a Nash equilibrium (NE) and a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). But sometimes several equilibria may coexist such that in one equilibrium no player reaches his target set whereas in another one several players reach it. It is thus very natural to identify "relevant" equilibria. In this paper, we consider different notions of relevant equilibria including Pareto optimal equilibria and equilibria with high social welfare. We provide complexity results for various related decision problems

Computer Aided Verification

This open access two-volume set LNCS 13371 and 13372 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 34rd International Conference on Computer Aided Verification, CAV 2022, which was held in Haifa, Israel, in August 2022. The 40 full papers presented together with 9 tool papers and 2 case studies were carefully reviewed and selected from 209 submissions. The papers were organized in the following topical sections: Part I: Invited papers; formal methods for probabilistic programs; formal methods for neural networks; software Verification and model checking; hyperproperties and security; formal methods for hardware, cyber-physical, and hybrid systems. Part II: Probabilistic techniques; automata and logic; deductive verification and decision procedures; machine learning; synthesis and concurrency. This is an open access book

Computer Aided Verification

The open access two-volume set LNCS 12224 and 12225 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 32st International Conference on Computer Aided Verification, CAV 2020, held in Los Angeles, CA, USA, in July 2020.* The 43 full papers presented together with 18 tool papers and 4 case studies, were carefully reviewed and selected from 240 submissions. The papers were organized in the following topical sections: Part I: AI verification; blockchain and Security; Concurrency; hardware verification and decision procedures; and hybrid and dynamic systems. Part II: model checking; software verification; stochastic systems; and synthesis. *The conference was held virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic

Pseudopolynomial iterative algorithm to solve total-payoff games and min-cost reachability games

International audienceQuantitative games are two-player zero-sum games played on directed weighted graphs. Total-payoff games—that can be seen as a refinement of the well-studied mean-payoff games—are the variant where the payoff of a play is computed as the sum of the weights. Our aim is to describe the first pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for total-payoff games in the presence of arbitrary weights. It consists of a non-trivial application of the value iteration paradigm. Indeed, it requires to study, as a milestone, a refinement of these games, called min-cost reachability games, where we add a reachability objective to one of the players. For these games, we give an efficient value iteration algorithm to compute the values and optimal strategies (when they exist), that runs in pseudo-polynomial time. We also propose heuristics to speed up the computations

LIPIcs, Volume 274, ESA 2023, Complete Volume

LIPIcs, Volume 274, ESA 2023, Complete Volum