Dynamics of business politics : evidence from Chinese firm internationalisation to Brazil

Tese (doutorado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Sociais, Centro de Pesquisa e Pós-Graduação sobre as Américas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos Comparados sobre as Américas, 2019.Esta tese aborda o papel da política empresarial no contexto de multinacionais estatais chinesas, analisando o surgimento e a consolidação de uma estatal do setor energético e a sua internacionalização para o Brasil. O estudo de caso traça a evolução corporativa de seu surgimento inicial em 2002, como consequência das reformas do setor elétrico na China, até suas operações no Brasil em 2016. Os resultados se baseiam em mais de três anos de pesquisa de campo - incluindo entrevistas nos setores eletricos no Brasil e na China - além de extensa análise de documentos de arquivo e do governo. Usando uma abordagem institucionalista, a tese identifica que a política empresarial é uma ferramenta vital para ajudar a empresa a obter vantagens competitivas no contexto da internacionalização pela sua superposição dos níveis nacionais e internacionais. Na China, onde a embeddedness institucional da empresa era forte, a empresa desenvolveu a capacidade de perseguir sua agenda industrial e de internacionalização com relativa autonomia, embora confinada ao sistema estatal de negócios. No Brasil, onde sua embeddedness institucional era fraca, dependia de vantagem econômica comparativa, como por exemplo licitação de baixo custo, transferência de conhecimento tecnológico e apoio diplomático. Como resultado, o estudo mostra que a empresa é capaz de incrementar as suas capabilidades existentes e as capacidades industriais para participar do setor energético brasileiro, enquanto simultaneamente consolida sua posição doméstica na China. Além de contribuir para a literatura sobre a relação das empresas estatais com o Estado, o estudo colabora para debates mais amplos sobre as diferenças nas relações entre o Estado e os negócios, as origens políticas das decisões corporativas e a modernização industrial nas economias emergentes.Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES).This dissertation addresses the role of business politics in the context of Chinese state-owned multinationals by analyzing the emergence and consolidation of a state-owned energy company and its internationalisation to Brazil. The single case study traces the corporate evolution from its initial emergence in 2002 as a consequence of China's power sector reforms to its operations in Brazil in 2016. The findings build on more than three years of field research - including interviews in electricity supply sectors in Brazil and China - as well as extensive analysis of archival and government documents. Using an institutionalist approach, the dissertation identifies that business politics is an important resource to help the company gain competitive advantage. In China, where the company's institutional embeddedness was strong, the company developed the ability to pursue its industrial and internationalisation agenda with relative autonomy, albeit confined to the state-business relations. In Brazil, where its institutional embeddedness was weak, it depended on comparative economic advantage, such as low-cost bidding, technology knowledge transfer, and comparative political advantage, such as diplomatic support. As a result, the case study shows that the firm is able to incrementally build on existing strengths and industrial capabilities to participate in the Brazilian energy sector, while simultaneously consolidating its domestic position in China. In addition to contributing to the literature on the relationship between state-owned enterprises and the state, the study contributes to broader debates about the differences in state-business relations, the political origins of corporate decisions, and industrial upgrading in emerging economies

Engaging for-profit providers in TB control: lessons learnt from initiatives in South Asia.

There has been a huge expansion in the private health-care sector over the past two decades, particularly in South Asia, resulting in over 80% of patients seeking care from private health providers. Despite concerns about the quality and equity of private sector service provision, most government public health bodies recognize that the private sector reaches individuals that public institutions cannot cater to, thereby being important in moving closer to universal health coverage. Numerous initiatives have been launched and are being planned to involve private practitioners in effectively diagnosing, reporting and managing infectious diseases such as tuberculosis. However, there is a notable dearth of papers discussing which elements of private sector engagement strategies are more or less successful and the ethical issues that arise when engagement strategies are operationalized. This article brings together the authors' experiences of working on projects to engage private allopathic health providers in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India for improved tuberculosis control. Motivations of and strategies required to engage private allopathic heath providers, specifically doctors, diagnostic laboratories and pharmacies, and some of the ethical issues that arise when designing programmes for engagement are discussed

For-Profit Public Enforcement

This Article investigates an important yet undertheorized phenomenon: financial incentives in public enforcement. Each year, public enforcers assess billions of dollars in penalties and other financial sanctions for violations of state and federal law. Why? If the awards in question were the result of private lawsuits, the answer would be obvious. We expect that private enforcers—the victims of law violations and their fee-seeking attorneys—will attempt to maximize financial recoveries. Record recoveries come as no surprise in private class actions, for example. But dollar signs are harder to explain in the context of public enforcement. Unlike private attorneys, public enforcers are paid by salary. They have no direct financial stake in successful enforcement efforts. We assume that public enforcers pursue financial awards only for their deterrent value, not for the benefits that such recoveries can bring the enforcement agency itself. Or do they? This Article argues, contrary to the conventional wisdom on the division between public and private enforcement, that public enforcers often seek large monetary awards for self-interested reasons divorced from the public interest in deterrence. The incentives are strongest when enforcement agencies are permitted to retain all or some of the proceeds of enforcement—an institutional arrangement that is common at the state level and beginning to crop up in federal law. Yet even when public enforcers must turn over their winnings to the general treasury, they may have reputational incentives to focus their efforts on measurable units like dollars earned. Financially motivated public enforcers are likely to behave more like private enforcers than is commonly appreciated: they will undertake more enforcement actions, focus on maximizing financial recoveries rather than securing injunctive relief, and compete with other would-be enforcers for lucrative cases. Those effects will often be undesirable, particularly in circumstances where the risk of over-enforcement is high. But financial incentives might provide a valuable spur to action for agencies that currently are performing well below optimal levels. Policymakers recognize as much when they seek to boost private enforcement by promising prevailing plaintiffs supra-compensatory damages. We show that financial incentives can serve a similar purpose in the public sphere, offering policymakers an additional tool for calibrating the level of public enforcement