306 research outputs found
Accuracy and Credal Imprecision
Many have claimed that epistemic rationality sometimes requires us to have imprecise credal states (i.e. credal states representable only by sets of credence functions) rather than precise ones (i.e. credal states representable by single credence functions). Some writers have recently argued that this claim conflicts with accuracy-centered epistemology, i.e., the project of justifying epistemic norms by appealing solely to the overall accuracy of the doxastic states they recommend. But these arguments are far from decisive. In this essay, we prove some new results, which show that there is little hope for reconciling the rationality of credal imprecision with accuracy-centered epistemology
Quantum objects are vague objects
[FIRST PARAGRAPHS]
Is vagueness a feature of the world or merely of our representations
of the world? Of course, one might respond to this question by asserting
that insofar as our knowledge of the world is mediated by our
representations of it, any attribution of vagueness must attach to the latter.
However, this is to trivialize the issue: even granted the point that all
knowledge is representational, the question can be re-posed by asking
whether vague features of our representations are ultimately eliminable or
not. It is the answer to this question which distinguishes those who believe
that vagueness is essentially epistemic from those who believe that it is,
equally essentially, ontic. The eliminability of vague features according to
the epistemic view can be expressed in terms of the supervenience of
‘vaguely described facts’ on ‘precisely describable facts’:
If two possible situations are alike as precisely described in terms of
physical measurements, for example, then they are alike as vaguely
described with words like ‘thin’. It may therefore be concluded that the facts
themselves are not vague, for all the facts supervene on precisely
describable facts. (Williamson 1994, p. 248; see also pp. 201-
204)
It is the putative vagueness of certain identity statements in
particular that has been the central focus of claims that there is vagueness
‘in’ the world (Parfit 1984, pp. 238-241; Kripke 1972, p. 345 n. 18). Thus,
it may be vague as to who is identical to whom after a brain-swap, to give
a much discussed example. Such claims have been dealt a forceful blow
by the famous Evans-Salmon argument which runs as follows: suppose for
reductio that it is indeterminate whether a = b. Then b definitely possesses
the property that it is indeterminate whether it is identical with a, but a
definitely does not possess this property since it is surely not
indeterminate whether a=a. Therefore, by Leibniz’s Law, it cannot be the
case that a=b and so the identity cannot be indeterminate (Evans 1978;
Salmon 1982)
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy
The Lockean Thesis says that you must believe p iff you’re sufficiently confident of it. On some versions, the 'must' asserts a metaphysical connection; on others, it asserts a normative one. On some versions, 'sufficiently confident' refers to a fixed threshold of credence; on others, it varies with proposition and context. Claim: the Lockean Thesis follows from epistemic utility theory—the view that rational requirements are constrained by the norm to promote accuracy. Different versions of this theory generate different versions of Lockeanism; moreover, a plausible version of epistemic utility theory meshes with natural language considerations, yielding a new Lockean picture that helps to model and explain the role of beliefs in inquiry and conversation. Your beliefs are your best guesses in response to the epistemic priorities of your context. Upshot: we have a new approach to the epistemology and semantics of belief. And it has teeth. It implies that the role of beliefs is fundamentally different than many have thought, and in fact supports a metaphysical reduction of belief to credence
Multiple actualities and ontically vague identity
Gareth Evans's argument against ontically vague identity has been picked over on many occasions. But extant proposals for blocking the argument do not meet well-motivated general constraints on a successful solution. Moreover, the pivotal position that defending ontically vague identity occupies vis a vis ontic vagueness more generally has not yet been fully appreciated. This paper advocates a way of resisting the Evans argument meeting all the mentioned constraints: if we can find referential indeterminacy in virtue of ontic vagueness, we can get out of the Evans argument while still preserving genuinely ontically vague identity. To show how this approach can vindicate particular cases of ontically vague identity, I develop a framework for describing ontic vagueness in general in terms of multiple actualities. The effect, overall, is to provide a principled and attractive approach to ontically vague identity that is immune from Evansian worries
Constructive set theory and Brouwerian principles
The paper furnishes realizability models of constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, CZF, which also validate Brouwerian principles such as the axiom of continuous choice (CC), the fan theorem (FT), and monotone bar induction (BIM), and thereby determines the proof-theoretic strength of CZF augmented by these principles. The upshot is that CZF+CC+FT possesses the same strength as CZF, or more precisely, that CZF+CC+FTis conservative over CZF for 02 statements of arithmetic, whereas the addition of a restricted version of bar induction to CZF (called decidable bar induction, BID) leads to greater proof-theoretic strength in that CZF+BID proves the consistency of CZF
Taking equality seriously
In this thesis, I attempt to reconcile two alternative approaches to justice: distributive and relational egalitarianism. When examining the two accounts, I claim that relational egalitarianism has distributive egalitarian implications. This implies an extensional overlap between the two accounts, namely a correspondence between the normative outcomes of relational and distributive egalitarianism.
This work is addressed primarily to relational egalitarian scholars, as well as others who are convinced by the value of relational equality as a worthy moral and political ideal. My aim is to prove that their goal implies embracing equality of distribution beyond relational equality. When making the case that relational egalitarians should take equality seriously, I claim that they should refrain from embracing distributive principles other than – or incompatible with – principles of distributive equality.
This statement entails both a negative and a positive thesis. On the negative side, we should be critical toward the prominent tendency within the relational egalitarian debate, as influenced by the work of Elizabeth Anderson (1999), to reject claims of distributive egalitarian justice in favour of sufficientarian claims of distribution. On the positive side, distributive equality is required by the logic of relational egalitarianism, although its normative significance exists independently of it.
While presenting my statements, I provide support for the externalist understanding of relational equality as most recently advanced by Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2018), through which the egalitarian character of someone’s relation depends on features external to their relation, such as on the distribution of the relevant currency among them. Whether or not individuals relate to one another as equals – I maintain – depends not merely on the internal feature of their relation, that is, on how they perceive or regard one another, but also, significantly, on how goods such as resources, welfare or opportunities are distributed among them. On my account, individuals are only equals when they recognize each other as equal in status and grant one another an equal share of the justice-relevant good.
In defending my thesis, I critically engage with the literature on both distributive egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism. In particular, in the first part, I reconstruct the egalitarian debate and its approach to equality as either a relational or a distributive ideal. In the second part, I question such either/or relation by arguing that relational equality implies distributive equality, because arbitrary distributive inequality violates the deliberative constraint of relating as equals. I strengthen this claim by looking at the particular instantiation of distributive inequality in the field of education, and unveil its theoretical implications while supporting the project of reconciling distributive egalitarian and relational egalitarian approaches to justice. In my view, relational and distributive egalitarianism are compatible theories within one and the same egalitarian framework. Their normative outcomes are – at least in part – equivalent
Quine’s ideological debacle
In two papers in the mid-seventies, Quine has discussed an ontological deba-cle, the reduction of ontology to an ontology of pure sets only. This debacle, which weakened Quine’s interest in ontology, is the natural outcome of on-tological relativity, or, more precisely, the proxy-function argument. It is ex-plained how Quine unavoidably came to this conclusion. Moreover, it is ar-gued that the result is even more damaging for Quine’s philosophy than has hitherto been assumed. It is shown that in addition to an ontological debacle, there is an ideological debacle, reducing the ideology (lexicon) of science to the ideology of set theory. The ideological debacle results from applying ex-tensional substitution of predicates within a scientific theory that is reinter-preted by means of proxy-functions to a theory with a set-theoretic ontology. Though Quine has recognized the possibility of an ideological debacle, his rebuttal is unconvincing. As a result, his tenet of extensionalism is under heavy pressure
African Metaphysics and Religious Ethics
Scholars of African moral thought reject the possibility of an African religious
ethics by invoking at least three major reasons. The first objection to ‘ethical
supernaturalism’ argues that it is part of those aspects of African culture that are
‘anachronistic’ insofar as they are superstitious rather than rational; as such, they
should be jettisoned. The second objection points out that ethical supernaturalism
is incompatible with the utilitarian approach to religion that typically characterises
some African peoples’ orientation to it. The last objection argues that religious ethics by their very nature require the feature (of revelation), which is generally lacking in African religious experiences. The facet of revelation is crucial for a religious ethics since it solves the epistemological problem of knowing the will of God or the content of morality. In this article, I construct a vitality-based African religious moral theory; and, I argue that it can successfully meet these objections
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