Robust Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox

We introduce a quantitative approach to comparative statics that allows to bound the maximum effect of an exogenous parameter change on a system's equilibrium. The motivation for this approach is a well known paradox in multimarket Cournot competition, where a positive price shock on a monopoly market may actually reduce the monopolist's profit. We use our approach to quantify for the first time the worst case profit reduction for multimarket oligopolies exposed to arbitrary positive price shocks. For markets with affine price functions and firms with convex cost technologies, we show that the relative profit loss of any firm is at most 25% no matter how many firms compete in the oligopoly. We further investigate the impact of positive price shocks on total profit of all firms as well as on social welfare. We find tight bounds also for these measures showing that total profit and social welfare decreases by at most 25% and 16.6%, respectively. Finally, we show that in our model, mixed, correlated and coarse correlated equilibria are essentially unique, thus, all our bounds apply to these game solutions as well.Comment: 23 pages, 1 figur

Agricultural cooperatives and quality-enhancing R&D in the agri-food system

This paper develops a game - theoretic model of heterogeneous consumers to analyze the effect of cooperative involvement on quality- enhancing product innovation activity, the pricing of food products, and the welfare of the groups involved in the context of a mixed duopoly where an openmembership consumer co- op competes with an IOF. Analytical results show that the involvement of the member welfare- maximizing co- op in R&D can be quality and welfare enhancing by increasing the arrival rate of product innovations and reducing the prices of food products. The effectiveness of the co- op is shown to depend on the nature of product differentiation and the relative quality of its products, the degree of consumer heterogeneity, and the size of innovation costs .Open Membership Cooperatives, Product Innovation, Mixed Oligopoly, Retained Earnings., Agribusiness, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,

THE EFFECT OF COOPERATIVES ON PRODUCT INNOVATION IN THE AGRI-FOOD SYSTEM

This paper develops a game-theoretic model of heterogeneous consumers to analyze the effect of cooperative involvement on quality-enhancing product innovation activity, the pricing of food products, and the welfare of the groups involved in the context of a mixed duopoly where an openmembership consumer co-op competes with an IOF. Analytical results show that the involvement of the member welfare-maximizing co-op in R&D can be quality and welfare enhancing by increasing the arrival rate of product innovations and reducing the prices of food products. The effectiveness of the coop is shown to depend on the nature of product differentiation and the relative quality of its products, the degree of consumer heterogeneity, and the size of innovation costs.cooperatives, product innovation, mixed oligopoly, retained earnings, Agribusiness,

Mixed oligopoly, vertical product differentiation and fixed quality-dependent costs

A private and a public firm face fixed quality-dependent costs of production and compete first in quality and then either in prices or in quantities. In the long run the public firm targets welfare maximization whereas the private firm maximizes profits. In the short run both firms compete in prices or quantities to maximize profits. Mixed competition is always socially desirable compared to a private duopoly regardless of the type of competition in the short run and the equilibrium quality ranking. In addition, mixed competition seems to be a more efficient regulatory instrument than the adoption of a minimum quality standard.vertical product differentiation, mixed oligopoly, quality, price and quantity competition

The Relative Rigidity of Monopoly Pricing

This paper seeks to explain why monopolies keep their nominal prices constant for longer periods than do tight oligopolies. We provide two possible explanations. The first is based on the presence of a small fixed cost of changing prices. The second, on small costs of discovering the optimal price. The incentive to change price for duopolists producing differentiated products exceeds that of a single monopolistic firm which produced the same tange of products as the duopoly.

Horizontal Differentiation and the survival of Train and Coach modes in medium range passenger transport, a welfare analysis comprising economies of scope and scale

The Portuguese transport system as a whole suffers from the dominance of personal transportation, this being generally less efficient. Coaches and trains struggle to stay in the business. This model explains the markets’ performance beyond price differentials, bundling the transport modes’ appeal in one index for each. The differentiated transport cost approach accounts for product differentiation, economies of scope accruing to the consumer, and allows for economies of scale, in the form of fixed costs, to be weighted in, as well as tax policies towards motoring. It goes further by building a general welfare function that permits all factors and competition regimes to be properly compared. These are a monopoly by cars, duopolies with cars and each of the public transports, and oligopolies with public transports either competing or colluding. Simulations are carried out, and discussed in light of swings in market share and changes in welfare, with a reasonable claim to plausibility. Both public transports make the public better off by staying in the market, although the coaches’ contribution is more decisive. Trains results are weighted down by heavy fixed costs, and the far reaching coach network of destinations offers the second best service (behind that of cars). Collusion in the public transports is a price worth paying, when compared with the car monopoly emerging from bankrupt operators.Horizontal Differentiation, Intermodal choice, Oligopoly, Economies of Scope, Economies of Scale, Regulation

Combating China’s Export Contraction: Fiscal Expansion or Accelerated Industrial Reform?

Initially, the global financial crisis caused a surge of financial inflows to China, raising investment, but this abated in 2008, leaving a substantial contraction in export demand. The government’s key response was to commit to an unprecedented fiscal expansion. Two oftignored consequences are, first that government spending is on non-traded goods and services and so enlarges the consequent real appreciation and, second, that a more inward-looking economy causes firms to face less elastic demand and hence to increase oligopoly rents, further enlarging the real appreciation. Both are important for China because of the contribution of its real-exchange-rate sensitive, low-margin labour-intensive export sector to total employment. An economy-wide analysis is offered, using a model that takes explicit account of oligopoly behaviour. The results suggest that a conventional fiscal expansion would further contract the Chinese economy. On the other hand, notwithstanding the export contraction further industrial reform, emphasising the largely state-owned sectors, would reduce costs and foster growth in both output and modern sector employment.China, financial crisis, fiscal expansion, oligopoly, price caps, privatisation

Channel Management and differentiation strategies: A case study from the market for fresh produce

The paper analyses the current differentiation strategies in the market for fresh produce. First a short review of the literature on channel structure and product differentiation is presented, in order to identify, on a theoretical grounding the incentives for differentiation strategies. Second, a case study is drawn of a UK channel intermediary organisation carrying out differentiation policies in the fresh produce category (on behalf of UK multiple retailer customers) supplied by a dedicated Italian grower. Results show that in the fresh produce industry there is room for product differentiation, but with contradictory welfare effects.fresh produce, product differentiation, channel structure and management, Agribusiness, Marketing,

Estimation of Cost Pass Through to Michigan Consumers in the ADM Price Fixing Case

This report analyzes the economic impact of price fixing in the wet corn milling industry on consumers in the State of Michigan. Two of the companies who produce citric acid have pleaded guilty to fixing its price. In this report we assume that price fixing also occurred among HFCS producers. Given the structure of the corn wet milling industry and the direct purchaser industries, the overcharge is essentially uniform across buyers and selling arrangements. We develop an actual economic model of price transmission based upon the three facts: 1) The overcharge as a percent of the processed product value at wholesale and at retail is small, 2) Fixed proportion technology, and 3) consumers have imperfect information about prices so a small price change has no effect on their purchase behavior. These facts establish that 100 percent or more of the common overcharge will be passed through to consumers. In a more general economic model, we analyze pass through when consumer demand is not perfectly inelastic. For different strategies (profit maximization, sales maximization subject to a target level of profit, and loss leader strategies) and for different market structures (competitive, monopoly, oligopoly), the rate of pass through is 100 percent or greater given certain documented characteristics of the industries in this case. Given the prior points consumer damages are the common overcharges for each commodity times the amount of the commodity sold during the damage period. This is a lower bound estimate of consumer damages because pass through may well be greater than 100%.price fixing, overcharge, cost pass through, fixed proportion production technology, flexible demand specifications, competitive structure, Agribusiness, Crop Production/Industries, Demand and Price Analysis,