A categorical characterization of relative entropy on standard Borel spaces

We give a categorical treatment, in the spirit of Baez and Fritz, of relative entropy for probability distributions defined on standard Borel spaces. We define a category suitable for reasoning about statistical inference on standard Borel spaces. We define relative entropy as a functor into Lawvere's category and we show convexity, lower semicontinuity and uniqueness.Comment: 16 page

Higher order elicitability and Osband's principle

A statistical functional, such as the mean or the median, is called elicitable if there is a scoring function or loss function such that the correct forecast of the functional is the unique minimizer of the expected score. Such scoring functions are called strictly consistent for the functional. The elicitability of a functional opens the possibility to compare competing forecasts and to rank them in terms of their realized scores. In this paper, we explore the notion of elicitability for multi-dimensional functionals and give both necessary and sufficient conditions for strictly consistent scoring functions. We cover the case of functionals with elicitable components, but we also show that one-dimensional functionals that are not elicitable can be a component of a higher order elicitable functional. In the case of the variance this is a known result. However, an important result of this paper is that spectral risk measures with a spectral measure with finite support are jointly elicitable if one adds the `correct' quantiles. A direct consequence of applied interest is that the pair (Value at Risk, Expected Shortfall) is jointly elicitable under mild conditions that are usually fulfilled in risk management applications.Comment: 32 page

Approximate Coherentism and Luck

Approximate coherentism suggests that imperfectly rational agents should hold approximately coherent credences. This norm is intended as a generalization of ordinary coherence. I argue that it may be unable to play this role by considering its application under learning experiences. While it is unclear how imperfect agents should revise their beliefs, I suggest a plausible route is through Bayesian updating. However, Bayesian updating can take an incoherent agent from relatively more coherent credences to relatively less coherent credences, depending on the data observed. Thus, comparative rationality judgments among incoherent agents are unduly sensitive to luck

On the Accuracy of Group Credences

to appear in Szabó Gendler, T. & J. Hawthorne (eds.) Oxford Studies in Epistemology volume 6 We often ask for the opinion of a group of individuals. How strongly does the scientific community believe that the rate at which sea levels are rising increased over the last 200 years? How likely does the UK Treasury think it is that there will be a recession if the country leaves the European Union? What are these group credences that such questions request? And how do they relate to the individual credences assigned by the members of the particular group in question? According to the credal judgment aggregation principle, Linear Pooling, the credence function of a group should be a weighted average or linear pool of the credence functions of the individuals in the group. In this paper, I give an argument for Linear Pooling based on considerations of accuracy. And I respond to two standard objections to the aggregation principle