Projections and functions of Nash equilibria

We show that any non-empty compact semi-algebraic subset of mixed action profiles on a fixed player set can be represented as the projection of the set of equilibria of a game in which additional binary players have been added. Even stronger, we show that any semi-algebraic continuous function, or even any semi-algebraic upper-semicontinuous correspondence with non-empty convex values, from a bounded semi-algebraic set to the unit cube can be represented as the projection of an equilibrium correspondence of a game with binary players in which payoffs depend on parameters from the domain of the function or correspondence in a multi-affine way. Some extensions are also presented

Distributivity breaking and macroscopic quantum games

Examples of games between two partners with mixed strategies, calculated by the use of the probability amplitude as some vector in Hilbert space are given. The games are macroscopic, no microscopic quantum agent is supposed. The reason for the use of the quantum formalism is in breaking of the distributivity property for the lattice of yes-no questions arising due to the special rules of games. The rules of the games suppose two parts: the preparation and measurement. In the first part due to use of the quantum logical orthocomplemented non-distributive lattice the partners freely choose the wave functions as descriptions of their strategies. The second part consists of classical games described by Boolean sublattices of the initial non-Boolean lattice with same strategies which were chosen in the first part. Examples of games for spin one half are given. New Nash equilibria are found for some cases. Heisenberg uncertainty relations without the Planck constant are written for the "spin one half game"

Payoff Performance of Fictitious Play

We investigate how well continuous-time fictitious play in two-player games performs in terms of average payoff, particularly compared to Nash equilibrium payoff. We show that in many games, fictitious play outperforms Nash equilibrium on average or even at all times, and moreover that any game is linearly equivalent to one in which this is the case. Conversely, we provide conditions under which Nash equilibrium payoff dominates fictitious play payoff. A key step in our analysis is to show that fictitious play dynamics asymptotically converges the set of coarse correlated equilibria (a fact which is implicit in the literature).Comment: 16 pages, 4 figure