Privacy Preservation by Disassociation

In this work, we focus on protection against identity disclosure in the publication of sparse multidimensional data. Existing multidimensional anonymization techniquesa) protect the privacy of users either by altering the set of quasi-identifiers of the original data (e.g., by generalization or suppression) or by adding noise (e.g., using differential privacy) and/or (b) assume a clear distinction between sensitive and non-sensitive information and sever the possible linkage. In many real world applications the above techniques are not applicable. For instance, consider web search query logs. Suppressing or generalizing anonymization methods would remove the most valuable information in the dataset: the original query terms. Additionally, web search query logs contain millions of query terms which cannot be categorized as sensitive or non-sensitive since a term may be sensitive for a user and non-sensitive for another. Motivated by this observation, we propose an anonymization technique termed disassociation that preserves the original terms but hides the fact that two or more different terms appear in the same record. We protect the users' privacy by disassociating record terms that participate in identifying combinations. This way the adversary cannot associate with high probability a record with a rare combination of terms. To the best of our knowledge, our proposal is the first to employ such a technique to provide protection against identity disclosure. We propose an anonymization algorithm based on our approach and evaluate its performance on real and synthetic datasets, comparing it against other state-of-the-art methods based on generalization and differential privacy.Comment: VLDB201

Privacy in the Genomic Era

Genome sequencing technology has advanced at a rapid pace and it is now possible to generate highly-detailed genotypes inexpensively. The collection and analysis of such data has the potential to support various applications, including personalized medical services. While the benefits of the genomics revolution are trumpeted by the biomedical community, the increased availability of such data has major implications for personal privacy; notably because the genome has certain essential features, which include (but are not limited to) (i) an association with traits and certain diseases, (ii) identification capability (e.g., forensics), and (iii) revelation of family relationships. Moreover, direct-to-consumer DNA testing increases the likelihood that genome data will be made available in less regulated environments, such as the Internet and for-profit companies. The problem of genome data privacy thus resides at the crossroads of computer science, medicine, and public policy. While the computer scientists have addressed data privacy for various data types, there has been less attention dedicated to genomic data. Thus, the goal of this paper is to provide a systematization of knowledge for the computer science community. In doing so, we address some of the (sometimes erroneous) beliefs of this field and we report on a survey we conducted about genome data privacy with biomedical specialists. Then, after characterizing the genome privacy problem, we review the state-of-the-art regarding privacy attacks on genomic data and strategies for mitigating such attacks, as well as contextualizing these attacks from the perspective of medicine and public policy. This paper concludes with an enumeration of the challenges for genome data privacy and presents a framework to systematize the analysis of threats and the design of countermeasures as the field moves forward

Garantia de privacidade na exploração de bases de dados distribuídas

Anonymisation is currently one of the biggest challenges when sharing sensitive personal information. Its importance depends largely on the application domain, but when dealing with health information, this becomes a more serious issue. A simpler approach to avoid this disclosure is to ensure that all data that can be associated directly with an individual is removed from the original dataset. However, some studies have shown that simple anonymisation procedures can sometimes be reverted using specific patients’ characteristics, namely when the anonymisation is based on hidden key attributes. In this work, we propose a secure architecture to share information from distributed databases without compromising the subjects’ privacy. The work was initially focused on identifying techniques to link information between multiple data sources, in order to revert the anonymization procedures. In a second phase, we developed the methodology to perform queries over distributed databases was proposed. The architecture was validated using a standard data schema that is widely adopted in observational research studies.A garantia da anonimização de dados é atualmente um dos maiores desafios quando existe a necessidade de partilhar informações pessoais de carácter sensível. Apesar de ser um problema transversal a muitos domínios de aplicação, este torna-se mais crítico quando a anonimização envolve dados clinicos. Nestes casos, a abordagem mais comum para evitar a divulgação de dados, que possam ser associados diretamente a um indivíduo, consiste na remoção de atributos identificadores. No entanto, segundo a literatura, esta abordagem não oferece uma garantia total de anonimato, que pode ser quebrada através de ataques específicos que permitem a reidentificação dos sujeitos. Neste trabalho, é proposta uma arquitetura que permite partilhar dados armazenados em repositórios distribuídos, de forma segura e sem comprometer a privacidade. Numa primeira fase deste trabalho, foi feita uma análise de técnicas que permitam reverter os procedimentos de anonimização. Na fase seguinte, foi proposta uma metodologia que permite realizar pesquisas em bases de dados distribuídas, sem que o anonimato seja quebrado. Esta arquitetura foi validada sobre um esquema de base de dados relacional que é amplamente utilizado em estudos clínicos observacionais.Mestrado em Ciberseguranç

Privacy-by-design in big data analytics and social mining

n/