A Pareto-metaheuristic for a bi-objective winner determination problem in a combinatorial reverse auction

The bi-objective winner determination problem (2WDP-SC) of a combinatorial procurement auction for transport contracts comes up to a multi-criteria set covering problem. We are given a set B of bundle bids. A bundle bid b in B consists of a bidding carrier c_b, a bid price p_b, and a set tau_b of transport contracts which is a subset of the set T of tendered transport contracts. Additionally, the transport quality q_t,c_b is given which is expected to be realized when a transport contract t is executed by a carrier c_b. The task of the auctioneer is to find a set X of winning bids (X is subset of B), such that each transport contract is part of at least one winning bid, the total procurement costs are minimized, and the total transport quality is maximized. This article presents a metaheuristic approach for the 2WDP-SC which integrates the greedy randomized adaptive search procedure, large neighborhood search, and self-adaptive parameter setting in order to find a competitive set of non-dominated solutions. The procedure outperforms existing heuristics. Computational experiments performed on a set of benchmark instances show that, for small instances, the presented procedure is the sole approach that succeeds to find all Pareto-optimal solutions. For each of the large benchmark instances, according to common multi-criteria quality indicators of the literature, it attains new best-known solution sets.Pareto optimization; multi-criteria winner determination; combinatorial auction; GRASP; LNS

Electronic Reverse Auctions: Spawning Procurement Innovation in the Context of Arab Culture

Government e-procurement initiatives have the potential to transform local institutions, but few studies have been published of strategies for implementing specific e-procurement tools, particularly involving procurement by a foreign government adapting to local culture in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA). This case describes procurement at a forward operating base (FOB) in Kuwait in support of operations in Iraq. The government procurers had to deal with a phenomenon unique to the MENA region: wasta. Wasta is a form of social capital that bestows power, influence, and connection to those who possess it, similar to guanxi in China. This study explores the value proposition and limitations of electronic reverse auctions (eRA) with the purpose of sharing best practices and lessons learned for government procurement in a MENA country. The public value framework provides valuable theoretical insights for the implementation of a new government e-procurement tool in a foreign country. In a culture dominated by wasta, the suppliers enjoyed the transparency and merit-based virtues of eRA’s that transferred successfully into the new cultural milieu: potential to increase transparency, competition, efficiency, and taxpayer savings. The practices provided herein are designed specifically to help buyers overcome structural barriers including training, organizational inertia, and a lack of eRA policy and guidance while implementing a new e-procurement tool in a foreign country

Combinatorial auctions for electronic business

Combinatorial auctions (CAs) have recently generated significant interest as an automated mechanism for buying and selling bundles of goods. They are proving to be extremely useful in numerous e-business applications such as e-selling, e-procurement, e-logistics, and B2B exchanges. In this article, we introduce combinatorial auctions and bring out important issues in the design of combinatorial auctions. We also highlight important contributions in current research in this area. This survey emphasizes combinatorial auctions as applied to electronic business situations

Developing Optimization Techniques for Logistical Tendering Using Reverse Combinatorial Auctions

In business-to-business logistical sourcing events, companies regularly use a bidding process known as tendering in the procurement of transportation services from third-party providers. Usually in the form of an auction involving a single buyer and one or more sellers, the buyer must make decisions regarding with which suppliers to partner and how to distribute the transportation lanes and volume among its suppliers; this is equivalent to solving the optimization problem commonly referred to as the Winner Determination Problem. In order to take into account the complexities inherent to the procurement problem, such as considering a supplier’s network, economies of scope, and the inclusion of business rules and preferences on the behalf of the buyer, we present the development of a mixed-integer linear program to model the reverse combinatorial auction for logistical tenders

Algorithms for bundling and pricing trucking services: Deterministic and stochastic approaches

Bundling and pricing trucking services is an important strategic decision for carriers. This is helpful when they consider the incorporation of new businesses to their networks, look for economic and optimal operations, and develop revenue management strategies. Reverse combinatorial auctions for trucking services are real-world examples that illustrate the necessity of such strategies. In these auctions, a shipper asks carriers for quotes to serve combinations of lanes and the carriers have to bundle demand and price it properly. This dissertation explores several dimensions of the problem employing state-of-the-art analytical tools. These dimensions include: Truckload (TL) and less-than-truckload (LTL) operations, behavioral attributes driving the selection of trucking services, and consideration of deterministic and stochastic demand. Analytical tools include: advanced econometrics, network modeling, statistical network analysis, combinatorial optimization, and stochastic optimization. The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the problem and related concepts. Chapter 2 studies the attributes driving the selection of trucking services and proposes an econometric model to quantify the shipper willingness to pay using data from a discrete choice experiment. Chapter 3 proposes an algorithm for demand clustering in freight logistics networks using historical data from TL carriers. Chapter 4 develops an algorithmic approach for pricing and demand segmentation of bundles in TL combinatorial auctions. Chapter 5 expands the latter framework to consider stochastic demand. Chapter 6 uses an analytical approach to demonstrate the benefits of in-vehicle consolidation for LTL carriers. Finally, Chapter 7 proposes an algorithm for pricing and demand segmentation of bundles in LTL combinatorial auctions that accounts for stochastic demand. This research provides meaningful negotiation guidance for shippers and carriers, which is supported by quantitative methods. Likewise, numerical experiments demonstrate the benefits and efficiencies of the proposed algorithms, which are transportation modeling contributions

The bid construction problem for truckload transportation services procurement in combinatorial auctions : new formulations and solution methods

De nos jours, l'évolution du commerce électronique ainsi que des niveaux de la consommation requièrent des acteurs de la chaine logistique et en particulier les transporteurs de gérer efficacement leurs opérations. Afin de rester concurrentiels et maximiser leurs profits, ils doivent optimiser leurs opérations de transport. Dans cette thèse de doctorat, nous nous focalisons sur les enchères combinatoires en tant que mécanisme de négociation pour les marchés d'approvisionnement des services de transport routier par camions permettant à un expéditeur d'externaliser ses opérations de transport et aux transporteurs d'acquérir des contrats de transport. Les mises combinatoires permettent à un transporteur participant à l'enchère d'exprimer ses intérêts pour une combinaison de contrats mis à l'enchère dans une même mise. Si la mise gagne, tous les contrats qui la forment seront alloués au transporteur au tarif exigé. Les défis majeurs pour le transporteur sont de déterminer les contrats de transport sur lesquels miser, les regrouper dans plusieurs mises combinatoires, s'il y a lieu, et décider des prix à soumettre pour chaque mise générée. Ces défis décisionnels définissent le problème de construction de mises combinatoires (BCP pour Bid Construction Problem). Chaque transporteur doit résoudre le BCP tout en respectant ses engagements préexistants et ses capacités de transport et en tenant compte des offres des compétiteurs, ce qui rend le problème difficile à résoudre. Dans la pratique, la majorité des transporteurs se basent sur leur connaissance du marché et leur historique pour fixer leurs prix des mises. Dans la littérature, la majorité des travaux sur le BCP considèrent des modèles déterministes où les paramètres sont connus et se limitent à un contexte de flotte homogène. En plus, nous notons qu'un seul travail à considérer une variante stochastique du BCP. Dans cette thèse de doctorat, nous visons à faire avancer les connaissances dans ce domaine en introduisant de nouvelles formulations et méthodes de résolution pour le BCP Le premier chapitre de cette thèse introduit une nouvelle variante du BCP avec une flotte hétérogène. En partant d'une comparaison des similitudes et des différences entre le BCP et les problèmes classiques de de tournées de véhicules, nous proposons une nouvelle formulation basée sur les arcs avec de nouvelles contraintes de bris de symétrie pour accélérer la résolution. Ensuite, nous proposons une approche heuristique et une autre exacte pour résoudre ce problème. L'heuristique développée est une recherche adaptative à grands voisinages (ALNS pour Adaptive Large Neighborhood Search) et se base sur le principe de destruction puis réparation de la solution à l'aide d'opérateurs conçus spécifiquement pour le BCP traité. La méthode exacte utilise la meilleure solution heuristique pour résoudre notre modèle mathématique avec le solveur CPLEX. Les résultats obtenus montrent la pertinence de nos méthodes en termes de qualités des solutions et des temps de calculs et ce pour des instances de grande taille. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous nous attaquons à un cas particulier du BCP où le transporteur n'a pas d'engagements existants et vise à déterminer un ensemble de contrats mis à l'enchère profitables à miser dessus. Cette problématique correspond à un problème de tournées de véhicules avec profits (TOP pour Team Orienteering Problem). Nous proposons pour le TOP une heuristique ALNS hybride avec de nouveaux opérateurs ainsi que de nouvelles fonctionnalités tenant compte de la nature du problème. Ensuite, nous comparons les performances de notre méthode avec toutes les méthodes déjà publiées dans la littérature traitant du TOP. Les résultats montrent que notre méthode surpasse généralement toutes les approches existantes en termes de qualité des solutions et/ou temps de calculs quand elle est testée sur toutes les instances de la littérature. Notre méthode améliore la solution d'une instance de grande taille, ce qui surligne sa performance. Dans le troisième chapitre, nous nous focalisons sur l'incertitude associée aux prix de cessions des contrats mis à l'enchère et sur les offres des transporteurs concurrents. Il n'existe qu'un seul article qui traite de l'incertitude dans le BCP cependant il ne permet pas de générer des mises multiples. Ainsi, nous proposons une nouvelle formulation pour le BCP avec des prix stochastiques permettant de générer des mises combinatoires et disjointes. Nous présentons deux méthodes pour résoudre ce problème. La première méthode est hybride et à deux étapes. Dans un premier temps, elle résout un problème de sélection pour déterminer un ensemble de contrats profitables. Dans un second temps, elle résout simultanément un problème de sélection de contrats et de détermination de prix des mises (CSPP pour Contracts Selection and Pricing Problem) en ne considérant que les contrats sélectionnés dans la première étape. Notre méthode exacte résout, avec l'algorithme de branch-and-cut, le CSPP sans présélectionner des contrats. Les résultats expérimentaux et de simulations que nous rapportons soulignent la performance de nos deux méthodes et évaluent l'impact de certains paramètres sur le profit réel du transporteur. Dans le quatrième chapitre, nous nous focalisons sur l'incertitude liée au succès des mises et à la non-matérialisation des contrats. Généralement, le transporteur souhaite avoir la garantie que si certaines des mises ne sont pas gagnées ou un contrat ne se matérialise pas, il n'encourra pas de perte en servant le sous-ensemble de contrats gagnés. Dans cette recherche, nous adressons le BCP avec prix stochastiques et développons une méthode exacte qui garantit un profit non négatif pour le transporteur peu importe le résultat des enchères. Nos simulations des solutions optimales démontrent, qu'en moyenne, notre approche permet au transporteur d'augmenter son profit en plus de garantir qu'il reste non-négatif peu importe les mises gagnées ou la matérialisation des contrats suivant l'enchère.Nowadays, the evolution of e-commerce and consumption levels require supply chain actors, in particular carriers, to efficiently manage their operations. In order to remain competitive and to maximize their profits, they must optimize their transport operations. In this doctoral thesis, we focus on Combinatorial Auctions (CA) as a negotiation mechanism for truckload (TL) transportation services procurement allowing a shipper to outsource its transportation operations and for a carrier to serve new transportation contracts. Combinatorial bids offer a carrier the possibility to express his valuation for a combination of contracts simultaneously. If the bid is successful, all the contracts forming it will be allocated to the carrier at the submitted price. The major challenges for a carrier are to select the transportation contracts to bid on, formulate combinatorial bids and associated prices. These decision-making challenges define the Bid Construction Problem (BCP). Each carrier must solve a BCP while respecting its pre-existing commitments and transportation capacity and considering unknown competitors' offers, which makes the problem difficult to solve. In practice, the majority of carriers rely on their historical data and market knowledge to set their prices. In the literature, the majority of works on the BCP propose deterministic models with known parameters and are limited to the problem with a homogeneous fleet. In addition, we found a single work addressing a stochastic BCP. In this thesis, we aim to advance knowledge in this field by introducing new formulations and solution methods for the BCP. The first chapter of this thesis introduces the BCP with a heterogeneous fleet. Starting from a comparison between the BCP and classical Vehicle Routing Problems (VRPs), we propose a new arc-based formulation with new symmetry-breaking constraints for the BCP. Next, we propose exact and heuristic approaches to solve this problem. Our Adaptive Large Neighborhood Search (ALNS) heuristic is based on a destroy-repair principle using operators designed for this problem. Our exact method starts from the heuristic solution and solves our mathematical model with CPLEX. The results we obtained revealed the relevance of our methods in terms of solutions quality and computational times for large instances with up to 500 contracts and 50 vehicles. In the second chapter, we tackle a particular case of the BCP where the carrier has no pre-existing commitments and aims to select a set of profitable auctioned contracts to bid on. This problem corresponds to a Team Orienteering Problem (TOP). We propose a hybrid ALNS heuristic for the TOP with new operators as well as new features taking into account the nature of the problem. Then, we compare the performance of our algorithm against the best solutions from the literature. The results show that our method generally outperforms all the existing ones in terms of solutions quality and/or computational times on benchmark instances. Our method improves one large instance solution, which highlights its performance. In the third chapter, we focus on the uncertainty associated with the auctioned contracts clearing prices and competing carriers offers. Only one article dealing with uncertainty in the BCP existed but it does not allow to generate multiple bids. Thus, we propose a new formulation for the BCP with stochastic prices allowing to generate non-overlapping combinatorial bids. We present two methods to solve this problem. The first one is a two-step hybrid heuristic. First, it solves a Contracts Selection Problem to determine a set of profitable contracts to bid on. Secondly, it simultaneously solves a Contracts Selection and Pricing Problem (CSPP) by considering only the set of auctioned contracts selected in the first stage. Our exact method solves a CSPP by branch-and-cut without pre-selecting contracts. The experimental and simulation results underline the performance of our two methods and evaluate the impact of certain parameters on the carrier's real profit. In the fourth chapter, we focus on the uncertainty associated with bids success and contracts non-materialization. Generally, the carrier seeks to be assured that if some of the submitted bids are not won or a contract does not materialize, it will not incur a loss by serving the remaining contracts. In this research, we address the BCP with stochastic prices and develop an exact method that ensures a non-negative profit for the carrier regardless of the auction outcomes and contracts materialization. Our simulations of the optimal solutions show that, on average, our approach increases the carrier's profit in addition to guaranteeing its non-negativity regardless of the bids won or the contracts materialization

Iterative Combinatorial Auction for Carrier Collaboration in Logistic Services

In collaborative logistics, multiple carriers form a network to share their transportation capacities. Collaboration among carriers results in improved resource utilization and, therefore, reduced costs. In this thesis, we propose an auction-based model for carrier collaboration in transportation services. The model achieves carrier collaboration through facilitating the negotiation among carriers over a group of shipping orders required by one or a group of shippers. The negotiation is conducted through a combinatorial iterative auction mechanism with the objective of minimizing the carriers’ overall costs. We first present a centralized carrier collaboration problem model in which a central entity has all required information to compute an optimal solution. We then consider a more realistic game theoretic setting where auction-based mechanism is applied to deal with self-interests of carriers. Compared with one-shot auctions, the proposed iterative bidding framework has the properties of reducing carriers’ information revelation and accommodating dynamic changes during the bidding process. Experimental results show that the procurement cost performance and the quality of solutions computed using the proposed iterative auction model is close to that of the optimal solutions