A Protected Single Sign-On Technique Using 2D Password in Distributed Computer Networks

Single Sign-On (SSO) is a new authentication mechanism that enables a legal user with a single credential to be authenticated by multiple service providers in a distributed computer network. Recently, a new SSO scheme providing well-organized security argument failed to meet credential privacy and soundness of authentication. The main goal of this project is to provide security using Single Sign-On scheme meeting at least three basic security requirements, i.e., unforgetability, credential privacy, and soundness. User identification is an important access control mechanism for client–server networking architectures. The concept of Single Sign-On can allow legal users to use the unitary token to access different service providers in distributed computer networks. To overcome few drawbacks like not preserving user anonymity when possible attacks occur and extensive overhead costs of time-synchronized mechanisms, we propose a secure Single Sign-On mechanism that is efficient, secure, and suitable for mobile devices in distributed computer networks. In a real-life application, the mobile user can use the mobile device, e.g., a cell phone, with the unitary token to access multiservice, such as downloading music; receive/reply electronic mails etc. Our scheme is based on one-way hash functions and random nonce to solve the weaknesses described above and to decrease the overhead of the system. The proposed scheme is more secure with two types of password scheme namely, Text password and Graphical Password referred as 2D password in distributed computer networks that yields a more efficient system that consumes lower energy. The proposed system has less communication overhead. It eliminates the need for time synchronization and there is no need of holding multiple passwords for different services

A method for making password-based key exchange resilient to server compromise

Abstract. This paper considers the problem of password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) in a client-server setting, where the server authenticates using a stored password file, and it is desirable to maintain some degree of security even if the server is compromised. A PAKE scheme is said to be resilient to server compromise if an adversary who compromises the server must at least perform an offline dictionary attack to gain any advantage in impersonating a client. (Of course, offline dictionary attacks should be infeasible in the absence of server compromise.) One can see that this is the best security possible, since by definition the password file has enough information to allow one to play the role of the server, and thus to verify passwords in an offline dictionary attack. While some previous PAKE schemes have been proven resilient to server compromise, there was no known general technique to take an arbitrary PAKE scheme and make it provably resilient to server compromise. This paper presents a practical technique for doing so which requires essentially one extra round of communication and one signature computation/verification. We prove security in the universal composability framework by (1) defining a new functionality for PAKE with resilience to server compromise, (2) specifying a protocol combining this technique with a (basic) PAKE functionality, and (3) proving (in the random oracle model) that this protocol securely realizes the new functionality.

PACCE -A Real Genuine Key Swap over Protocols

A Secure protocols for password-based user authentication unit well-studied among the crypto logical literature but have did not see wide-spread adoption on the internet; most proposals up to presently want full modifications to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, making preparation onerous. Recently many traditional styles square measure projected among that a cryptographically secure countersign-based mutual authentication protocol is run among a confidential (but not primarily authenticated) channel like TLS; the countersign protocol is sure to the established channel to forestall active attacks. Such protocols unit helpful in apply for a ramification of reasons: ability to validate server certificates and can all told likelihood be enforced with no modifications to the secure channel protocol library. It offers a scientific study of such authentication protocols. Building on recent advances in modelling TLS, we've associate inclination to provide a correct definition of the meant security goal, that we've associate inclination to decision password-authenticated and confidential channel institution (PACCE). we've associate inclination to imply generically that combining a secure channel protocol, like TLS, Our prototypes supported TLS unit accessible as a cross-platform client-side Firefox browser extension furthermore as associate golem application and a server-side internet application which will simply be place in on servers

Privacy protection for e-health systems by means of dynamic authentication and three-factor key agreement

During the past decade, the electronic healthcare (e-health) system has been evolved into a more patient-oriented service with smaller and smarter wireless devices. However, these convenient smart devices have limited computing capacity and memory size, which makes it harder to protect the user’s massive private data in the e-health system. Although some works have established a secure session key between the user and the medical server, the weaknesses still exist in preserving the anonymity with low energy consumption. Moreover, the misuse of biometric information in key agreement process may lead to privacy disclosure, which is irreparable. In this study, we design a dynamic privacy protection mechanism offering the biometric authentication at the server side whereas the exact value of the biometric template remains unknown to the server. And the user anonymity can be fully preserved during the authentication and key negotiation process because the messages transmitted with the proposed scheme are untraceable. Furthermore, the proposed scheme is proved to be semantic secure under the Real-or-Random Model. The performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme suits the e-health environment at the aspect of security and resource occupation

Password-based group key exchange in a constant number of rounds

Abstract. With the development of grids, distributed applications are spread across multiple computing resources and require efficient security mechanisms among the processes. Although protocols for authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocols seem to be the natural mechanisms for supporting these applications, current solutions are either limited by the use of public key infrastructures or by their scalability, requiring a number of rounds linear in the number of group members. To overcome these shortcomings, we propose in this paper the first provably-secure password-based constant-round group key exchange protocol. It is based on the protocol of Burmester and Desmedt and is provably-secure in the random-oracle and ideal-cipher models, under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. The new protocol is very efficient and fully scalable since it only requires four rounds of communication and four multi-exponentiations per user. Moreover, the new protocol avoids intricate authentication infrastructures by relying on passwords for authentication.

Threshold password-authenticated key exchange

Abstract. In most password-authenticated key exchange systems there is a single server storing password verification data. To provide some resilience against server compromise, this data typically takes the form of a one-way function of the password (and possibly a salt, or other public values), rather than the password itself. However, if the server is compromised, this password verification data can be used to perform an offline dictionary attack on the user’s password. In this paper we propose an efficient password-authenticated key exchange system involving a set of servers, in which a certain threshold of servers must participate in the authentication of a user, and in which the compromise of any fewer than that threshold of servers does not allow an attacker to perform an offline dictionary attack. We prove our system is secure in the random oracle model under the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption against an attacker that may eavesdrop on, insert, delete, or modify messages between the user and servers, and that compromises fewer than that threshold of servers.

Password-Protected Secret Sharing

We revisit the problem of protecting user\u27s private data against adversarial compromise of user\u27s device(s) which would normally store this data. We formalize an attractive solution to this problem as Password-Protected Secret-Sharing (PPSS), which is a protocol that allows a user to secret-share her data among n trustees in such a way that (1) the user can retrieve the shared secret upon entering a correct password into a reconstruction protocol which succeeds as long as at least t+1 honest trustees participate, and (2) the shared data remains secret even against the adversary which corrupts at most t servers, with the level of protection expected of password-authentication, i.e. the probability that the adversary learns anything useful about the secret is at most negligibly greater than q/|D| where q is the number of reconstruction protocol instances in which adversary engages and |D| is the size of the dictionary from which the password was randomly chosen. We propose an efficient PPSS protocol in the public key model, i.e. where the device can remember a trusted public key, provably secure under the DDH assumption, using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs which are efficiently instantiatable in the Random Oracle Model (ROM). The resulting protocol is robust and practical, with fewer than $4t+12$ exponentiations per party, and with only three messages exchanged between the user and each server, implying a single round of interaction in the on-line phase. As a side benefit our PPSS protocol yields a new Threshold Password Authenticated Key Exchange (T-PAKE) protocol in the public key model which is significantly faster than existing T-PAKE\u27s provably secure in the public key model in ROM