False advertising in a crowdfunding market

As a growing enormously method of financing and selling new products, crowdfunding usually accompanies with the overstating product quality. We consider creators with low product quality in a crowdfunding market may use false advertising to overstate the value of their products and a policy maker can punish such false advertising. We propose a two-period crowdfunding model in which a creator may charge different prices over time to sequentially arriving buyers. Both advertising and prices decisions of creators are discussed in the paper, and we characterize an equilibrium where false advertising interact with crowdfunding pricing dynamics over time

Innovative online platforms: Research opportunities

Economic growth in many countries is increasingly driven by successful startups that operate as online platforms. These success stories have motivated us to define and classify various online platforms according to their business models. This study discusses strategic and operational issues arising from five types of online platforms (resource sharing, matching, crowdsourcing, review, and crowdfunding) and presents some research opportunities for operations management scholars to explore

A Dynamic Model of Crowdfunding

Crowdfunding is quickly emerging as an alternative to traditional methods of funding new products. In a crowdfunding campaign, a seller solicits financial contributions from a crowd, usually in the form of pre-buying an unrealized product, and commits to producing the product if the total amount pledged is above a certain threshold. We provide a model of crowdfunding in which consumers arrive sequentially and make decisions about whether to pledge or not. Pledging is not costless, and hence consumers would prefer not to pledge if they think the campaign will not succeed. This can lead to cascades where a campaign fails to raise the required amount even though there are enough consumers who want the product. The paper introduces a novel stochastic process -- anticipating random walks -- to analyze this problem. The analysis helps explain why some campaigns fail and some do not, and provides guidelines about how sellers should design their campaigns in order to maximize their chances of success.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/117507/1/1307_Mostagir.pd

Equity crowdfunding, shareholder structures, and firm performance

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Wiley via the DOI in this record.Research question/issue: This paper provides a first-time glimpse into the postcampaign financial and innovative performance of equity-crowdfunded (ECF) and matched nonequity-crowdfunded (NECF) firms. We further investigate how direct and nominee shareholder structures in ECF firms are associated with firm performance. Research findings/insights: We find that ECF firms have 8.5 times higher failure rates than matched NECF firms. However, 3.4 times more ECF firms have patent applications than matched NECF firms. Within the group of ECF firms, we find that ECF firms financed through a nominee structure make smaller losses, whereas ECF firms financed through a direct shareholder structure have more new patent applications, including foreign patent applications. Theoretical/academic implications: Our findings suggest that there are important adverse selection issues on equity crowdfunding platforms, although these platforms also serve as a catalyst for innovative activities. Moreover, our findings suggest that there is a more complex relationship between dispersed versus concentrated crowd shareholders and firm performance than currently assumed in the literature. Practitioner/policy implications: For policy makers and crowdfunding platforms, investor protection against adverse selection will be important to ensure the sustainability of equity crowdfunding markets. For entrepreneurs and crowd investors, our study highlights how equity crowdfunding and the adopted shareholder structure relate to short-term firm performance.Research Foundation—Flander

USING CROWDFUNDING AS PART OF THE PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

AbstractCrowdfunding is the process of taking a project in need of investment and asking a large group of people to supply the investment. It allows organisations to sell their product before production, reducing the risk of new product development. Organisations such as Tesla and General Electric have used crowdfunding successfully but crowdfunding is yet to be explored as part of a formalised product development framework. This paper includes the business case for commercialising new products with crowdfunding and presents crowdfunding as part of a product development and commercialisation framework.</jats:p

Investigating the mix of strategic choices and performance of transaction platforms: Evidence from the crowdfunding setting

Research Summary: The platform literature offers keen insights on the pricing and non-pricing strategies that transaction platforms undertake. We supplement this work by studying how platforms mix together their strategic choices and the association with platforms’ performance. To that end, we focus on crowdfunding platforms; a prominent setting of transaction platforms. We present an inductive large-N study of the population of 788 crowdfunding platforms that operated in EU-15 countries up to 2018. Our contribution is threefold: (a) identifying common mixes of strategic choices; (b) tracking deviations from these mixes; and (c) associating these with platforms’ survival and growth. We discuss our findings and how they advance knowledge at the intersection of the platform and strategic management literatures. Managerial Summary: Notable transaction-platforms such as eBay, LinkedIn, and Tencent have an aggregate market-value in the hundreds of billions of dollars. We know that platforms’ success is driven by the strategic choices they undertake. Yet, we know less about how they mix together these choices and the association with platforms’ performance. Our study addresses this gap by focusing on a prominent setting: crowdfunding. Using data on the population of 788 crowdfunding platforms in EU-15 countries, we show that these platforms cluster around three common mixes of strategic choices. Moreover, crowdfunding platforms do not strictly adhere to the strategy mix they are affiliated with. Interestingly, there is a positive association between the degree to which a platform's choices differentiate from its strategy mix and platform's subsequent performance

What Is a Security in the Crowdfunding Era?

With the advent of the crowdfunding era, financial interests in business enterprises may look less like investment instruments commonly known as common stock or debentures, and more like loans, gambling bets, rights to consumable products or services or charitable or other nonprofit donations. A closer look at innovations in interests, instruments and offerings in the crowdfunding era preceding the enactment of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) offers a basis for comparisons and contrasts that raises questions about the categorization of instruments regulated as securities. These and other questions are important to a rethinking of the structure of financial and financially related regulation in and outside the realm of U.S. securities law. Specifically, innovations in financial interests and instruments that immediately preceded the JOBS Act raise a number of important questions about regulatory authority and interpretation. How do we classify the instruments that represent complex or hybrid financial interests in business enterprises? What area of regulation should apply to them? Why? What do the answers to those questions tell us, if anything, about the current (and possible future) structure and function of domestic and international financial regulation? This essay preliminarily explores the features of certain financial instruments in an effort to begin to answer these questions by focusing on what a security — a statutory and regulatory category including specific financial instruments — is and should be under federal securities law

Customer Segmentation Strategy of Crowdfunding Platform with Completion Time Uncertainty

While crowdfunding allows firms to raise external capitals from a large group of audience, firms are often unable to control their production process, and the project may fail without being completed on time. Having this in mind and knowing that consumers are heterogeneous in accepting late completion, fundraising firms often offer multiple reward plans to do customer segmentation to maximize the fund they may raise. Popular segmentation tools include early shipment promise and refund policy. Using a game-theoretic model, we show that the firm should adopt one of the two screening tools, but not both. Which tool a fundraising firm should choose is also examined. Our conclusions offer insights into managerial decisions for firms using crowdfunding in their early project development