2,074 research outputs found
Provability Logic and the Completeness Principle
In this paper, we study the provability logic of intuitionistic theories of
arithmetic that prove their own completeness. We prove a completeness theorem
for theories equipped with two provability predicates and
that prove the schemes and for
. Using this theorem, we determine the logic of fast provability
for a number of intuitionistic theories. Furthermore, we reprove a theorem
previously obtained by M. Ardeshir and S. Mojtaba Mojtahedi determining the
-provability logic of Heyting Arithmetic
Constructive Provability Logic
We present constructive provability logic, an intuitionstic modal logic that
validates the L\"ob rule of G\"odel and L\"ob's provability logic by permitting
logical reflection over provability. Two distinct variants of this logic, CPL
and CPL*, are presented in natural deduction and sequent calculus forms which
are then shown to be equivalent. In addition, we discuss the use of
constructive provability logic to justify stratified negation in logic
programming within an intuitionstic and structural proof theory.Comment: Extended version of IMLA 2011 submission of the same titl
Lewis meets Brouwer: constructive strict implication
C. I. Lewis invented modern modal logic as a theory of "strict implication".
Over the classical propositional calculus one can as well work with the unary
box connective. Intuitionistically, however, the strict implication has greater
expressive power than the box and allows to make distinctions invisible in the
ordinary syntax. In particular, the logic determined by the most popular
semantics of intuitionistic K becomes a proper extension of the minimal normal
logic of the binary connective. Even an extension of this minimal logic with
the "strength" axiom, classically near-trivial, preserves the distinction
between the binary and the unary setting. In fact, this distinction and the
strong constructive strict implication itself has been also discovered by the
functional programming community in their study of "arrows" as contrasted with
"idioms". Our particular focus is on arithmetical interpretations of the
intuitionistic strict implication in terms of preservativity in extensions of
Heyting's Arithmetic.Comment: Our invited contribution to the collection "L.E.J. Brouwer, 50 years
later
Turing jumps through provability
Fixing some computably enumerable theory , the
Friedman-Goldfarb-Harrington (FGH) theorem says that over elementary
arithmetic, each formula is equivalent to some formula of the form
provided that is consistent. In this paper we give various
generalizations of the FGH theorem. In particular, for we relate
formulas to provability statements which
are a formalization of "provable in together with all true
sentences". As a corollary we conclude that each is
-complete. This observation yields us to consider a recursively
defined hierarchy of provability predicates which look a lot
like except that where calls upon the
oracle of all true sentences, the recursively
calls upon the oracle of all true sentences of the form . As such we obtain a `syntax-light' characterization of
definability whence of Turing jumps which is readily extended
beyond the finite. Moreover, we observe that the corresponding provability
predicates are well behaved in that together they provide a
sound interpretation of the polymodal provability logic
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