Fraud and error in the field of EU social security coordination Reference year : 2016

This study summarises the information provided by the Member States in their annual voluntary reports on their experience and progress concerning cooperation on fraud and error in the reference year 2016, as provided for in Decision H5 of the Administrative Commission for the Coordination of Social Security Systems. The Member States’ reports have been analysed with the aim of identifying several elements. First, particular attention goes to the steps taken throughout the year to prevent and combat fraud and error in the field of EU social security coordination. Secondly, the aim of the country reports was to identify specific problems in implementing the EU coordination rules which may lead to, at least risks of, fraud and error. Thirdly, an outline is provided of the steps taken to promote compliance by institutions and healthcare providers with the coordination rules and to provide information to citizens, in the field of benefits in kinds. Fourthly, the report notes good practices, lessons learned and remaining issues or concerns when dealing with crossborder cooperation and information exchange within the framework of Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009 on the coordination of social security systems. Fifthly, the report summarises the examples of or proposals or suggestions for measures to improve the overall tackling of fraud and error in the field of social security coordination which National Contact Points (NCPs) can operationalise without the need for changes to national or EU law. Also some additional remarks, made by a few Member States, are inserted at the end of this report. Finally, the report contains an Annex I (National legislation relevant to preventing and combating social security fraud and error within the framework of Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009 on the coordination of social security systems, including the relevant definitions of fraud and error and penalties and sanctions that apply) and an Annex II (Inventory of bilateral agreements and bilateral cooperation arrangements with other EU or EEA Member States entered into for the purposes of combating fraud and error within the framework of Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009 on the coordination of social security systems)

Inter-agency Cooperation and Good Tax Governance in Africa

In 2015, the Vienna University of Economics and Business (WU) and the African Tax Institute at the University of Pretoria launched a project to identify the links between corruption, money laundering and tax crimes in Africa. The project promotes the concepts of good tax governance and the importance to economic development of a tax system that is transparent and free of corruption. The project explores how law enforcement agencies and tax authorities can best cooperate to counter corruption and bribery. The project was initially aimed at three focus countries, namely, Ghana, Nigeria and South Africa, but soon was extended to other African countries. This is a joint initiative with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and is also supported by the World Bank. This book brings together a series of background papers prepared for the Conference on Inter-Agency Co-operation and Good Tax Governance in Africa held at the University of Pretoria in July 2016. After a rigorous double peer-review process, the papers were revised by the authors. We express our gratitude to and acknowledge the services of the following peer reviewers: Tom Balco; Carika Fritz; Leon Gerber; Willem Jacobs; Benjamin Kujinga; Thabo Legwaila; Annet Oguttu; Dirk Scholtz; David Solomon; and Xeniya Yeroshenko. Finally, we express our sincere gratitude to all the research and administrative assistants who contributed to the Good Tax Governance in Africa Project. This book pays tribute to their efforts. Jeffrey Owens, Rick McDonell, Riël Franzsen and Jude Amos (Vienna and Pretoria, November 2017

Analytical Report 2017 on mutual assistance and sincere cooperation. An inquiry into the cooperation to enforce the coordination Regulations and to combat fraud and error.

Good administration and cooperation can be regarded as of paramount importance for the smooth functioning of the coordination Regulations and might be considered as the fifth general coordination principle. Good cooperation is a set of indispensable rules for the good functioning of the coordination system. Throughout the different modifications to the coordination Regulations, this principle has been vested with a higher status. During recent years this principle has gained further significance in the context of social fraud. Trying to combat social fraud can be complicated and inefficient because of different practical and legal problems of cooperation between administrations within one Member State (internal, national cooperation) and because of problems of cooperation between administrations of different Member States (external, international cooperation). Multi-national but also multi-dimensional cooperation is required in order to successfully combat social fraud and abuse. Good exchange of information and cooperation between the competent institutions within the framework of coordination Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009 could contribute to this objective. A set of rules has therefore been established under the coordination Regulations. These provisions could be considered an elaboration of the general principle of sincere cooperation within EU law, enacted in Article 4 (3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), according to which the Member States have to cooperate in good faith in their dealings with the EU as well as among themselves. The characteristics of this cooperation under the coordination Regulations are manifold: communication of relevant information (which may affect the implementation of the Regulations) between the authorities; good administrative assistance according to which an institution of a Member State may request the relevant authority of another Member State to lend its good support to the first institution in providing information; direct communication between the authorities and with the insured persons (based on the principles of public service, efficiency, active assistance, rapid delivery and accessibility (often through electronic exchange of data); the prohibition of the rejection of claims or documents based on language; the mutual information duty between the insured persons and the competent authorities (e.g. of any change in the personal or family situation which affects their right to benefits or the obligation for notification of decisions); the avoidance of interpretation difficulties and differences of views between institutions; and the obligation for the latter to provide certain information “within a reasonable period”. In a strict sense the principle of sincere cooperation also includes recovery of incorrectly paid benefits, recovery of provisional payments and contributions, and offsetting and assistance with recovery. The Regulations contain important improvements and developments in this field of cooperation, which can be found in the taxation field. The application of these principles is complex and many clarifications are missing, raising the risk that they may not always be in the interest of the persons concerned. Recommendations for improvement, some of them based on other European procedural rules, are currently under discussion. Another key aspect of good administrative cooperation to combat social fraud is the (electronic) exchange of data, and the mutual provision of (digital) information. The use of databases is gaining importance and becoming more widespread throughout the Member States. This exchange of information should be fast, safe and efficient, which is definitively important in a cross-border context. However, the privacy argument is frequently invoked in order to refuse to exchange information requested by a competent body of another Member State. While this argument of privacy may be used by other institutions for not transmitting the requested information, it may also be invoked at a later stage and result in a finding of unlawfully obtained proof in violation of the law and/or individual privacy. For all these reasons the framework within which this exchange takes place is of the utmost importance. The impact of these privacy arguments should not be underestimated, just as the borderlines are not always very clear. It cannot be ignored that the issue of privacy introduces limits to the strategy against social fraud. As demonstrated by the Court of Justice of the European Union, the question can be asked whether all cases in which data are currently exchanged in the context of (cross-border) social fraud are actually in compliance with all privacy and data protection requirements. Recently a strengthening of European level data protection and associated rights in the framework of the coordination Regulations were proposed, but further investigations in this domain are recommended. It should be noted that the edifice of administrative cooperation rules in the framework of Regulations (EC) No 883/2004 and (EC) No 987/2009 are not conceived as intentional instruments for countering fraud and abuse. From that perspective it might prove worthwhile to look beyond the legal framework of the coordination Regulations in order to see how other legal fields are dealing with comparable problems. Posting Directive 96/71/EC and Enforcement Directive 2014/67/EU have set up a system of measures that should improve posted workers' rights, eliminate abuse, and attain fairer competition with a better level playing field. Furthermore, inspiration might also be found in domains outside social law. The provisions of the TEU regarding the area of freedom, security and justice include a legal basis for Union acts in the field of judicial cooperation in both civil and criminal matters as well as police cooperation in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences. First, it would be interesting to see to what extent some of these instruments of judicial and police cooperation are already being used for mutual assistance in the field of social security. In this respect, it must be emphasised that misconduct with regard to social security (benefits or contributions) may only come within the scope of cooperation instruments in criminal matters, if the behaviour potentially constitutes a criminal or at least administrative offence. However, deciding if and when certain behaviour with regard to social security may constitute a (criminal) offence falls within the competence of the Member States. Furthermore, these instruments often focus on areas of serious crime, and do not – although this is not completely excluded – include specific offences with regard to social security. It would also be interesting to find out how those instruments are dealing with certain problems of cross-border mutual assistance, which could complement or serve as an example for social security regulation. In this report a toolbox of possible instruments has been selected and examined in order to find out if they might be helpful to further develop and improve cooperation under the social security Regulations. These elements include joint teams and participation of officials in other Member States; the setting-up of central European data repositories; exploring the extent to which more of a push function could be installed for the mutual information requirements; the introduction of clearly defined and therefore limited grounds for refusal or non-recognition; the strengthening of institutionalised networks and national contact points so that they have the necessary powers and tools in order to effectively execute their tasks; stricter rules and clarifications with respect to the sending of documents; the introduction of more fixed deadlines and time limits; and finally more specifications on the expenses incurred as a result of the general principle of mutual recognition

How Countries Seek to Strengthen Anti-Money Laundering Laws in Response to the Panama Papers, and the Ethical Implications of Incentivizing Whistleblowers

The Panama Papers is currently the world’s largest whistleblower case that involved 11.5 million leaked documents and over 214,000 offshore entities. It all linked back to one Panamanian law firm, Mossack Fonseca. In 2016, over 400 investigative journalists collaboratively and simultaneously published stories that exposed the money laundering and tax-evading schemes committed by the rich and powerful. This included political figures and heads of states, celebrities, sports figures, criminal organizations, and terrorist groups. This article aims to dissect the innerworkings of Mossack Fonseca’s asset-shielding strategy and investigate how the Panamanian law firm was able to circumvent the tax and anti-money laundering laws of over 50 countries. We will also examine the global responses to the Panama Papers, the proposed reforms and strategies, and the obstacles to moving forward. Finally, this article explores the ethical duties of lawyers, the significance of attorney-client privilege, and the implications of monetarily incentivizing whistleblowers