Institutions and preferences determine resilience of ecological-economic systems

We perform a model analysis to study the origins of limited resilience in ecological-economic systems. We demonstrate that the resilience properties of the ecosystem are essentially determined by the management institutions and consumers’ preferences for ecosystem services. In particular, we show that complementarity of ecosystem services in human well-being and open access of the ecosystem to profit-maximizing harvesting firms may lead to limited resilience of the ecosystem. We conclude that the role of human preferences and management institutions is not just to facilitate adaptation to, or transformation of, some natural dynamics of ecosystems. Rather, human preferences and management institutions are themselves important determinants of the fundamental dynamic characteristics of the ecological-economic system, such as limited resilience.ecological-economic systems, ecosystem services, institutions, natural resource management, preferences, resilience

Estimating exports and imports demand for Manufactured goods: The role of FDI

In this paper we examine the joint performance of FDI and trade under a full liberalization process consistent with New Trade Theory models. The testing framework consists of the estimation of demand for exports and imports of manufactured goods for a panel containing the majority of the EU countries as well as the US and Japan. The model includes as explanatory factors, not only the traditional determinants of trade, but also new ones, such as the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI). We apply a variety of panel unit root and cointegration tests to the cases of both homogeneous and heterogeneous panels. Whereas there is no evidence of cointegration when using just the traditional formulation, the results are favorable to the existence of long-run relationships linking the variables of the augmented model. Moreover, the results point mainly to a complementarity relationship between trade and FDI.

Complementarity Among Vertical Integration Decisions: Evidence from Automobile Product Development

This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may depend on the level of (non-contractible) effort on the part of each agent; contracting complementarity results if coordination efforts are interdependent and vertical integration facilitates a higher level of non-contractible effort. Second, effective coordination may require the disclosure of proprietary trade secrets, and the potential for expropriation by external suppliers may induce complementarity among vertical integration choices. We provide evidence for complementarity in product development contracting by taking advantage of a detailed dataset that includes the level of vertical integration and the contracting environment for individual automobile systems in the luxury automobile segment. Using an instrumental variables framework that distinguishes complementarity from unobserved firm-level factors, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that contracting complementarity is an important driver of vertical integration choices. The findings suggest that contracting complementarity may be particularly important when coordination is important to achieve but difficult to monitor.

Firm-Specific Characteristics and the Timing of Foreign Direct Investment Projects

This paper uses a proportional hazard model to study foreign direct investment by Japanese manufacturers in Europe between 1970 and 1994. We divide each firm’s investment total into a sequence of individual investment decisions and analyze how firm-specific characteristics affect each decision. We find that total factor productivity is a significant determinant of a firm’s initial and subsequent investments. Parent-firm size does not have a significant influence on the initial decision to invest. Large firms simply have more investments than smaller firms. Other firm-specific characteristics, such as the R&D intensity, export share and keiretsu membership, also play a role in the investment process.foreign direct investment, productivity, hazard model, Japan, keiretsu

Lumpy Investment, Sectoral Propagation, and Business Cycles

This paper proposes a model of endogenous fluctuations in investment. A monopolistic producer has an incentive to invest when the aggregate demand is high. This causes a propagation of investment across sectors. When the investment follows an (S,s) policy, the propagation size can exhibit a significant fluctuation. We characterize the probability distribution of the propagation size, and show that its variance can be large enough to match the observed investment fluctuations. We then implement this mechanism in a dynamic general equilibrium model to explore an investment-driven business cycle. By calibrating the model with the SIC 4-digit level industry data, we numerically show that the model replicates the basic structure of the business cycles(S,s) policy, aggregation, propagation, heavy-tailed distribution

Firm-Specific Characteristics and the Timing of Foreign Direct Investment Projects

This paper uses a proportional hazard model to study foreign direct investment by Japanese manufacturers in Europe between 1970 and 1994. We divide each firm?s investment total into a sequence of individual investment decisions and analyze how firm-specific characteristics affect each decision. We find that total factor productivity is a significant determinant of a firm?s initial and subsequent investments. Parent-firm size does not have a significant influence on the initial decision to invest. Large firms simply have more investments than smaller firms. Other firm-specific characteristics, such as the R&D intensity, export share and keiretsu membership, also play a role in the investment process. --Foreign direct investment,productivity,hazard model,Japan,keiretsu

VERTICAL R&D SPILLOVERS, COOPERATION, MARKET STRUCTURE, AND INNOVATION

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied: no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three competitive externalities (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors increases (decreases) R&D when horizontal spillovers are high (low); the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation are taken into account. The paper proposes a theory of innovation and market structure, showing that the relation between innovation and competition depends on horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers, and cooperative settings. The private incentives for R&D cooperation are addressed. It is found that buyers and sellers have divergent interests regarding the choice of cooperative settings and that spillovers increase the likelihood of the emergence of cooperation in a decentralized equilibrium.Vertical R&D spillovers, Market structure, Innovation, Vertical R&D cooperation, R&D policy

From the Theory of the Firm to FDI and Internalisation: A Survey

This paper surveys recent contributions on the Internalisation issue, based on different theories of the firm, to show how the make-or-buy decision, at an international level, has been assessed through the opening up of the “black box” - traditionally explored by the theorists of the firm – and the simultaneous endogenization of the market environment – as in the International Economics tradition. In particular, we consider three Archetypes – Grossman-Hart-Moore treatment of hold-up and contractual incompleteness, Holmstrom-Milgrom view of the firm as an incentive system, Aghion-Tirole conceptualisation of formal and real authority in organisations – and show how they have been embedded in industry and general equilibrium models of FDI to explain the boundaries of global firms.FDI, Internalisation, International Economics, Incomplete contracts

Vertical R&D Spillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied: no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three competitive externalities (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors increases (decreases) R&D when horizontal spillovers are high (low); the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation are taken into account. The paper proposes a theory of innovation and market structure, showing that the relation between innovation and competition depends on horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers, and cooperative settings. The private incentives for R&D cooperation are addressed. It is found that buyers and sellers have divergent interests regarding the choice of cooperative settings and that spillovers increase the likelihood of the emergence of cooperation in a decentralized equilibrium. Cet article étudie les externalités de recherche verticales entre des firmes en amont et des firmes en aval. Il y a deux industries verticalement reliées, avec des externalités horizontales au sein de chaque industrie et des externalités verticales entre les deux industries. Quatre structures de coopération en R&D sont considérées: pas de coopération, coopération horizontale, coopération verticale, et coopération horizontale et verticale simultanément. Les externalités verticales augmentent la R&D et le bien-être, alors que les externalités horizontales peuvent les augmenter ou les diminuer. La comparaison des structures de coopération en terme de R&D révèle qu'aucune structure ne domine uniformément les autres. Le classement des structures de coopération dépend des externalités horizontales et verticales, et de la concurrence. Le classement dépend des signes et magnitudes de trois externalités concurrentielles (verticale, horizontale et diagonale) qui captent l'effet de la R&D d'une firme sur les profits des autres firmes. Un des résultats de base de la littérature sur l'investissement stratégique est que la coopération entre concurrents augmente (diminue) la R&D lorsque les externalités horizontales sont élevées (faibles); le modèle montre que ce résultat n'est pas toujours vérifié en présence des externalités verticales et/ou de la coopération verticale. Le papier propose une théorie reliant le degré d'innovation à la structure du marché: la relation entre la concurrence et l'innovation dépend des externalités horizontales, des externalités verticales et de la structure de coopération. Les incitations privées à la coopération en R&D sont examinées; on montre que les vendeurs et les acheteurs ont des préférences différentes quant au choix de structure de coopération et que les externalités augmentent la vraisemblance de l'émergence décentralisée de la coopération.Vertical R&D spillovers, market structure, innovation, vertical R&D cooperation, R&D policy, Externalités de recherche verticales, structure de marché, innovation, coopération verticale en R&D, politique de R&D