Transparent quantification into hyperpropositional contexts de re

This paper is the twin of (Duží and Jespersen, in submission), which provides a logical rule for transparent quantification into hyperprop- ositional contexts de dicto, as in: Mary believes that the Evening Star is a planet; therefore, there is a concept c such that Mary be- lieves that what c conceptualizes is a planet. Here we provide two logical rules for transparent quantification into hyperpropositional contexts de re. (As a by-product, we also offer rules for possible- world propositional contexts.) One rule validates this inference: Mary believes of the Evening Star that it is a planet; therefore, there is an x such that Mary believes of x that it is a planet. The other rule validates this inference: the Evening Star is such that it is believed by Mary to be a planet; therefore, there is an x such that x is believed by Mary to be a planet. Issues unique to the de re variant include partiality and existential presupposition, sub- stitutivity of co-referential (as opposed to co-denoting or synony- mous) terms, anaphora, and active vs. passive voice. The validity of quantifying-in presupposes an extensional logic of hyperinten- sions preserving transparency and compositionality in hyperinten- sional contexts. This requires raising the bar for what qualifies as co-denotation or equivalence in extensional contexts. Our logic is Tichý’s Transparent Intensional Logic. The syntax of TIL is the typed lambda calculus; its highly expressive semantics is based on a procedural redefinition of, inter alia, functional abstraction and application. The two non-standard features we need are a hyper- intension (called Trivialization) that presents other hyperintensions and a four-place substitution function (called Sub) defined over hy- perintensions

Refining concepts by machine learning

DOI nefunkční (25.11.2019)In this paper we deal with machine learning methods and algorithms applied in learning simple concepts by their refining or explication. The method of refining a simple concept of an object O consists in discovering a molecular concept that defines the same or a very similar object to the object O. Typically, such a molecular concept is a professional definition of the object, for instance a biological definition according to taxonomy, or legal definition of roles, acts, etc. Our background theory is Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL). In TIL concepts are explicated as abstract procedures encoded by natural language terms. These procedures are defined as six kinds of TIL constructions. First, we briefly introduce the method of learning with a supervisor that is applied in our case. Then we describe the algorithm 'Framework' together with heuristic methods applied by it. The heuristics is based on a plausible supply of positive and negative (near-miss) examples by which learner's hypotheses are refined and adjusted. Given a positive example, the learner refines the hypothesis learnt so far, while a near-miss example triggers specialization. Our heuristic methods deal with the way refinement is applied, which includes also its special cases generalization and specialization.Web of Science23395894

An Essentialist Theory of the Meaning of Slurs

In this paper, I develop an essentialist model of the semantics of slurs. I defend the view that slurs are a species of kind terms: Slur concepts encode mini-theories which represent an essence-like element that is causally connected to a set of negatively-valenced stereotypical features of a social group. The truth-conditional contribution of slur nouns can then be captured by the following schema: For a given slur S of a social group G and a person P, S is true of P iff P bears the “essence” of G—whatever this essence is—which is causally responsible for stereotypical negative features associated with G and predicted of P. Since there is no essence that is causally responsible for stereotypical negative features of a social group, slurs have null-extension, and consequently, many sentences containing them are either meaningless or false. After giving a detailed outline of my theory, I show that it receives strong linguistic support. In particular, it can account for a wide range of linguistic cases that are regarded as challenging, central data for any theory of slurs. Finally, I show that my theory also receives convergent support from cognitive psychology and psycholinguistics

Making AI Meaningful Again

Artificial intelligence (AI) research enjoyed an initial period of enthusiasm in the 1970s and 80s. But this enthusiasm was tempered by a long interlude of frustration when genuinely useful AI applications failed to be forthcoming. Today, we are experiencing once again a period of enthusiasm, fired above all by the successes of the technology of deep neural networks or deep machine learning. In this paper we draw attention to what we take to be serious problems underlying current views of artificial intelligence encouraged by these successes, especially in the domain of language processing. We then show an alternative approach to language-centric AI, in which we identify a role for philosophy

Inferring knowledge from textual data by natural deduction

In this paper, we introduce the system for inferring implicit computable knowledge from textual data by natural deduction. Our background system is Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) with its procedural semantics that assigns abstract procedures known as TIL constructions to terms of natural language as their context-invariant meanings. The input data for our method are produced by the so-called Normal Translation Algorithm (NTA). The algorithm processes natural-language texts and produces TIL constructions. In this way we have obtained a large corpus of TIL meaning procedures. These procedures are furthermore processed by our algorithms for type checking and context recognition, so that the rules of natural deduction for inferring computable knowledge can be afterwards applied.Web of Science241482

Making AI meaningful again

Artificial intelligence (AI) research enjoyed an initial period of enthusiasm in the 1970s and 80s, but this enthusiasm was tempered by a long interlude of frustration when genuinely useful AI applications failed to be forthcoming. Today, we are experiencing once again a period of enthusiasm, fired above all by the successes of the technology of deep neural networks or deep machine learning. In this paper we draw attention to what we take to be serious problems underlying current views of artificial intelligence encouraged by these successes, especially in the domain of language processing. We then show an alternative approach to language-centric AI, in which we identify a role for philosophy

Making AI meaningful again

Artificial intelligence (AI) research enjoyed an initial period of enthusiasm in the 1970s and 80s. But this enthusiasm was tempered by a long interlude of frustration when genuinely useful AI applications failed to be forthcoming. Today, we are experiencing once again a period of enthusiasm, fired above all by the successes of the technology of deep neural networks or deep machine learning. In this paper we draw attention to what we take to be serious problems underlying current views of artificial intelligence encouraged by these successes, especially in the domain of language processing. We then show an alternative approach to language-centric AI, in which we identify a role for philosophy.Comment: 23 pages, 1 Tabl

Introduction

International audienceThis introductory chapter is organized into three parts. The first part focuses on the syntactic structure and compositional interpretation of determiner phrases, and frames the ontological issues related to reference to kinds in this context. It addresses a series of ontological issues relevant to the analysis of natural language: in order to account for linguistic data, must we postulate the existence of kinds, viewed as a type of entities, distinguished from particulars or tokens? What is the relationship between kinds and sets of entities, between kinds and properties, between kinds and sets of properties? The second part is comprised of three sections which are dedicated respectively to the stage-level/individual-level distinction, to the contribution of unboundedness and plurality, and to the dispositional reading of generic sentences. The questions addressed in this part pertain to the relationship between genericity, habituality, abilities, and dispositions. The third part examines the type of generic sentences, opposing analytic vs synthetic judgments, and raises the question of the notion of normality. It comprises two sections. The first section addresses the issue of the linguistic manifestation of the analytic/synthetic distinction and investigates the sources of the available interpretations for indefinite generic sentences, bare plurals, and definite plural generics. The second section discusses the notion of normality, comparing the view of normality as a statistical fact and the view of normality as a normative one

'On a Supposed Puzzle Concerning Modality and Existence'

Kit Fine has proposed a new solution to what he calls ‘a familiar puzzle’ concerning modality and existence. The puzzle concerns the argument from the alleged truths ‘It is necessary that Socrates is a man’ and ‘It is possible that Socrates does not exist’ to the apparent falsehood ‘It is possible that Socrates is a man and does not exist’. We discuss in detail Fine’s setting up of the ‘puzzle’ and his rejection, with which we concur, of two mooted solutions to it. (One of these uses standard, Kripkean, notions, and the other rests on work done by Arthur Prior.) We set out, and reject, the philosophy of modality underlying Fine’s new solution, and we defend an alternative response to the alleged puzzle. Our solution follows the work of David Wiggins in distinguishing between the sentential operator ‘It is necessary that’ and the predicate modifier ‘necessarily’. We briefly provide this distinction with a possible- world semantics on which it is neither a necessary truth, in some sense, that Socrates exists nor true, in some sense, that Socrates necessarily exists