How Satellites are Moving Beyond the Class System: Class Agnostic Development and Operations Approaches for Constraints-Driven Missions

Should we abolish the Class System? The Class A/B/C/D mission assurance and risk posture designations familiar to most satellite developers were established in 1986. They are used by both the Department of Defense (DoD) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to define risk and risk mitigation requirements for flight missions. However, many of today’s satellites are different – smaller, digitally engineered, designed for production, and increasingly destined for proliferated architectures. The rate of development is increasing while the uniqueness of the systems being built is decreasing. The need to move faster and the ability to utilize, for the first time in space, real product-line components challenges the premise and assumptions behind the Class A through D designations. The traditional “Class System” is not as applicable to most small satellite developments, which instead focus on ways to prioritize key, high impact, agile processes in an effort to cut costs and timelines. Operating within this environment requires satellite developers to apply practices that are agnostic to class definition (e.g., the practices that are most fundamental to ensuring the mission meets the needs). This paper outlines the Class Agnostic approach and constraints-based mission implementation practices. It will describe several real-life examples from Air Force Research Laboratory, Space and Missile System Center, and Space Rapid Capabilities Office missions that are applying a “class agnostic” approach to their missions. It will include lessons learned from missions which failed critical Do No Harm requirements and lost a flight to missions that have fully utilized the class agnostic approach. It will also discuss how the several missions used class-agnostic techniques to balance requirements of scope, risk, cost, and schedule to maximize the chances of mission success within hard constraints. The approaches used in these missions are applicable not only to small satellites, but also to any mission intending to move beyond the “Class System” to a more agile and flexible mindset for risk mitigation and mission assurance

Including Technical and Security Risks in the Development of Information Systems: A Programmatic Risk Management Model

Developing and managing an information systems project has always been challenging, but with increased security concerns and tight budget resources, the risks are even greater. With more networks, mobility, and telecommuting, there is an increased need for an assessment of the technical and security risks. These risks if realized can have devastating impacts: interruptions of service, data theft or corruption, embezzlement and fraud, and compromised customer privacy. The software risk assessment literature (for example, Barki et al. 2001; Lyytinen et al. 1998; Schmidt et al. 2001) has focused primarily on managerial (i.e., development) risks, while the security risk models (for example, Cohen et al. 1998; Straub and Welke 1998) do not include the development risks and implementation costs. Theoretical risk models need to be developed that can provide a framework for assessing and managing the critical technical failure and security risk factors in conjunction with the managerial and development risks. This research seeks to model this problem by extending risk models originally developed for large-scale engineering systems

Development of Risk Uncertainty Factors from Historical NASA Projects

NASA is a good investment of federal funds and strives to provide the best value to the nation. NASA has consistently budgeted to unrealistic cost estimates, which are evident in the cost growth in many of its programs. In this investigation, NASA has been using available uncertainty factors from the Aerospace Corporation, Air Force, and Booz Allen Hamilton to develop projects\u27 risk posture. NASA has no insight into the developmental of these factors and, as demonstrated here, this can lead to unrealistic risks in many NASA Programs and projects (P/p). The primary contribution of this project is the development of NASA missions\u27 uncertainty factors, from actual historical NASA projects, to aid cost-estimating as well as for independent reviews which provide NASA senior management with information and analysis to determine the appropriate decision regarding P/p. In general terms, this research project advances programmatic analysis for NASA projects

Customer Utilization Requirements and Their Impact for Space Station Capabilities

This is a summary of work presented to the Level B Space Station Program Office at Johnson Space Center related to customer requirements definition and their impact for Space Station design. The study was global in scope, querying the range of potential Station users for their ranked requirements for access to Station capabilities. User groups are identified based on their common set of functional requirements for Station services, and group needs were ranked according to level of utility for each unique Space Station capability. Analysis of the design drivers identified by the utility scores was conducted, resulting in a determination of which Station capabilities are in greatest demand, and where major technical commonalities and incompatibilities exist between user groups. This analysis provides a mechanism whereby NASA managers can evaluate the impact of design tradeoffs for the Station\u27s customer community. Major conclusions of the study include: 1) the need to base design choices on functional user group needs in order to account for currently unknown users; 2) emphasizing operational flexibility and minimizing life cycle costs in order to provide a user-friendly system; 3) scarring the Station to allow for potential external resource enhancements provided by international partners or commercial firms; and 4) establishing an IOC operating envelope based on the identified core capabilities with the greatest utility to the widest user community. In particular, this means optimizing for users who have a primary requirement for manned interaction on the Station, and providing for users whose requirements are not met within the IOC envelope through growth configurations or logistical support for their activities outside the core manned facility

Feasibility study of an Integrated Program for Aerospace-vehicle Design (IPAD) system. Volume 6: Implementation schedule, development costs, operational costs, benefit assessment, impact on company organization, spin-off assessment, phase 1, tasks 3 to 8

A baseline implementation plan, including alternative implementation approaches for critical software elements and variants to the plan, was developed. The basic philosophy was aimed at: (1) a progressive release of capability for three major computing systems, (2) an end product that was a working tool, (3) giving participation to industry, government agencies, and universities, and (4) emphasizing the development of critical elements of the IPAD framework software. The results of these tasks indicate an IPAD first release capability 45 months after go-ahead, a five year total implementation schedule, and a total developmental cost of 2027 man-months and 1074 computer hours. Several areas of operational cost increases were identified mainly due to the impact of additional equipment needed and additional computer overhead. The benefits of an IPAD system were related mainly to potential savings in engineering man-hours, reduction of design-cycle calendar time, and indirect upgrading of product quality and performance

Organizational Considerations for Implementing Systems Engineering and Integration in the Ares Projects Office

Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) is a critical discipline in developing new space systems. In 2005, NASA performed an internal study of 24 agency and Department of Defense (DoD) programs to evaluate methods of integrating SE&I practices and determine their effectiveness. The goal of the study was to determine the best SE&I implementation strategy for the Ares Projects Office. The study identified six SE&I organizational structures: 1. Lead systems integrator (LSI) with SE&I responsibility and government technical insight. 2a. Integration contractor with government SE&I responsibility (government insight). 2b. Integration contractor with government SE&I responsibility (government oversight). 3a. Prime contractor with SE&I responsibility (government insight). 3b. Prime contractor with SE&I responsibility (government oversight). 3c. Prime contractor with SE&I responsibility (government/industry partnership). 4a.Prime contractor with government SE&I responsibility (government insight). 4b. Prime contractor with government SE&I responsibility (government oversight). 4d.Prime contractors with total system performance responsibility (TSPR). 5. Prime contractor with government SE&I responsibility and integration products through a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC). 6. Government/FFRDC in-house development with SE&I responsibility and function. The organizational structure used most often was number 4, using a prime contractor with government SE&I responsibility and government technical insight. However, data analyses did not establish a positive relationship between program development costs and specific SE&I organizational types, nor did it positively determine the relationship between successful programs or projects and their SE&I structure. The SE&I study reached the following conclusions: (1) Large, long-duration, technically complex programs or projects reach their technical goals, but rarely meet schedule or cost goals. NASA's recent successes have been smaller, short-duration development projects using heritage hardware/software, focused technology development, technical oversight and stable external factors. (2) Programs and projects have failed or been terminated due to lack of technical insight, relaxing of SE&I processes, and unstable external factors. (3) The study did not find a single, clear optimum SE&I organization type to fit all projects. However, while any organizational structure can be made to work, the fewer complexities in the program, the better the likelihood of success. (4) The most common successful SE&I organization structure type in the study was type 4b, where the government maintained integration responsibility, with the prime contractor providing SE&I products and the government providing technical oversight. This study was instrumental in helping the APO select organization structure 4, following the same SE&I and oversight process used during humanlund7s last voyages to the Moon

Market Structure and Energy Efficiency: The Case of New Commercial Buildings

This is a report on why commercial office buildings aren’t more energy efficient. Several decades of energy efficiency programs have resulted in some gains, but overall increases in the energy efficiency of buildings have fallen far short of the 30 to 50 percent improvement that many efficiency advocates believe is possible. The purpose of this study is to consider the “why” question by empirically examining the dynamics of new commercial building markets. To do so, the authors used multiple research techniques, including qualitative field observation and interview methods that allow for a more in-depth understanding of complicated market processes. Their research focused primarily on new office buildings and centered in four regional markets: Sacramento, San Francisco, Seattle, and Portland. The authors identify key dynamics of commercial office building markets, describe how change and innovation occurs in commercial development, discuss the implications for energy efficiency, and suggest next steps

Life Cycle Cost Growth Study for the Discovery and New Frontiers Program Office

The D&NF Program Office LCC Management Study provides a detailed look at the drivers underlying cost overruns and schedule delays for five D&NF missions. While none of the findings are new, the study underlines the importance of continued emphasis on sound project management techniques: a clean project management structure with a clear definition of roles and responsibilities across the various partners in a project, an understanding of institutional standards and procedures and any differences among the partners, and the critical need for a comprehensive IMS that can be used easily and routinely to identify potential threats to the critical path. The study also highlights the continuing need for realistic estimates of the total LCC. Sufficient time and resources must be allocated early in a project to ensure that the appropriate trade studies and analyses are performed across all aspects of a mission: spacecraft, ground system, operations concept, and fault management, to ensure that proposed and confirmed costs truly reflect the resource requirements over the entire mission life cycle. These studies need to include a realistic review of the assumptions underlying the use of new technologies, the integration of heritage and new hardware and software into the total mission environment, and any development and test savings based on heritage technology and lessons learned. Finally, the LCC Management Study stresses the need to listen to, carefully consider, and take positive action regarding the issues raised during reviews by the expert review teams

Trade-Off Time: How Four States Continue to Deliver

Highlights performance measures used in Indiana, Maryland, Utah, and Virginia to ensure results-driven budgeting by defining goals, assessing priorities and trade-offs, targeting cuts with precision, and creating a culture of results-focused budgeting

A system safety model for developmental aircraft programs

Basic tenets of safety as applied to developmental aircraft programs are presented. The integration of safety into the project management aspects of planning, organizing, directing and controlling is illustrated by examples. The basis for project management use of safety and the relationship of these management functions to 'real-world' situations is presented. The rationale which led to the safety-related project decision and the lessons learned as they may apply to future projects are presented