The role of information systems in the prevention and detection of transnational and international crime

© Cambridge University Press 2014. All around the world criminal activity remains at the forefront of governmental concerns, not only as a problem that distorts the very fabric of society within the confines of national jurisdictions, but also as a problem that cuts across national borders to exhibit a global dimension. The international dimension of criminal activity remains critical and is generally characterized by a complexity that is unique and requires action on many different levels. Criminals set out to mask their illegal activities and deliberately generate complexity as a means of concealment. In doing so, they exploit new developments in technology that assist them in achieving their ends. This criminality exhibits forms of innovation that stretch far beyond traditional criminal activity (e.g., drug and human trafficking) and manages to attach itself within the broader fabric of society by exploiting the very latest developments. This evolution is necessary as criminals seek not only to escape arrest, prosecution and conviction, but also to enjoy the fruits of their criminality (mostly financial gains). Thus, they seek to develop ways of exploiting the various diffuse norms of social interaction (e.g., trust), financial modes of conduct (e.g., cash-based economies), technological and communication developments (e.g., Internet), and thereby minimize the possibility for detection. By limiting the resources that can be made available for prevention (or making them obsolete when developing new criminal behaviour), they participate in this co-evolution actively; and this they achieve by generating complexity

Risky business: managing electronic payments in the 21st Century

On June 20 and 21, 2005, the Payment Cards Center of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, in conjunction with the Electronic Funds Transfer Association (EFTA), hosted a day-and-a-half forum, “Risky Business: Managing Electronic Payments in the 21st Century.” The Center and EFTA invited participants from the financial services and processing sectors, law enforcement, academia, and policymakers to explore key topics associated with the challenge of effectively managing risk in a payments environment that is increasingly electronic. The meeting’s goal was to identify areas of potential risk and explore interindustry solutions. This paper provides highlights from the forum presentations and ensuing conversations.

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing: A Whitepaper

Illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing refers to fishing activities that do not comply with regional, national, or international fisheries conservation or management measures. This whitepaper characterizes the status of Illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing, the philanthropic community's current efforts to help reduce it, and potential opportunities for the Packard Foundation to become more actively engaged. The paper was drafted between March and June 2015, following a combination of desk research and a handful of select interviews

The changing nature of U.S. card payment fraud: industry and public policy options

As credit and debit card payments have become the primary payment instrument in retail transactions, awareness of identity theft and concerns over the safety of payments has increased. Traditional forms of card payment fraud are still an important threat, but fraud resulting from unauthorized access to payment data appears to be rising, and we are only beginning to get a sense of the dimensions of the problem. ; Thus far, the role of public policy has been to encourage the card payment industry to limit fraud by developing its own standards and procedures. Whether this policy stance is sufficient depends on the effectiveness of industry efforts to limit fraud in light of the dramatic shift toward card payments. ; Sullivan provides an overview of card payment fraud in the United States. He develops a preliminary estimate of the rate of U.S. card payment fraud and suggests that such fraud is higher than in several other countries for which data are available. The U.S. payment industry is taking steps to combat payment fraud, but progress has been slowed by conflicts of interest, inadequate incentives, and lack of coordination. Thus, policymakers should monitor the card payment industry to see if it better coordinates security efforts, and if not, consider actions to help overcome barriers to effective development of security.

Credit Card Fraud: A New Perspective On Tackling An Intransigent Problem

This article offers a new perspective on battling credit card fraud. It departs from a focus on post factum liability, which characterizes most legal scholarship and federal legislation on credit card fraud and applies corrective mechanisms only after the damage is done. Instead, this article focuses on preempting credit card fraud by tackling the root causes of the problem: the built-in incentives that keep the credit card industry from fighting fraud on a system-wide basis. This article examines how credit card companies and banks have created a self-interested infrastructure that insulates them from the liabilities and costs of credit card fraud. Contrary to widespread belief, retailers, not card companies or banks, absorb much of the loss caused by thieves who shop with stolen credit cards. Also, credit card companies and banks earn fees from every credit card transaction, including those that are fraudulent. In addressing these problems, this article advocates broad reforms, including legislation that would mandate data security standards for the industry, empower multiple stakeholders to create the new standards, and offer companies incentives to comply by capping bank fees for those that are compliant, while deregulating fees for those that are not compliant

Analysis of cybercrime activity: perceptions from a South African financial bank

Research report submitted to the School of Economic and Business Sciences, University of the Witwatersrand in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Commerce (Information Systems) by coursework and research. Johannesburg, 28 February 2017.This study is informed by very little empirical research in the field of cybercrime and specifically in the context of South African banks. The study bridges this gap in knowledge by analyzing the cybercrime phenomenon from the perspective of a South African bank. It also provides a sound basis for conducting future studies using a different perspective. In order to achieve this, an interpretive research approach was adopted using a case study in one of the biggest banks in South Africa where cybercrime is currently a topical issue and one that is receiving attention from senior management. Cohen and Felson (1979) Routine Activity Theory was used as a theoretical lens to formulate a conceptual framework which informed the data collection, analysis and synthesis of cybercrime in the selected bank. Primary data was obtained via semistructured interviews. Secondary data was also obtained which allowed for data triangulation. From the perspective of a South African bank, the study concluded that weak security and access controls, poor awareness and user education, prevalent use of the internet, low conviction rates and perceived material gain are the major factors that lead to cybercriminal activity. In order to curb the ever increasing rate of cybercrime, South African banking institutions should consider implementing stronger security and access controls to safeguard customer information, increase user awareness and education, implement effective systems and processes and actively participate in industry wide focus groups. The transnational nature of cybercrime places an onus on all banks in South Africa and other countries to collaborate and define a joint effort to combat the increasing exposure to cybercriminal activity. The use of the Routine Activity Theory provided an avenue to study the cybercrime phenomenon through a different theoretical lens and aided a holistic understanding of the trends and the behavioral attributes contributing to cybercriminal activity that can help South African banks model practical solutions to proactively combat the splurge of cybercrime. Keywords: Cybercrime, internet, crime, computer networks, Routine Activity Theory, South African banks.GR201

Quantum surveillance and 'shared secrets'. A biometric step too far? CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe, July 2010

It is no longer sensible to regard biometrics as having neutral socio-economic, legal and political impacts. Newer generation biometrics are fluid and include behavioural and emotional data that can be combined with other data. Therefore, a range of issues needs to be reviewed in light of the increasing privatisation of ‘security’ that escapes effective, democratic parliamentary and regulatory control and oversight at national, international and EU levels, argues Juliet Lodge, Professor and co-Director of the Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence at the University of Leeds, U

A web of harms: serious and organised crime and its impact on Australian interests

Overview This report analyses serious, transnational and organised crime and the harms it causes to Australia’s interest, with the aim of reinvigorating a discussion of this critical matter amongst Australians. This web impacts on our national interests to the sum of an estimated $15 billion per year. That very conservative estimate includes costs to government through denied revenue and increased law enforcement costs. But there are also social, health and economic harms to individuals, community and business. The report poses a series of questions to be considered by the community, business and government