Formally sound implementations of security protocols with JavaSPI

Designing and coding security protocols is an error prone task. Several flaws are found in protocol implementations and specifications every year. Formal methods can alleviate this problem by backing implementations with rigorous proofs about their behavior. However, formally-based development typically requires domain specific knowledge available only to few experts and the development of abstract formal models that are far from real implementations. This paper presents a Java-based protocol design and implementation framework, where the user can write a security protocol symbolic model in Java, using a well defined subset of the language that corresponds to applied π-calculus. This Java model can be symbolically executed in the Java debugger, formally verified with ProVerif, and further refined to an interoperable Java implementation of the protocol. Soundness theorems are provided to prove that, under some reasonable assumptions, a simulation relation relates the Java refined implementation to the symbolic model verified by ProVerif, so that, for the usual security properties, a property verified by ProVerif on the symbolic model is preserved in the Java refined implementation. The applicability of the framework is evaluated by developing an extensive case study on the popular SSL protocol

Formal-Guided Fuzz Testing: Targeting Security Assurance from Specification to Implementation for 5G and Beyond

Softwarization and virtualization in 5G and beyond necessitate thorough testing to ensure the security of critical infrastructure and networks, requiring the identification of vulnerabilities and unintended emergent behaviors from protocol designs to their software stack implementation. To provide an efficient and comprehensive solution, we propose a novel and first-of-its-kind approach that connects the strengths and coverage of formal and fuzzing methods to efficiently detect vulnerabilities across protocol logic and implementation stacks in a hierarchical manner. We design and implement formal verification to detect attack traces in critical protocols, which are used to guide subsequent fuzz testing and incorporate feedback from fuzz testing to broaden the scope of formal verification. This innovative approach significantly improves efficiency and enables the auto-discovery of vulnerabilities and unintended emergent behaviors from the 3GPP protocols to software stacks. Following this approach, we discover one identifier leakage model, one DoS attack model, and two eavesdrop attack models due to the absence of rudimentary MITM protection within the protocol, despite the existence of a Transport Layer Security (TLS) solution to this issue for over a decade. More remarkably, guided by the identified formal analysis and attack models, we exploit 61 vulnerabilities using fuzz testing demonstrated on srsRAN platforms. These identified vulnerabilities contribute to fortifying protocol-level assumptions and refining the search space. Compared to state-of-the-art fuzz testing, our united formal and fuzzing methodology enables auto-assurance by systematically discovering vulnerabilities. It significantly reduces computational complexity, transforming the non-practical exponential growth in computational cost into linear growth

Logical Consistency Validation Tools for Distributed Systems

As a result of using Information Technology (IT) in different technological processes it is necessary to develop new application specific communication protocols. The number of application specific protocols is growing rapidly in different areas: medicine, communication, industry, power systems, computer networks, etc. Protocol errors discovered in the implementation phase are usually a consequence of inconsistent protocol design, which implies the necessity of methodology for error detection in an early design phase. This paper describes formal methods for distributed systems, especially SPIN/Promela tool for formal verification of logical consistency in distributed systems. A protocol used in power systems IEC60870-5-101 has been verified as an example of formal verification of a distributed system. Formal specification, simulation and verification of logical consistency have been successfully done by using SPIN/Promela software

Easing the Transition from Inspiration to Implementation: A Rapid Prototyping Platform for Wireless Medium Access Control Protocols

Packet broadcast networks are in widespread use in modern wireless communication systems. Medium access control is a key functionality within such technologies. A substantial research effort has been and continues to be invested into the study of existing protocols and the development of new and specialised ones. Academic researchers are restricted in their studies by an absence of suitable wireless MAC protocol development methods. This thesis describes an environment which allows rapid prototyping and evaluation of wireless medium access control protocols. The proposed design flow allows specification of the protocol using the specification and description language (SDL) formal description technique. A tool is presented to convert the SDL protocol description into a C++ model suitable for integration into both simulation and implementation environments. Simulations at various levels of abstraction are shown to be relevant at different stages of protocol design. Environments based on the Cinderella SDL simulator and the ns-2 network simulator have been developed which allow early functional verification, along with detailed and accurate performance analysis of protocols under development. A hardware platform is presented which allows implementation of protocols with flexibility in the hardware/software trade-off. Measurement facilities are integral to the hardware framework, and provide a means for accurate real-world feedback on protocol performance

An IDE for the Design, Verification and Implementation of Security Protocols

Security protocols are critical components for the construction of secure and dependable distributed applications, but their implementation is challenging and error prone. Therefore, tools for formal modelling and analysis of security protocols can be potentially very useful to support software engineers. However, despite such tools having been available for a long time, their adoption outside the research community has been very limited. In fact, most practitioners find such applications too complex and hardly usable for their daily work. In this paper, we present an Integrated Development Environment for the design, verification and implementation of security protocols, aimed at lowering the adoption barrier of formal methods tools for security. In the spirit of Model Driven Development, the environment supports the user in the specification of the model using the simple and intuitive language AnB (and its extension AnBx). Moreover, it provides a push-button solution for the formal verification of the abstract and concrete models, and for the automatic generation of Java implementation. This Eclipse-based IDE leverages on existing languages and tools for the modelling and verification of security protocols, such as the AnBx Compiler and Code Generator, the model checker OFMC and the cryptographic protocol verifier ProVerif

Formal Verification of a MESI-based Cache Implementation

Cache coherency is crucial to multi-core systems with a shared memory programming model. Coherency protocols have been formally verified at the architectural level with relative ease. However, several subtle issues creep into the hardware realization of cache in a multi-processor environment. The assumption, made in the abstract model, that state transitions are atomic, is invalid for the HDL implementation. Each transition is composed of many concurrent multi-core operations. As a result, even with a blocking bus, several transient states come into existence. Most modern processors optimize communication with a split-transaction bus, this results in further transient states and race conditions. Therefore, the design and verification of cache coherency is increasingly complex and challenging. Simulation techniques are insufficient to ensure memory consistency and the absence of deadlock, livelock, and starvation. At best, it is tediously complex and time consuming to reach confidence in functionality with simulation. Formal methods are ideally suited to identify the numerous race conditions and subtle failures. In this study, we perform formal property verification on the RTL of a multi-core level-1 cache design based on snooping MESI protocol. We demonstrate full-proof verification of the coherence module in JasperGold using complexity reduction techniques through parameterization. We verify that the assumptions needed to constrain inputs of the stand-alone cache coherence module are satisfied as valid assertions in the instantiation environment. We compare results obtained from formal property verification against a state-of-the-art UVM environment. We highlight the benefits of a synergistic collaboration between simulation and formal techniques. We present formal analysis as a generic toolkit with numerous usage models in the digital design process

Experiences with formal engineering: model-based specification, implementation and testing of a software bus at Neopost

We report on the actual industrial use of formal methods during the development of a software bus. During an internship at Neopost Inc., of 14 weeks, we developed the server component of a software bus, called the XBus, using formal methods during the design, validation and testing phase: we modeled our design of the XBus in the process algebra mCRL2, validated the design using the mCRL2-simulator, and fully automatically tested our implementation with the model-based test tool JTorX. This resulted in a well- tested software bus with a maintainable architecture. Writing the model (mdev), simulating it, and testing the implementation with JTorX only took 17% of the total development time. Moreover, the errors found with model-based testing would have been hard to find with conventional test methods. Thus, we show that formal engineering can be feasible, beneficial and cost-effective.\ud The findings above, reported earlier by us in (Sijtema et al., 2011) [1], were well- received, also in industrially oriented conferences (Ferreira and Romanenko, 2010) [2] and [3]. In this paper, we look back on the case study, and carefully analyze its merits and shortcomings. We reflect on (1) the added benefits of model checking, (2) model completeness and (3) the quality and performance of the test process.\ud Thus, in a second phase, after the internship, we model checked the XBus protocol—this was not done in [1] since the Neopost business process required a working implementation after 14 weeks. We used the CADP tool evaluator4 to check the behavioral requirements obtained during the development. Model checking did not uncover errors in model mdev, but revealed that model mdev was neither complete nor optimized: in particular, requirements to the so-called bad weather behavior (exceptions, unexpected inputs, etc.) were missing. Therefore, we created several improved models, checked that we could validate them, and used them to analyze quality and performance of the test process. Model checking was expensive: it took us approx. 4 weeks in total, compared to 3 weeks for the entire model-based testing approach during the internship.\ud In the second phase, we analyzed the quality and performance of the test process, where we looked at both code and model coverage. We found that high code coverage (almost 100%) is in most cases obtained within 1000 test steps and 2 minutes, which matches the fact that the faults in the XBus were discovered within a few minutes.\ud Summarizing, we firmly believe that the formal engineering approach is cost-effective, and produces high quality software products. Model checking does yield significantly better models, but is also costly. Thus, system developers should trade off higher model quality against higher costs

Applying Formal Methods to Networking: Theory, Techniques and Applications

Despite its great importance, modern network infrastructure is remarkable for the lack of rigor in its engineering. The Internet which began as a research experiment was never designed to handle the users and applications it hosts today. The lack of formalization of the Internet architecture meant limited abstractions and modularity, especially for the control and management planes, thus requiring for every new need a new protocol built from scratch. This led to an unwieldy ossified Internet architecture resistant to any attempts at formal verification, and an Internet culture where expediency and pragmatism are favored over formal correctness. Fortunately, recent work in the space of clean slate Internet design---especially, the software defined networking (SDN) paradigm---offers the Internet community another chance to develop the right kind of architecture and abstractions. This has also led to a great resurgence in interest of applying formal methods to specification, verification, and synthesis of networking protocols and applications. In this paper, we present a self-contained tutorial of the formidable amount of work that has been done in formal methods, and present a survey of its applications to networking.Comment: 30 pages, submitted to IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorial